6 ms·

I believe GP is talking about the lower level QUIC protocol. That’s like TCP requiring TLS. A tradeoff would have been QUIC not requiring it but the higher lev

I believe GP is talking about the lower level QUIC protocol. That’s like TCP requiring TLS. A tradeoff would have been QUIC not requiring it but the higher level http/3 protocol requiring (if that’s possible idk)

tialaramex 4y ago
TLS delivers three things, Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication. But intuitively these three things are what people expect their transport protocol to do anyway, it's actually surprising as a user that TCP doesn't really bother providing say, Integrity. "Oh, yeah, your data might be arbitrarily changed by the time it is delivered". Er, what? BCP 78 "Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack" says the Internet should design new systems to resist such monitoring and so offering these intuitive properties for a new transport protocol made sense. And that's what QUIC is. In a BCP 78 universe it doesn't make sense to ship new protocols that will be rendered useless by the surveillance apparatus.
- asdfghjhgfderty 4y ago
  it's insane to expect the opposite: that traffic in my own network will need to keep reaching to a certificate authorities outside to validate packages from one host to another. if you don't understand why these 3 things are on top of tcp, well, nevermind, I was going to say you shouldn't be designing networks buy you migth be already on the quic steering committee. most committee now are a joke so that some googler middle mamaget makes it to jr director. sigh.
  - tialaramex 4y ago
    The use of TLS for QUIC does not imply or require the use of the Web PKI which is what I assume you're thinking of by "certificate authorities outside to validate packages".
    - csmpltn 4y ago
      > "The use of TLS for QUIC does not imply or require the use of the Web PKI" Handling certificate revocations (which would be needed to "ensure security"), does indeed imply the use of some way to check for the revocations in a timely manner. The revocation lists themselves can be tampered-with.
      - tialaramex 4y ago
        You've jumped from assuming the Web PKI, which isn't required, to assuming online revocation checks, which is even more not required.
        csmpltn 4y ago
        So how does your imaginary version of a transport-layer guarantee a message can't be tampered with if it trusts keys which are revoked?
        ric2b 4y ago
        Web PKI is not the only way to revoke keys.
        csmpltn 4y ago
        > "Web PKI is not the only way to revoke keys." You're not answering my question (we both know why), and I never mentioned anything about WebPKI in any of my comments anyways.
- csmpltn 4y ago
  > "it's actually surprising as a user that TCP doesn't really bother providing say, Integrity" TCP is a transport-layer protocol (ref the OSI model). The responsibilities of a transport-layer are neatly summarized here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer The OSI model is comprised of layers of abstractions, each building on-top of each other. Making TCP (a transport-layer protocol) depend on TLS (an application-layer protocol, ref https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer) is completely backwards, and makes absolutely no sense when considering the model. The OSI model has been around for a very long while. If you have a degree in CS, or have studied networking in university - chances are you've had to learn about the OSI model. There's no reason to throw that away now, or reinvent the wheel.
  - Jasper_ 4y ago
    TCP/IP does not use the OSI model. Stacking layers on top of each other promotes inefficiency and poor security, and is one reason why TCP/IP won over the OSI-recommended protocols.
    - csmpltn 4y ago
      > "Stacking layers on top of each other promotes inefficiency and poor security" Yet that's exactly how the internet works today.
  - tialaramex 4y ago
    > The OSI model has been around for a very long while. Even imagining that for some reason I wasn't aware of that, why would it be relevant? > If you have a degree in CS, or have studied networking in university - chances are you've had to learn about the OSI model. And the waterfall software development model. A bunch of long obsolete data structures. Open Hypermedia (remember that? No? That's OK it doesn't matter any more). What's happened here is that you've privileged a bad model that somebody probably taught you out of a textbook (hopefully while grimacing, since this is useless "information") over the real world experience of dozens of really smart people who work with actual networking and designed QUIC. Maybe, if I'm giving you benefit of the doubt you've assumed "user" somehow means "undergraduate who is studying the OSI model" but it doesn't - billions of people use the Internet, far more than will study any degree, let alone Computer Science. And it's quite reasonable for them to expect their communications to have these three properties. If your preferred model insists that we can't have security until the application layer then your model is wrong, just as surely as if you have a model of the Atom which assumes it's a solid ball of something (the plum pudding model, as with OSI perhaps some undergraduates were taught this model between when it was proposed and when experiments showed it's just wrong).

tialaramex 4y ago

TLS delivers three things, Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication. But intuitively these three things are what people expect their transport protocol to do anyway, it's actually surprising as a user that TCP doesn't really bother providing say, Integrity. "Oh, yeah, your data might be arbitrarily changed by the time it is delivered". Er, what? BCP 78 "Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack" says the Internet should design new systems to resist such monitoring and so offering these intuitive properties for a new transport protocol made sense. And that's what QUIC is. In a BCP 78 universe it doesn't make sense to ship new protocols that will be rendered useless by the surveillance apparatus.

asdfghjhgfderty 4y ago
it's insane to expect the opposite: that traffic in my own network will need to keep reaching to a certificate authorities outside to validate packages from one host to another. if you don't understand why these 3 things are on top of tcp, well, nevermind, I was going to say you shouldn't be designing networks buy you migth be already on the quic steering committee. most committee now are a joke so that some googler middle mamaget makes it to jr director. sigh.
- tialaramex 4y ago
  The use of TLS for QUIC does not imply or require the use of the Web PKI which is what I assume you're thinking of by "certificate authorities outside to validate packages".
  - csmpltn 4y ago
    > "The use of TLS for QUIC does not imply or require the use of the Web PKI" Handling certificate revocations (which would be needed to "ensure security"), does indeed imply the use of some way to check for the revocations in a timely manner. The revocation lists themselves can be tampered-with.
    - tialaramex 4y ago
      You've jumped from assuming the Web PKI, which isn't required, to assuming online revocation checks, which is even more not required.
      - csmpltn 4y ago
        So how does your imaginary version of a transport-layer guarantee a message can't be tampered with if it trusts keys which are revoked?
        ric2b 4y ago
        Web PKI is not the only way to revoke keys.
        csmpltn 4y ago
        > "Web PKI is not the only way to revoke keys." You're not answering my question (we both know why), and I never mentioned anything about WebPKI in any of my comments anyways.
csmpltn 4y ago
> "it's actually surprising as a user that TCP doesn't really bother providing say, Integrity" TCP is a transport-layer protocol (ref the OSI model). The responsibilities of a transport-layer are neatly summarized here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer The OSI model is comprised of layers of abstractions, each building on-top of each other. Making TCP (a transport-layer protocol) depend on TLS (an application-layer protocol, ref https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_layer) is completely backwards, and makes absolutely no sense when considering the model. The OSI model has been around for a very long while. If you have a degree in CS, or have studied networking in university - chances are you've had to learn about the OSI model. There's no reason to throw that away now, or reinvent the wheel.
- Jasper_ 4y ago
  TCP/IP does not use the OSI model. Stacking layers on top of each other promotes inefficiency and poor security, and is one reason why TCP/IP won over the OSI-recommended protocols.
  - csmpltn 4y ago
    > "Stacking layers on top of each other promotes inefficiency and poor security" Yet that's exactly how the internet works today.
- tialaramex 4y ago
  > The OSI model has been around for a very long while. Even imagining that for some reason I wasn't aware of that, why would it be relevant? > If you have a degree in CS, or have studied networking in university - chances are you've had to learn about the OSI model. And the waterfall software development model. A bunch of long obsolete data structures. Open Hypermedia (remember that? No? That's OK it doesn't matter any more). What's happened here is that you've privileged a bad model that somebody probably taught you out of a textbook (hopefully while grimacing, since this is useless "information") over the real world experience of dozens of really smart people who work with actual networking and designed QUIC. Maybe, if I'm giving you benefit of the doubt you've assumed "user" somehow means "undergraduate who is studying the OSI model" but it doesn't - billions of people use the Internet, far more than will study any degree, let alone Computer Science. And it's quite reasonable for them to expect their communications to have these three properties. If your preferred model insists that we can't have security until the application layer then your model is wrong, just as surely as if you have a model of the Atom which assumes it's a solid ball of something (the plum pudding model, as with OSI perhaps some undergraduates were taught this model between when it was proposed and when experiments showed it's just wrong).