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Every one of your criticisms here is very valid. > I think you're trying too hard to look for errors in a system that isn't your preference and not looking har

• godelski 4y ago
  > I worry that if we get into disputes over which alternative voting system is better, that momentum will be lost and we won't change at all I worry that history will repeat itself and that we'll try it for awhile and then turn back because it does not resolve the things people care about (multi-parties and strong spoilers). > I don't know if you're from the US or not I am and demonstrated knowledge about this idiom. My comment was that the idiom is inappropriate for the conversation at hand, not that it is inappropriate for all circumstances. Why else do you think I quoted Plato? > I want n-candidate elections to actually have n candidates. Then you want a system that is scalable, transparent (i.e. low computational complexity, trivially parallelizable, and trivially verifiable from statistical subsets). > It's true that you can be a bullet voter on a ranked ballot, but there's no incentive to (that I can think of). Don't explain it to me, explain this to yourself. Why is the logic for "no incentive" invalidating in one case but not another? I argued that these are nearly identical situations and have several comments noting that there is no incentive to vote in the way you are suggesting. You are not being consistent in your logic and I'm trying to explain but it is frustrating. Maybe I am being too liberal in using my links and expecting others to read. So let me state it explicitly: there is no incentive to not give your top candidate the maximal score. So your logic is inconsistent. On the other hand, I don't expect all voters to be rational but I do expect (and have linked to experiments with people) a convergence to rationality (also consider what rational means. It doesn't mean smart but that people will play near optimally. We mix normal language and game theory language and this can create a lot of confusion).
  • idrios 4y ago
    No no your links are good, very cool to learn about rangevoting.com, I can see it has a ton to teach. But it's hard to immediately reconcile the data from these links with my own intuitions and first hand experiences and draw conclusions while still in the middle of the discussion. You're making the argument that I shouldn't be concerned about people thresholding their votes because scaled sincerity is a nearly optimal strategy in a cardinal voting scheme, so people can vote with their heart and not feel like their vote has been wasted. That's one of the findings in the paper you shared[1] that Scaled Sincerity gets (at worst) 91% of the utility compared to Mean Based Thresholding when there are 3 candidates, 80% percent for 5 candidates, 78% for 9... etc But there'll still inevitably be an election where 2 candidates were very close and the scaled sincerity voters who supported the 2nd place candidate feel like the election was stolen from them. The media will make an uproar about it. Voters will vote with a thresholding scheme after that. So in this case we should just skip to approval voting so people don't feel like they were robbed of the fraction of the vote they didn't contribute to their candidate. Your other point is people will bullet vote in ranked voting and so I'm defending it too strongly. Your other article[0] very strongly argues that IRV is worse than approval voting in regards to getting bullet voters. I know it's a cop out of me to quote the criticisms that the article itself provides, but the data size really is too small. In their summary of comparisons, 16% bullet voting in Burlington and ~21% bullet voting in Irish presidential are not bad percentages in my opinion, and I don't know anything about the SF 07 or Dartmouth 06 elections. I don't understand why the low computational complexity is important as long as the algorithm is simple to understand. Bubble sort has higher computational complexity but is a simpler algorithm than merge sort. But I don't know the details of vote counting in practice. If the computational complexity is so high that you wouldn't even determine who won until days or weeks later and was highly prone to error, then I'd stand corrected. I don't see how cardinal voting would make a difference in there being multiple parties. Edit: Also I don't mean to occupy either of our New Years Eves on this conversation. I could be sold on approval voting if that's the takeaway you're trying to get it. I learned a lot today. Hope nothing I said offended in any way. [0] https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo [1] https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html ^ re-linking these because the context is so far up the thread