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> Because pure honesty is never an optimal strategy? I'm not aware of a system where that's the optimal strategy It's not in a system alone. Strategies are som

> Because pure honesty is never an optimal strategy? I'm not aware of a system where that's the optimal strategy It's not in a system alone. Strategies are something you have when you have information about the other players and their payoffs. As it happens, honesty is an excellent strategy in Condorcet methods (even the "bad" ones, like those who aren't monotonic) when you have a realistic amount of information about other people's preferences/strategies. People who are honest because they can't be bothered to be strategic, do great with those methods. In approval, even the information about who the front runners are, causes trouble. And in range, even with NO information, you'll know it's better to just use the max and min values. Those systems don't encourage honesty, and the "extra information" range sneaks in from self-reported strength of preferences on an absolute scale, is junk information. Nothing good can come of using it. Certainly it's no good to use it to reject a candidate that is preferred by a majority over all the other candidates.

godelski 4y ago
https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/ https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/
- vintermann 4y ago
  We've been through this so many times. The original version of those simulation-based utility arguments was pushed by Warren D. Smith on RangeVoting.org. There are so many ways to lie with simulation. When you took away even the most obvious lie in the simulations painting range in a good light - namely when you took away the simulated people's magical ability to honestly compare interpersonal utility on an absolute scale, so they always ranked their most preferred 100 and their least preferred 0, no matter where they were in "opinion space" - then most of the good properties of score vanished. Smith for a while conceded that, and advocated range with top-2 runoff if you were concerned with that (as if this was some obscure technicality). Second, those simulations had lousy ideas of "strategy", as if strategy was just a percentage slide. Strategies are inherently dynamic, and require coordination - if I see you instructing your supporters how to vote, I can take that into account in how instruct my supporters to vote.

godelski 4y ago

https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/ https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/

vintermann 4y ago
We've been through this so many times. The original version of those simulation-based utility arguments was pushed by Warren D. Smith on RangeVoting.org. There are so many ways to lie with simulation. When you took away even the most obvious lie in the simulations painting range in a good light - namely when you took away the simulated people's magical ability to honestly compare interpersonal utility on an absolute scale, so they always ranked their most preferred 100 and their least preferred 0, no matter where they were in "opinion space" - then most of the good properties of score vanished. Smith for a while conceded that, and advocated range with top-2 runoff if you were concerned with that (as if this was some obscure technicality). Second, those simulations had lousy ideas of "strategy", as if strategy was just a percentage slide. Strategies are inherently dynamic, and require coordination - if I see you instructing your supporters how to vote, I can take that into account in how instruct my supporters to vote.