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> The two designs are very different, but the experiments reach the same result: in both, delegation rates are unexpectedly high and higher than abstention rate

> The two designs are very different, but the experiments reach the same result: in both, delegation rates are unexpectedly high and higher than abstention rates, and LD underperforms relative to both universal voting and abstention. What might be the meaning of "underperforms" in this context?

StefanKarpinski 4y ago
Was confused by that as well. Sounds like Liquid Democracy doesn't do well compared to the alternatives, which would certainly be an interesting result, but doesn't fit with what the rest of the abstract seems to be suggesting.
- pc86 4y ago
  What might be the meaning of "doesn't do well" in this context?
  - anigbrowl 4y ago
    Less good at identifying a correct answer than just polling people.
    - pc86 4y ago
      It's rare that a policy vote has an objectively right or wrong outcome.
      - anigbrowl 4y ago
        Agreed, I think the authors of this study oversold the conclusions. They have a valid point insofar as delegation is not a magic bullet, and people often over-delegate. Perhaps that latter is because they are OK with representative democracy in principle, but want the capacity to revoke & reallocate their vote without waiting months or years for an election. I found the study disappointingly shallow and conclusory by comparison to the usually excellent standards of the NBER, but it might be that the cost of surveying people limited the depth of their investigation.
      - mistermann 4y ago
        It's likely not actually rare as much as we haven't developed the means to measure such things, so as a result we guess.
yorwba 4y ago
In the experiments, there are two options, exactly one of which is designated correct, and voters are given the task of voting for the correct option using imperfect information as to which one that is. "Underperforms" then means that the correct option is chosen less often. (If you want a more precise mathematical statement, the explanation of the model starts on page 8.) Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/socialism_communism_and_marxism_pt_1_on_trust_and/ https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. In a "conflict-theoretical" experiment where voters are trying to maximize their benefit even at the expense of others, I suspect people would do quite well at identifying a member of their own tribe to delegate their vote to.
- mistermann 4y ago
  > Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. Ok thanks for this....it doesn't make it make sense, but it's useful to know where people's errors lie.
heisenzombie 4y ago
"" For example, consider one of the parametrizations we study: a group of 15 voters of which 3 are experts; the experts’ information is correct with probability 70%, while the precision of non-experts’ signals can take any value between 50 and 70%, with equal probability. Then only non-experts with signals of precision close to random should delegate: a non-expert with information that she knows is only 55% likely to be correct should not delegate to experts whom she knows to be correct with probability 70%. "" This is not about politics, or subjective questions about complicated situations. It imagines a world in which there is one correct answer and the reason that different people vote differently is due to a lack of information about that truth. This is very much a simplified "game" they're playing with. In this context, the result -- I think -- is more like an outcome of the central limit theorem. Basically, if you get lots of people each with a 55% chance of being correct to vote on a binary choice, they're very likely to pick the correct choice in aggregate. If you have one person who is 70% correct vote, they're 30% likely to get it wrong. So you actually don't want too many of the 55% people to delegate their decision to the 70% person, which is a bit counter-intuitive. This is sort of interesting, and I think says something useful about the Liquid Democracy concept. However I think the experiment is simplified to the point that it's a categorically different thing than even moderately interesting political questions, and so I don't think it's an argument against applying liquid democracy to politics.

StefanKarpinski 4y ago

Was confused by that as well. Sounds like Liquid Democracy doesn't do well compared to the alternatives, which would certainly be an interesting result, but doesn't fit with what the rest of the abstract seems to be suggesting.

pc86 4y ago
What might be the meaning of "doesn't do well" in this context?
- anigbrowl 4y ago
  Less good at identifying a correct answer than just polling people.
  - pc86 4y ago
    It's rare that a policy vote has an objectively right or wrong outcome.
    - anigbrowl 4y ago
      Agreed, I think the authors of this study oversold the conclusions. They have a valid point insofar as delegation is not a magic bullet, and people often over-delegate. Perhaps that latter is because they are OK with representative democracy in principle, but want the capacity to revoke & reallocate their vote without waiting months or years for an election. I found the study disappointingly shallow and conclusory by comparison to the usually excellent standards of the NBER, but it might be that the cost of surveying people limited the depth of their investigation.
    - mistermann 4y ago
      It's likely not actually rare as much as we haven't developed the means to measure such things, so as a result we guess.

yorwba 4y ago

In the experiments, there are two options, exactly one of which is designated correct, and voters are given the task of voting for the correct option using imperfect information as to which one that is. "Underperforms" then means that the correct option is chosen less often. (If you want a more precise mathematical statement, the explanation of the model starts on page 8.) Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/socialism_communism_and_marxism_pt_1_on_trust_and/ https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. In a "conflict-theoretical" experiment where voters are trying to maximize their benefit even at the expense of others, I suspect people would do quite well at identifying a member of their own tribe to delegate their vote to.

mistermann 4y ago
> Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. Ok thanks for this....it doesn't make it make sense, but it's useful to know where people's errors lie.

heisenzombie 4y ago

"" For example, consider one of the parametrizations we study: a group of 15 voters of which 3 are experts; the experts’ information is correct with probability 70%, while the precision of non-experts’ signals can take any value between 50 and 70%, with equal probability. Then only non-experts with signals of precision close to random should delegate: a non-expert with information that she knows is only 55% likely to be correct should not delegate to experts whom she knows to be correct with probability 70%. "" This is not about politics, or subjective questions about complicated situations. It imagines a world in which there is one correct answer and the reason that different people vote differently is due to a lack of information about that truth. This is very much a simplified "game" they're playing with. In this context, the result -- I think -- is more like an outcome of the central limit theorem. Basically, if you get lots of people each with a 55% chance of being correct to vote on a binary choice, they're very likely to pick the correct choice in aggregate. If you have one person who is 70% correct vote, they're 30% likely to get it wrong. So you actually don't want too many of the 55% people to delegate their decision to the 70% person, which is a bit counter-intuitive. This is sort of interesting, and I think says something useful about the Liquid Democracy concept. However I think the experiment is simplified to the point that it's a categorically different thing than even moderately interesting political questions, and so I don't think it's an argument against applying liquid democracy to politics.