I have absolutely no idea what anything you just wrote means. You're ramblings make no sense whatsoever, and they lead towards no conclusions. Get over yourself

I have absolutely no idea what anything you just wrote means. You're ramblings make no sense whatsoever, and they lead towards no conclusions. Get over yourself. > "What's happened here is that you've privileged a bad model that somebody probably taught you out of a textbook" So you're dismissing the OSI model as a "bad model" that "somebody taught me", yet there's this other shiny thing developed by "dozens of really smart people" and that's clearly the way to go because those people "work with actual networking". > "And it's quite reasonable for them to expect their communications to have these three properties." Their communications are clearly secured and tamper-proof already today, despite not using QUIC. How do you square that? The security happens at the application layer, using mechanisms such as TLS. Additional security mechanisms can clearly come on-top. No need to bake everything into a single transport-layer protocol when there's endless flexibility available by layering the protocols on-top of each other. > "If your preferred model insists that we can't have security until the application layer then your model is wrong" How about instead of throwing fits about some vague ideas of "security" you actually provide concrete examples of what it is you're talking about, so that we can have a meaningful and constructive conversation about technology? All I was saying is that there's no reason to introduce more complexity into the transport layer, since "security" is already handled by the application layer (on a per-application basis). It's unclear whether a single "security" model fits into the transport layer, which should be as agnostic and light-weight as possible (hence it's original intention - to facilitate the transfer of information between endpoints, and leave the rest to whatever consumes that information).