4 ms·

> It can lock down free and open computing and this is far greater than the threat by trojans that I didn't have in the last 20 years. I see this claim made ov

> It can lock down free and open computing and this is far greater than the threat by trojans that I didn't have in the last 20 years. I see this claim made over and over, yet we are still to see an actual "act of aggression" (modulo incompetence of an individual vendor - slip ups happen[0]). Every single PC system I ever heard of, allows either enrolling your own keys, or just disabling secure boot; most accept the MS-signed bootloader shim found in common desktop distros; I think this is even mandated in MS' specification that it must be possible for the users to bypass this. If you haven't had a trojan in the last 20 years, you have been diligent and/or lucky. Scattershot malware (cryptolockers, miners) is incredibly common, one of our customers was hit several times (on systems we weren't managing). More sophisticated attacks are an everyday thing against high-value targets[1][2]. Exploiting computer (in)security is a multi-billion dollar business, platforms far more locked down than PC are being routinely targeted and exploited. Real people, fighting for IRL freedom - journalists, activists, opposition politicians - are in danger. Please stop spreading the FUD against secure boot, and please back your claims with facts. [0]: https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/59931.html https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/59931.html https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32023868 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32023868 [1]: https://techcrunch.com/2023/01/14/circleci-hackers-stole-customer-source-code/ https://techcrunch.com/2023/01/14/circleci-hackers-stole-cus... [2]: https://xeiaso.net/blog/spearphishing https://xeiaso.net/blog/spearphishing

goosedragons 4y ago
Because there was pushback against it. Originally with Windows 8 certification MS didn't care if OEMs had an option to disable Secure Boot or not. After the initial outcry an option was added. They then tried again with Windows 10. And this only applies to x86 based machines, ARM models have secure boot stuck on since RT launched. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/windows-10-to-make-the-secure-boot-alt-os-lock-out-a-reality/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/windo... Did secure boot stop those malware attacks? Somehow despite secure boot being enabled as default for like 10 years I still routinely hear about XYZ getting hit by ransomware so I'm guessing no. Software freedom can help IRL too.
- smileybarry 4y ago
  Of course Secure Boot wouldn’t magically stop all malware, it’s one security measure to stop bootkits and kernel tampering.
- rollcat 4y ago
  > Did secure boot stop those malware attacks? Secure boot is designed to stop a class of APTs, it is by itself ineffective at preventing malware infection. > Software freedom can help IRL too. I never argued against software freedom (or freedom in general) - quite the opposite. But I am disturbed whenever free software advocates paint freedom in one-dimensional terms. You can have hardware that is designed to compromise one of your freedoms, but simultaneously reinforce another. And you can often still utilise that hardware to empower the user, without any compromises. However the rhetoric keeps boiling down to "secure = locked down = non-free = evil". Thank you for the article.
raxxorraxor 4y ago
If an "act of aggression" would happen, I would have no recourse against it. But that is besides the fact that these acts of aggression for locking down system did indeed happen numerous times in the industry. That is not surprising if you look at the economic interests of involved parties. On the contrary, you are spreading FUD if you argue for such mechanisms that allegedly are required to protect activists and journalists. That they they would be the primary beneficiaries. This is quite analog to the war on terror justifying security policies. The primary vector of malware isn't near boot, it is quite exotic these days. Maybe not rare, but not the primary attack for usual targets. But that is also irrelevant if I could just spoof any attestation. Just give me the option. Shouldn't be too much of a request, no? One prediction is that there will be classes of devices. Trusted and untrusted. We already see that happening. This is not desirable for security and in the interest of users. That especially includes journalists and activists. For security it isn't enough to wait for aggression, you also have to look at a larger picture. Some people argued HDCP is to shield against eavesdropping. And it if is in the interest of security, you would need to propose very foundational security arguments. As it is exposing your security state to third parties is an additional threat itself.
- rollcat 4y ago
  > If an "act of aggression" would happen, I would have no recourse against it. You have the same recourse as you've always had. Vote with your wallet, don't buy the hardware. I am much more concerned about Intel ME and AMD PSP, where's the outrage about that? > But that is besides the fact that these acts of aggression for locking down system did indeed happen numerous times in the industry. Can you please link me some articles/references? This is relevant to my interests, I would like to actually see something that backs up the counter-argument. > On the contrary, you are spreading FUD if you argue for such mechanisms that allegedly are required to protect activists and journalists. That they they would be the primary beneficiaries. This is quite analog to the war on terror justifying security policies. I'm aware I'm stretching things, but the stance "Secure Boot = attack on computing freedom" is quite regularly stretched to argue against many other hardware security features, such as TPM or Secure Enclave. If my laptop is stolen, confidentiality of all my data is only as good as my passphrase. Am I paranoid enough to employ a complex, unique, zxcvbn-proof passphrase? Hell no. I would much rather use four random dictionary words, and let the TPM throttle cracking attempts. (Yes, I know LUKS offers KDF, with a number of iterations picked to reasonably throttle cracking attempts on today's hardware. I would still rather see the cracking stopped dead after 10 attempts, and this physically requires dedicated hardware.) It's 2023, Thinkpads have been shipping with TPMs for over a decade, and I still can't easily utilise a TPM to keep the FDE decryption key - is it because the TPM genuinely does not offer tangible improvement over plain LUKS, or is it because it was being actively pushed back against in the free software community, and nobody bothered to integrate the functionality? Repeat this for GPG/SSH/FIDO keys, I am expected to buy a dongle that I can lose, and plug it into a USB port - but can't sensibly utilise the hardware that has been soldered onto my motherboard, which was designed with that explicit purpose? Please correct me if I'm wrong, but all I'm seeing is a pattern of: "dedicated security hardware = attack on freedom", with pushbacks at any attempts to utilise such hardware for the benefit of the user. > The primary vector of malware isn't near boot, it is quite exotic these days. APTs / evil maid never stopped being a thing. Security isn't about what's unlikely, it's about the entire chain. Maybe your targeted attack requires a key logger to remain dormant/undetected until a particular moment in time, six months from now, and the best way to hide it is by paravirtualising your kernel. We've seen attacks way more sophisticated than that (stuxnet). > But that is also irrelevant if I could just spoof any attestation. I agree 100%, attestation is just layers of bullshit. But I still want my device to ring an alarm if an APT is suspected.
michaelt 4y ago
> Scattershot malware (cryptolockers, miners) is incredibly common, one of our customers was hit several times (on systems we weren't managing). Do you think secure boot stops cryptolockers? By what means?
- rollcat 4y ago
  > Do you think secure boot stops cryptolockers? By what means? You took my sentence out of its specific context (GP was arguing that they hadn't had any malware in 20 years), and put it in another, where quite obviously my argument is painted much weaker.

goosedragons 4y ago

Because there was pushback against it. Originally with Windows 8 certification MS didn't care if OEMs had an option to disable Secure Boot or not. After the initial outcry an option was added. They then tried again with Windows 10. And this only applies to x86 based machines, ARM models have secure boot stuck on since RT launched. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/windows-10-to-make-the-secure-boot-alt-os-lock-out-a-reality/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/windo... Did secure boot stop those malware attacks? Somehow despite secure boot being enabled as default for like 10 years I still routinely hear about XYZ getting hit by ransomware so I'm guessing no. Software freedom can help IRL too.

smileybarry 4y ago
Of course Secure Boot wouldn’t magically stop all malware, it’s one security measure to stop bootkits and kernel tampering.
rollcat 4y ago
> Did secure boot stop those malware attacks? Secure boot is designed to stop a class of APTs, it is by itself ineffective at preventing malware infection. > Software freedom can help IRL too. I never argued against software freedom (or freedom in general) - quite the opposite. But I am disturbed whenever free software advocates paint freedom in one-dimensional terms. You can have hardware that is designed to compromise one of your freedoms, but simultaneously reinforce another. And you can often still utilise that hardware to empower the user, without any compromises. However the rhetoric keeps boiling down to "secure = locked down = non-free = evil". Thank you for the article.

raxxorraxor 4y ago

If an "act of aggression" would happen, I would have no recourse against it. But that is besides the fact that these acts of aggression for locking down system did indeed happen numerous times in the industry. That is not surprising if you look at the economic interests of involved parties. On the contrary, you are spreading FUD if you argue for such mechanisms that allegedly are required to protect activists and journalists. That they they would be the primary beneficiaries. This is quite analog to the war on terror justifying security policies. The primary vector of malware isn't near boot, it is quite exotic these days. Maybe not rare, but not the primary attack for usual targets. But that is also irrelevant if I could just spoof any attestation. Just give me the option. Shouldn't be too much of a request, no? One prediction is that there will be classes of devices. Trusted and untrusted. We already see that happening. This is not desirable for security and in the interest of users. That especially includes journalists and activists. For security it isn't enough to wait for aggression, you also have to look at a larger picture. Some people argued HDCP is to shield against eavesdropping. And it if is in the interest of security, you would need to propose very foundational security arguments. As it is exposing your security state to third parties is an additional threat itself.

rollcat 4y ago
> If an "act of aggression" would happen, I would have no recourse against it. You have the same recourse as you've always had. Vote with your wallet, don't buy the hardware. I am much more concerned about Intel ME and AMD PSP, where's the outrage about that? > But that is besides the fact that these acts of aggression for locking down system did indeed happen numerous times in the industry. Can you please link me some articles/references? This is relevant to my interests, I would like to actually see something that backs up the counter-argument. > On the contrary, you are spreading FUD if you argue for such mechanisms that allegedly are required to protect activists and journalists. That they they would be the primary beneficiaries. This is quite analog to the war on terror justifying security policies. I'm aware I'm stretching things, but the stance "Secure Boot = attack on computing freedom" is quite regularly stretched to argue against many other hardware security features, such as TPM or Secure Enclave. If my laptop is stolen, confidentiality of all my data is only as good as my passphrase. Am I paranoid enough to employ a complex, unique, zxcvbn-proof passphrase? Hell no. I would much rather use four random dictionary words, and let the TPM throttle cracking attempts. (Yes, I know LUKS offers KDF, with a number of iterations picked to reasonably throttle cracking attempts on today's hardware. I would still rather see the cracking stopped dead after 10 attempts, and this physically requires dedicated hardware.) It's 2023, Thinkpads have been shipping with TPMs for over a decade, and I still can't easily utilise a TPM to keep the FDE decryption key - is it because the TPM genuinely does not offer tangible improvement over plain LUKS, or is it because it was being actively pushed back against in the free software community, and nobody bothered to integrate the functionality? Repeat this for GPG/SSH/FIDO keys, I am expected to buy a dongle that I can lose, and plug it into a USB port - but can't sensibly utilise the hardware that has been soldered onto my motherboard, which was designed with that explicit purpose? Please correct me if I'm wrong, but all I'm seeing is a pattern of: "dedicated security hardware = attack on freedom", with pushbacks at any attempts to utilise such hardware for the benefit of the user. > The primary vector of malware isn't near boot, it is quite exotic these days. APTs / evil maid never stopped being a thing. Security isn't about what's unlikely, it's about the entire chain. Maybe your targeted attack requires a key logger to remain dormant/undetected until a particular moment in time, six months from now, and the best way to hide it is by paravirtualising your kernel. We've seen attacks way more sophisticated than that (stuxnet). > But that is also irrelevant if I could just spoof any attestation. I agree 100%, attestation is just layers of bullshit. But I still want my device to ring an alarm if an APT is suspected.

michaelt 4y ago

> Scattershot malware (cryptolockers, miners) is incredibly common, one of our customers was hit several times (on systems we weren't managing). Do you think secure boot stops cryptolockers? By what means?

rollcat 4y ago
> Do you think secure boot stops cryptolockers? By what means? You took my sentence out of its specific context (GP was arguing that they hadn't had any malware in 20 years), and put it in another, where quite obviously my argument is painted much weaker.