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They can definitely inadvertently be part of someone's supply line. The official repository takes precedence over any locally configured repositories (say, an i
by jeroenhd 4y ago
They can definitely inadvertently be part of someone's supply line. The official repository takes precedence over any locally configured repositories (say, an in-house package named libhttps).
When that package suddenly gets published onto the official repo, it may replace the intended package without the devs noticing until it's too late.
I think this is a flawed design for a package management tool but it's the tool we've got.
These packages could be random typosquats but they might also be targeted supply chain attacks against a specific company. With the CircleCI leak, the names of internal packages may just have leaked.
- woodruffw 4y agoIn pip, multiple configured indexes have equal priority with first-wins on order of configuration (if memory serves); the tiebreaker is the version, so the attacker would need to publish a higher version than the one used internally. Either way, that’s not the attack described in the post, and is speculative to a degree that doesn’t warrant the “0day” descriptor. It’s also not actionable for companies that run entire PyPI mirrors rather than supplementary indexes, which is the norm.
- DelightOne 4y agoKnowing the source code would make it easier.
- donmcronald 4y ago> The official repository takes precedence over any locally configured repositories (say, an in-house package named libhttps). Wow. I wonder how a repository manager like Nexus handles that. If there aren't any namespaces, would it suddenly go upstream and fetch something from the official repos?