From the article: > Either your password has sufficient entropy to resist brute-forcing, in which case it is already probably a cryptographic key, or it doesn’

From the article: > Either your password has sufficient entropy to resist brute-forcing, in which case it is already probably a cryptographic key, or it doesn’t – in which case it will eventually be cracked no matter how many iterations you apply to it. What a weird thing to say. The vast majority of passwords, probably even the majority of "password1234" passwords, won't be cracked. Whatever they are guarding are just not worth even the minor effort of checking "password1234". The corollary is most of the time you don't need 128 bit security. You just need enough security to make it not worth the effort. PBKDF2 does raise the bar on that effort by a few bits. That is is worthwhile, which seems to be the reverse of what he is saying. In the end 128 bits is not much more than a short cut. If you have less that 128 bits, you have to weigh up the value of the data you are protecting versus the effort of getting more entropy. But at 128 bits you can stop weighing up and just assume there will be a weaker link in the chain.