3 ms·

>On another note, checks charge 0% commission: to pay someone $5, you need $5. I can make a direct bank transfer "faster payment", which usually takes a few se

>On another note, checks charge 0% commission: to pay someone $5, you need $5. I can make a direct bank transfer "faster payment", which usually takes a few seconds to arrive in the destination account, for a fee of £0.

maratc 4y ago
> usually takes a few seconds to arrive in the destination account This also means that whoever takes over your account, can send the money out and cash it in very fast. This of course would never happen to me or you, but happened to a relative of mine who got a call from "their bank security" and then were directed to install a "security check app" (remote control tool), and change their password in the banking app. The thieves then got off with money that they transferred out in a matter of seconds, with no recourse.
- adql 4y ago
  They need to take over the account, vs fake a bit of paper
  - deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
- Nextgrid 4y ago
  > a relative of mine who got a call from "their bank security" and then were directed to install a "security check app" (remote control tool), and change their password in the banking app Presumably you want their money to be returned, but would you want the same if it was physical thieves pretending to be the alarm/security company that went in to "repair" the physical safe and made off with all its valuables? Would you still want the money to be returned (ultimately subsidised by all other customers of the bank or the taxpayer) if someone physically withdraws all their money in cash and hands it over to someone who pretends to be a bank employee and has a convincing name tag? Looking at it from the bank's perspective, the user willingly delegated their identity to the scammer by voluntarily handing over control of their authentication instrument. There is not much the bank can do in this case that wouldn't also hinder legitimate usage - this may have very well been a legitimate transaction for buying a car/house deposit/etc. FYI, there is recourse against authorised push payment fraud, but it's a goodwill scheme that most banks participate in as opposed to a legally mandated feature. Nevertheless, it's worth trying out.
- jonp888 4y ago
  Selling the inherent slowness of a transfer method as an anti fraud feature is just absurd. If a delay is beneficial it can be introduced artificially for those who want/need it For instance, my bank limits the total daily transfer, with any changes to that amount taking time to take effect.
  - maratc 4y ago
    > it can be introduced artificially for those who want/need it If it can be introduced artificially by the user, it can be skipped artificially by the fraudster, so the anti-fraud effectiveness of such an "anti-fraud feature" would be zero.

maratc 4y ago

> usually takes a few seconds to arrive in the destination account This also means that whoever takes over your account, can send the money out and cash it in very fast. This of course would never happen to me or you, but happened to a relative of mine who got a call from "their bank security" and then were directed to install a "security check app" (remote control tool), and change their password in the banking app. The thieves then got off with money that they transferred out in a matter of seconds, with no recourse.

adql 4y ago
They need to take over the account, vs fake a bit of paper
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
Nextgrid 4y ago
> a relative of mine who got a call from "their bank security" and then were directed to install a "security check app" (remote control tool), and change their password in the banking app Presumably you want their money to be returned, but would you want the same if it was physical thieves pretending to be the alarm/security company that went in to "repair" the physical safe and made off with all its valuables? Would you still want the money to be returned (ultimately subsidised by all other customers of the bank or the taxpayer) if someone physically withdraws all their money in cash and hands it over to someone who pretends to be a bank employee and has a convincing name tag? Looking at it from the bank's perspective, the user willingly delegated their identity to the scammer by voluntarily handing over control of their authentication instrument. There is not much the bank can do in this case that wouldn't also hinder legitimate usage - this may have very well been a legitimate transaction for buying a car/house deposit/etc. FYI, there is recourse against authorised push payment fraud, but it's a goodwill scheme that most banks participate in as opposed to a legally mandated feature. Nevertheless, it's worth trying out.
jonp888 4y ago
Selling the inherent slowness of a transfer method as an anti fraud feature is just absurd. If a delay is beneficial it can be introduced artificially for those who want/need it For instance, my bank limits the total daily transfer, with any changes to that amount taking time to take effect.
- maratc 4y ago
  > it can be introduced artificially for those who want/need it If it can be introduced artificially by the user, it can be skipped artificially by the fraudster, so the anti-fraud effectiveness of such an "anti-fraud feature" would be zero.