3 ms·
Ostrom’s Law: Property rights in the commons (2011)
- dwheeler 4y agoThis reminds me of an old joke: "Yes, it works in practice, but does it work in theory?" It seems wise to occasionally remind ourselves that if the model widely diverges from reality, then it is the model that is deficient.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoSince many people are not going to read the whole thing, I'd like to quote perhaps the most important paragraph of this, regarding Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the commons", an oft-quoted but fundamentally incorrect concept: > When Hardin (1968, p. 1244) asked his readers to “[p]icture a pasture open to all,” he was referencing an ungoverned open-access regime from which nobody could be excluded. Yet by calling the resulting collective action problem “the tragedy of the commons,” the notion of common property became conflated with the lawless (or law-free) condition of open access. The distinction between open-access and common property was made decades ago by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and has been reiterated by Ostrom (e.g. 1999, pp. 335–336; see also Schlager and Ostrom 1992) and others (e.g. McCay 1996, p. 113; Dagan and Heller 2001, pp. 556–557; Eggertsson 2003, pp. 75–76). Yet confusion on this point has yet to be fully eradicated. Recognizing that nearly all “private” property is actually owned (or at least used) by groups, such as households or firms, offers one way around this blind spot. These everyday examples of non-tragic commons lead us to ask not whether common property is feasible at all, but rather under what circumstances and at what scale.