5 ms·

It's a bit different, in that property rights are (at least in part) around to incentivize production of the property. Probably a better analogy is property ri

It's a bit different, in that property rights are (at least in part) around to incentivize production of the property. Probably a better analogy is property rights in land.

SilasX 4y ago
Well ... in order to carry this over to ordinary real property, and make the situation analogous to water rights, you'd have to tweak a few things. Imagine that, if you didn't allow randos to walk through a plot of land, then, eventually, the plot would become toxic and totally useless, with a value of zero. (i.e. what will happen with water rights if they keep drawing according to the assumptions that ground the law). This is a purely physical constraint. Imagine furthermore that (like normal), the property right entitles the owner to stop randos from walking through, but also, if they don't exercise that right, then title to that plot will revert to someone else (i.e. how use-it-or-lose-it provisions work in water rights here). In isolation, then, it's totally rational for the owner to keep randos from walking through, as that maximizes their ability to profit from the land -- even though over the long-term this destroys the total use value of the land. The fix, then, is to say, "okay, we won't revert title to someone else anymore if you let randos walk through. Also, you can sell that right." Then, the owner will sell rando-walking right, and the land won't become toxic. Win win all around. You can even pay the owner for the lost value from the transition, and still come out ahead.
- s1artibartfast 4y ago
  Why exactly is the land becoming toxic in this scenario?
  - SilasX 4y ago
    Just an arbitrary constraint in the analog, corresponding to how continued water drawing can kill off aquifers.
    - s1artibartfast 4y ago
      OK, I think I largely agree that the solution is to let owners sell walking rights. This is described in the article as leasing the water rights, and I think a solid part of the solution. The problem is who pays for the walking rights, and how much. If it is too low, the owner would rather use the water/land until it is depleted. This is further complicated by the fact that in Utah, much of the farming water from rain isn't being depleted, but rather, the lake is drying up. Someone upstream might say, I have a source of water good for the next 1000 years, and can earn $10/year. Why should I accept $5/year to send it down stream? Also, the article mentions that a major issue is trust, which cant be stated enough. If I destroy my business and a life long investment to accept $5/year, what protections do I have that the price wont go to $1/year, or $0? If the state makes a binding contract, can I even trust that? This lack of trust is based in history, as cities and states in the west frequently brake water contracts with farmers. Sometimes states end up having to pay settlements for break of contract like in California, but even these are usually pennies on the dollar and decades later.

It's a bit different, in that property rights are (at least in part) around to incentivize production of the property. Probably a better analogy is property rights in land.

SilasX 4y ago

Well ... in order to carry this over to ordinary real property, and make the situation analogous to water rights, you'd have to tweak a few things. Imagine that, if you didn't allow randos to walk through a plot of land, then, eventually, the plot would become toxic and totally useless, with a value of zero. (i.e. what will happen with water rights if they keep drawing according to the assumptions that ground the law). This is a purely physical constraint. Imagine furthermore that (like normal), the property right entitles the owner to stop randos from walking through, but also, if they don't exercise that right, then title to that plot will revert to someone else (i.e. how use-it-or-lose-it provisions work in water rights here). In isolation, then, it's totally rational for the owner to keep randos from walking through, as that maximizes their ability to profit from the land -- even though over the long-term this destroys the total use value of the land. The fix, then, is to say, "okay, we won't revert title to someone else anymore if you let randos walk through. Also, you can sell that right." Then, the owner will sell rando-walking right, and the land won't become toxic. Win win all around. You can even pay the owner for the lost value from the transition, and still come out ahead.

s1artibartfast 4y ago
Why exactly is the land becoming toxic in this scenario?
- SilasX 4y ago
  Just an arbitrary constraint in the analog, corresponding to how continued water drawing can kill off aquifers.
  - s1artibartfast 4y ago
    OK, I think I largely agree that the solution is to let owners sell walking rights. This is described in the article as leasing the water rights, and I think a solid part of the solution. The problem is who pays for the walking rights, and how much. If it is too low, the owner would rather use the water/land until it is depleted. This is further complicated by the fact that in Utah, much of the farming water from rain isn't being depleted, but rather, the lake is drying up. Someone upstream might say, I have a source of water good for the next 1000 years, and can earn $10/year. Why should I accept $5/year to send it down stream? Also, the article mentions that a major issue is trust, which cant be stated enough. If I destroy my business and a life long investment to accept $5/year, what protections do I have that the price wont go to $1/year, or $0? If the state makes a binding contract, can I even trust that? This lack of trust is based in history, as cities and states in the west frequently brake water contracts with farmers. Sometimes states end up having to pay settlements for break of contract like in California, but even these are usually pennies on the dollar and decades later.