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Perhaps we should avoid trying to understand the world around us in simple terms since we know we've got it wrong in the past? Or maybe it's better for us to di

Perhaps we should avoid trying to understand the world around us in simple terms since we know we've got it wrong in the past? Or maybe it's better for us to discuss the arguments and metaphors themselves? Perhaps you could give a reason why you think the human brain is not physical system? Don't get me wrong, I do believe there's a place for the philosophy of science. But to give a list of instances where metaphors have been wong in the past as some form of argument against a given metaphor does not seem robust to me.

coldtea 4y ago
>Perhaps we should avoid trying to understand the world around us in simple terms since we know we've got it wrong in the past? You're saying it as some counter-argument, but I actually agree with it: Yes. We should learn our lesson, and try to understand complex things for what they are, and map their complexity - not think that we "get them" when we only have a simplistic reductionistic version of them... >Perhaps you could give a reason why you think the human brain is not physical system? First, where does the question come from? Who said that I think "the human brain is not physical system"? It not being "a computer" doesn't mean that it's not a physical system anymore than it not being "a gear mechanism" means it's not a physical system. Second, a rock is a physical system too, but a computer can't be a rock. A rock simulation isn't a rock either: it lacks several very important attributes of rockiness. So, the question is less about whether a brain is a physical system, than about whether modelling some physical interactions its all it takes (as opposed to the actual interactions and their "qualia"). Or even worse, whether loading a big enough statistical model is all it takes... -- as if we have already discovered the interplays and mechanisms involved in the brain, neurons, chemical pathways, and such, and modelled them, and we're just short of enough scale with GPT.
- macguillicuddy 4y ago
  My original point, which I perhaps haven't articulated well, is this. 1. The human brain has outputs (e.g. creative works, or even just movements of limbs etc) 2. The human brain has inputs (e.g. the light landing on retinas, the DNA and processes that gave rise to its structure). 3. The outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs (probably my most contentious contention :-P ). This is what I mean by it's physical system. 4. The human brain shares these features with a computer. And thus my metaphor is formed. I'm happy to concede that metaphors like this have been shown to be wrong in the past, and indeed we can learn humility by remembering that. But I'm much more interested in thinking about which of 1 through 4 may be wrong and why.
  - jonathanstrange 4y ago
    Your point 3 cannot be shown with current scientific methods and is overall implausible. Popper argues that in his non-reductionist 3 Worlds Theory. It is extremely hard to find halfway convincing reductionist explanations for the simplest human phenomena, let alone the whole of our cultural and technological products and advances. In my opinion, emergence is more plausible than any of the reductionist stories. However, as a computationalist, I consider it possible that similar phenomena could emerge on any computational device.
  - coldtea 4y ago
    >3. The outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs (probably my most contentious contention :-P ). This is what I mean by it's physical system. Well, this needs to be proven. Note that "the outputs of the human brain are influenced by its inputs" is not the same as "the outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs". >4. The human brain shares these features with a computer. And thus my metaphor is formed. Doesn't it also share it with, e.g. a meat processing machine? It too has an input (say, meat and spices) and an output (e.g. sausages), and it's output is a function of its input (e.g. different meat and spices create different kinds of sausages).

coldtea 4y ago

>Perhaps we should avoid trying to understand the world around us in simple terms since we know we've got it wrong in the past? You're saying it as some counter-argument, but I actually agree with it: Yes. We should learn our lesson, and try to understand complex things for what they are, and map their complexity - not think that we "get them" when we only have a simplistic reductionistic version of them... >Perhaps you could give a reason why you think the human brain is not physical system? First, where does the question come from? Who said that I think "the human brain is not physical system"? It not being "a computer" doesn't mean that it's not a physical system anymore than it not being "a gear mechanism" means it's not a physical system. Second, a rock is a physical system too, but a computer can't be a rock. A rock simulation isn't a rock either: it lacks several very important attributes of rockiness. So, the question is less about whether a brain is a physical system, than about whether modelling some physical interactions its all it takes (as opposed to the actual interactions and their "qualia"). Or even worse, whether loading a big enough statistical model is all it takes... -- as if we have already discovered the interplays and mechanisms involved in the brain, neurons, chemical pathways, and such, and modelled them, and we're just short of enough scale with GPT.

macguillicuddy 4y ago
My original point, which I perhaps haven't articulated well, is this. 1. The human brain has outputs (e.g. creative works, or even just movements of limbs etc) 2. The human brain has inputs (e.g. the light landing on retinas, the DNA and processes that gave rise to its structure). 3. The outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs (probably my most contentious contention :-P ). This is what I mean by it's physical system. 4. The human brain shares these features with a computer. And thus my metaphor is formed. I'm happy to concede that metaphors like this have been shown to be wrong in the past, and indeed we can learn humility by remembering that. But I'm much more interested in thinking about which of 1 through 4 may be wrong and why.
- jonathanstrange 4y ago
  Your point 3 cannot be shown with current scientific methods and is overall implausible. Popper argues that in his non-reductionist 3 Worlds Theory. It is extremely hard to find halfway convincing reductionist explanations for the simplest human phenomena, let alone the whole of our cultural and technological products and advances. In my opinion, emergence is more plausible than any of the reductionist stories. However, as a computationalist, I consider it possible that similar phenomena could emerge on any computational device.
- coldtea 4y ago
  >3. The outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs (probably my most contentious contention :-P ). This is what I mean by it's physical system. Well, this needs to be proven. Note that "the outputs of the human brain are influenced by its inputs" is not the same as "the outputs of the human brain are a function of its inputs". >4. The human brain shares these features with a computer. And thus my metaphor is formed. Doesn't it also share it with, e.g. a meat processing machine? It too has an input (say, meat and spices) and an output (e.g. sausages), and it's output is a function of its input (e.g. different meat and spices create different kinds of sausages).