5 ms·

If you're scared of your government, you shouldn't be using any form of communication without end-to-end encryption that you control fully. This much should hav

If you're scared of your government, you shouldn't be using any form of communication without end-to-end encryption that you control fully. This much should have been obvious for decades now. Criminals and revolutionaries are surely just as aware of these simple facts as we are, so these systems will likely mainly be used to spy on the innocent for political or personal gain. If you make secure crypto a crime, only criminals will have secure crypto.

wahnfrieden 15y ago
This doesn't help when you have e.g. an OS-level keylogger.
- billybob 15y ago
  You missed his point. If you have "any form of communication with end-to-end encryption that you control fully", that precludes "an OS-level keylogger".
  - dextorious 15y ago
    No, it does not. Communication is what happens on the wire.
    - billybob 15y ago
      I think we're using different definitions of "control fully." In my view, in order to control the encryption process fully, you must control the device doing the encryption. If you're using an OS with a keylogger, you DON'T have "end-to-end encryption that you control fully" because you don't control one of the ends. If you fully controlled both ends, the security of the wire would be irrelevant. It could send copies of every message you send straight to your enemy's inbox and it would still be secure, because only the two fully controlled ends could decrypt the messages they send one another. If you don't control the device, you don't control the encryption.
eternalban 15y ago
If things are really that bad, that in itself would raise red flags all over the place. related aside: I always wondered at people who push TOR for citizens of authoritarian regimes - please pin a "subject of interest" on me, pretty please. imho, it is not "content" that upsets these regimes, it is the desire to question the system that is the issue.
- tete 15y ago
  OT, I know but it's Tor, not TOR.

wahnfrieden 15y ago

This doesn't help when you have e.g. an OS-level keylogger.

billybob 15y ago
You missed his point. If you have "any form of communication with end-to-end encryption that you control fully", that precludes "an OS-level keylogger".
- dextorious 15y ago
  No, it does not. Communication is what happens on the wire.
  - billybob 15y ago
    I think we're using different definitions of "control fully." In my view, in order to control the encryption process fully, you must control the device doing the encryption. If you're using an OS with a keylogger, you DON'T have "end-to-end encryption that you control fully" because you don't control one of the ends. If you fully controlled both ends, the security of the wire would be irrelevant. It could send copies of every message you send straight to your enemy's inbox and it would still be secure, because only the two fully controlled ends could decrypt the messages they send one another. If you don't control the device, you don't control the encryption.

eternalban 15y ago

If things are really that bad, that in itself would raise red flags all over the place. related aside: I always wondered at people who push TOR for citizens of authoritarian regimes - please pin a "subject of interest" on me, pretty please. imho, it is not "content" that upsets these regimes, it is the desire to question the system that is the issue.

tete 15y ago
OT, I know but it's Tor, not TOR.