8 ms·
You can't really make that either though. Facebook itself can see everything. As soon as you federate that all the admins can see everything and nothing is priv
by invig 4y ago
You can't really make that either though. Facebook itself can see everything. As soon as you federate that all the admins can see everything and nothing is private.
You could try and encrypt it down to the user level but a person added to a group would only see the content added from that point forward (the ability to decrypt would be defined at the time of the post, and new people could never read it).
The only way around that would be centralised key management which defeats the whole point.
This is one of those problems where it's probably better to just use Facebook.
- foobarbecue 4y agoOh. Good point about the admins. I somehow missed that.
- donkeyd 4y agoJust look at the 'Twitter Files'. It's not great that Elon can access anyone's private messages. It's a great tool to blackmail people.
- LamaOfRuin 4y agoI believe that option 2, where it relies on individual encryption at the cost of reading history, is how matrix does it (or can do it if chosen).
- neodymiumphish 4y agoActually, I don't think this is right. The creator of a group or "shared to group Y" chat/posts can generate a shared key for use within that limited friend group. Their individual posts would be encrypted validated by their own private key, but all posts among the group would also be encrypted against the group chat. Struggle here would be that anyone who gets the shared key would have access to view and potentially add to the group.
- mrtesthah 4y agoSignal's encrypted group chat management was recently made more robust and may be instructive: https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/ https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/