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> So in short, Russia becoming a local hegemon is fine in principle As an outside observer, perhaps, but I suspect for those in Eastern Europe who lived under
by mannerheim 4y ago
> So in short, Russia becoming a local hegemon is fine in principle
As an outside observer, perhaps, but I suspect for those in Eastern Europe who lived under Russian hegemony in living memory, even this would be undesirable.
> But now I don't actually know why I went down this thread, I don't think Putin believes he should and can become a local hegemon.
It is a matter of speculation whether Putin actually believes in expanding Russia and its sphere of influence, or merely acts so, but it hardly matters if that's the way he's acting.
- danbruc 4y agoAs an outside observer, perhaps, but I suspect for those in Eastern Europe who lived under Russian hegemony in living memory, even this would be undesirable. Cuba probably does not feel any better about the US hegemony, they are getting punished for no good reasons since 60 years. It is a matter of speculation whether Putin actually believes in expanding Russia and its sphere of influence, or merely acts so, but it hardly matters if that's the way he's acting. I think this makes a big difference because the possible solutions for this conflict will be very different.
- mannerheim 4y ago> Cuba probably does not feel any better about the US hegemony, they are getting punished for no good reasons since 60 years. Perhaps, and I wouldn't blame them either if they didn't want to be under US hegemony either. > I think this makes a big difference because the possible solutions for this conflict will be very different. Ukrainians will not accept not joining the EU; migrants will risk life and limb to board rickety deathtraps of boats to enter the EU. Putin knows this, of course, and whether or not he believed in stopping Ukraine from joining the EU or only acted so no longer matters because this war aim is no longer achievable. So he has settled at the moment for the consolation prize of the annexation of the four oblasts of southeastern Ukraine. Again, whether he believes in a Novorossiyan project or only acts as if so in order to come across as having at least gained something, anything from this war, hardly matters. The Ukrainians have little reason to stop their offensive at the moment. They likely believe (and I do, too) that they will be able to retake all of the land that the Russians captured last year, that they will be able to drive Russia back to at least the pre-February 2022 borders. If they are correct, there is no reason to settle for anything less than a return to those pre-war borders. Either way, this is incompatible with both Putin genuinely wishing to annex these territories and Putin acting so but in reality just trying to scrape out a win. If Putin is driven out of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, if the land bridge to Crimea is broken, if Ukraine can still join the EU, then he will have wasted untold resources and lives for nothing. No amount of spin can blind even ordinary Russians from realising that at that point, and whether Putin believes in this project or not, he has already inexorably tied his political fate and legacy to the outcome of this war. And if Russia is pushed back to the pre-February borders and has nothing more to offer in negotiations, Ukraine may decide to push into Donetsk, Luhansk, and/or Crimea - and at that point, it becomes worse than just a waste, but a genuine loss.