4 ms·
Why is this downvoted? Ain't it exponentially harder to break RSA using qubits each time you double the key length? Until we switch to quantum resistant algor
by TacticalCoder 4y ago
Why is this downvoted? Ain't it exponentially harder to break RSA using qubits each time you double the key length?
Until we switch to quantum resistant algorithms, we can keep doubling the key length for some time no?
8192 bits should still be acceptable speed wise (if we consider that 2048 bits is broken, then I'll take slower operations over broken keys any day of the week).
- adgjlsfhk1 4y agoBecause it isn't. This paper (alegedly) uses sublinear qbits (that's the whole point).
- 3np 4y agoWhat isn't what?
- adgjlsfhk1 4y agoThe number of qbits isn't exponential in key length with this paper (if it's correct)
- krastanov 4y agoNo, if you have a scalable quantum computer (which no one has yet), then doubling the key size just requires doubling the number of logical qubits. That is for asymmetric encryption that uses "hidden subgroup problems", like RSA. We have newer asymmetric algorithms that are resistant to quantum attacks, they are just not well tested yet.
- jeandejean 4y agoJudging by the current difficulties of building a quantum computer with bigger number of qbits, I'd assume scaling linearly isn't trivial at all. So increasing key size should definitely increase security, if not exponentially, at least buying a lot of time?