3 ms·
All that Argon2 does over PBKDF2, or indeed even older alternatives, is move a narrow range of "Not good" passwords into the "Maybe adequate" category. Very go
by tialaramex 4y ago
All that Argon2 does over PBKDF2, or indeed even older alternatives, is move a narrow range of "Not good" passwords into the "Maybe adequate" category.
Very good passwords (e.g. generated randomly by typical modern password managers) are unaffected, you can't guess or brute force them, so Argon2 isn't making a difference.
Very bad passwords (e.g. your username, 12345678, password) are also unaffected, despite Argon2 the bad guys can just guess the password.
What's really "obsolete" is the password itself. Memorable† Shared secret authentication has been a bad idea for decades. At the point where people were really excited about Rainbow tables because Microsoft are incompetent, we should have been gently insisting people stop using passwords, but we got sucked into telling them about better password hashing instead and now here I am talking about Argon2 again, not to a weird niche audience who genuinely have to use shared secrets, but to people who thought that looked simpler. Ugh.
† As originally posted I didn't write Memorable here. Shared secrets aren't great anyway, but there are a lot of practical applications if we don't need to memorise them. The faster re-connection to a modern web server when you visit HN again later today relies on a shared secret to make it work but it's not a memorable secret, it's just arbitrary data stored in a computer. Passwords are intended to be "memorable" so that a human can remember what they are.
- SAI_Peregrinus 4y agoI'd say passwords are nice as a second factor. They're terrible as a first factor, but as an optional addon memorized secrets do improve security. The obvious problem is that we treat "something you have" items like Yubikeys, phones (webauthn), TOTP tokens, and fingers (biometrics) as second factors instead of as the primary factor.
- tialaramex 4y agoWebAuthn, and FIDO underlying it are both happy to provide both factors. A good smartphone is itself "something you have" and is capable of verifying either "something you are" via local biometrics or "something you know" in the form of a password.
- gray_charger 4y agoPasswords are the only "warrant-proof" encryption method we have. A government can force you to provide either "something you have" (e.g. yubikey) or "something you are" (biometrics). For those in repressive regimes that's extremely important.
- kevincox 4y agoIt is worth noting that passwords + HSM are a very strong approach. Of course HSMs aren't infallible either.