3 ms·

I too think package managers are amazing... reads new git security threat "brew upgrade" done!

by jasonmarks_ 4y ago

joe_guy 4y ago
Running brew upgrade uses git, so it has to run the insecure git to upgrade.
- woodruffw 4y ago
  Wait until you hear about how your OpenSSL patches get delivered!
  - yencabulator 4y ago
    Via signed Git tags? object 19cc035b6c6f2283573d29c7ea7f7d675cf750ce type commit tag openssl-3.0.7 tagger Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> 1667335515 +0100 OpenSSL 3.0.7 release tag -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJGBAABCAAwFiEE3HAyZir4heL0fyQ/UnRmohynnm0FAmNhhWASHHRvbWFzQG9w ZW5zc2wub3JnAAoJEFJ0ZqIcp55tZRkQAJKQ35fUFQ3Wfuj4vbNQNX0Iv/c11q9o 7Li8A8ananoYhnW9tpVTfpBCHAbE/fvwY3TMCE6IzBsRcjjef1CAqtEEDYI39aEt Nr00hUTVQeeH95viYMhmelq6axjkX8dGjfZBufZPJzrKrrj/eZLfmL3A1nZ9yYeF MCTxzpcOtaanJQ35h1Ayx3Hj1mcfTixGZR1drlJa5pDoF3y40ysxt/3ZYRD0Z/hO NbQ5QK/GPjnBheJaha6X7BoGgMRzXCfVSqtP/hE2Szzdq3nkZbWuDYw8EQ+Nr8Ni Q0BIIZLQbTYf4lmTXMbZdgUFq9/vSFNuz2IudDGiHrVfV1HZrZigHly61gqaXhjF Uir2LjMEgMr7D4O0udM6RnR7A1Wn3++sc8m3bGHYj+j+oSHSiKpZ0yxKbGY0TITL 1/vJMBZe46rW2qQi8WI4fkRnyRVc+L19AHqHYeA9XHMWKFgRKgHlf+yf2ysPKsD6 lGYCFwLJrlec/Sq4mbwe59JwtQbf4LHUQ4k+M1Cr5q04WegMH/nFjOanv8Ehs1Se WqJZD/1O+p8Go71g7c8kJ9QYiHkkr/xgs8BF7WMlNw7df5za6V1Ns/VCMSfQ9HF8 SlODL7NBffQr0A9rGD/AueN2pATzv1p90/Cz5VCIWRfCHMN6EmurdGcSJkSXRbjY SDAGDysitYmo =/eQF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    - woodruffw 4y ago
      And how, pray tell, are you downloading those signatures? Or the public keys corresponding to them, for that matter, if you don't have them locally already (and, if you do, why do you trust them given that your transport layer has been compromised?) Besides: if you actually verify `git` signatures, you can count yourself in a club of less than a dozen people who bother. That isn't to say that you're wrong to, just that an optional signature is, to a first approximation, as useful as not signing at all.
      - yencabulator 4y ago
        The public keys for those signatures have already been downloaded by any vendor who knows what they're doing; a new TLS forgery vulnerability won't really hurt there. Or, let's put it this way: If you don't bother with the signatures, a TLS forgery likely isn't the easiest way to feed you a fake openssl release, hijacking an account or hacking Github et al are. Also, Github itself verifies Git signatures, and the maintainers seem to have Github's "vigilant mode" on.
- jasonmarks_ 4y ago
  ugh technically correct, the best type of correct
- funcDropShadow 4y ago
  brew repositories are hosted at Github. According the linked article Github did a full scan on all repositories whether those attacks were already in use and implemented mitigations to make it impossible to push attacks to Github. I.e. it should be safe to run brew upgrade.

I too think package managers are amazing... reads new git security threat "brew upgrade" done!

joe_guy 4y ago

Running brew upgrade uses git, so it has to run the insecure git to upgrade.

woodruffw 4y ago
Wait until you hear about how your OpenSSL patches get delivered!
- yencabulator 4y ago
  Via signed Git tags? object 19cc035b6c6f2283573d29c7ea7f7d675cf750ce type commit tag openssl-3.0.7 tagger Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> 1667335515 +0100 OpenSSL 3.0.7 release tag -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJGBAABCAAwFiEE3HAyZir4heL0fyQ/UnRmohynnm0FAmNhhWASHHRvbWFzQG9w ZW5zc2wub3JnAAoJEFJ0ZqIcp55tZRkQAJKQ35fUFQ3Wfuj4vbNQNX0Iv/c11q9o 7Li8A8ananoYhnW9tpVTfpBCHAbE/fvwY3TMCE6IzBsRcjjef1CAqtEEDYI39aEt Nr00hUTVQeeH95viYMhmelq6axjkX8dGjfZBufZPJzrKrrj/eZLfmL3A1nZ9yYeF MCTxzpcOtaanJQ35h1Ayx3Hj1mcfTixGZR1drlJa5pDoF3y40ysxt/3ZYRD0Z/hO NbQ5QK/GPjnBheJaha6X7BoGgMRzXCfVSqtP/hE2Szzdq3nkZbWuDYw8EQ+Nr8Ni Q0BIIZLQbTYf4lmTXMbZdgUFq9/vSFNuz2IudDGiHrVfV1HZrZigHly61gqaXhjF Uir2LjMEgMr7D4O0udM6RnR7A1Wn3++sc8m3bGHYj+j+oSHSiKpZ0yxKbGY0TITL 1/vJMBZe46rW2qQi8WI4fkRnyRVc+L19AHqHYeA9XHMWKFgRKgHlf+yf2ysPKsD6 lGYCFwLJrlec/Sq4mbwe59JwtQbf4LHUQ4k+M1Cr5q04WegMH/nFjOanv8Ehs1Se WqJZD/1O+p8Go71g7c8kJ9QYiHkkr/xgs8BF7WMlNw7df5za6V1Ns/VCMSfQ9HF8 SlODL7NBffQr0A9rGD/AueN2pATzv1p90/Cz5VCIWRfCHMN6EmurdGcSJkSXRbjY SDAGDysitYmo =/eQF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
  - woodruffw 4y ago
    And how, pray tell, are you downloading those signatures? Or the public keys corresponding to them, for that matter, if you don't have them locally already (and, if you do, why do you trust them given that your transport layer has been compromised?) Besides: if you actually verify `git` signatures, you can count yourself in a club of less than a dozen people who bother. That isn't to say that you're wrong to, just that an optional signature is, to a first approximation, as useful as not signing at all.
    - yencabulator 4y ago
      The public keys for those signatures have already been downloaded by any vendor who knows what they're doing; a new TLS forgery vulnerability won't really hurt there. Or, let's put it this way: If you don't bother with the signatures, a TLS forgery likely isn't the easiest way to feed you a fake openssl release, hijacking an account or hacking Github et al are. Also, Github itself verifies Git signatures, and the maintainers seem to have Github's "vigilant mode" on.
jasonmarks_ 4y ago
ugh technically correct, the best type of correct
funcDropShadow 4y ago
brew repositories are hosted at Github. According the linked article Github did a full scan on all repositories whether those attacks were already in use and implemented mitigations to make it impossible to push attacks to Github. I.e. it should be safe to run brew upgrade.