I'd agree with almost all of that, but with two additions: I think we can locally approximate reality as an axiomatic system, with the axioms just being the stu

I'd agree with almost all of that, but with two additions: I think we can locally approximate reality as an axiomatic system, with the axioms just being the stuff we've decided to treat as true for the moment. When the context changes what counts as an axiom changes, but that only rarely happens to me with chairs. Second, I think there's at least a rough partial order on the things people propose as axioms: the order of how surprised I am when someone contests one, if you like. Very surprised, if it's the existence of external reality; not too surprised at all, sadly, if it's whether biologists are to be trusted over the pastor at their church on the origin of species. The nice thing about that machinery is that when you meet the second sort of person, you're not forced to believe that they're fundamentally irrational and immune to all reason. One more thing: trusting experts is a very convenient heuristic for me individually, and I use it all the time, but it's not epistemelogically all that useful. In principle you can always replace an appeal to the authority of a genuine expert with the evidence that they rely on to come to their judgement: if you can't, then they're speaking outside of their expertise. No one of us can win an argument on the internet that way; time is finite and we each only know so much. But if we all chip away at it, by supplying evidence where and when we can, we might get somewhere.