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If you're actually concerned about this (as far as I'm aware there's been no evidence that the voting you suggest is common when experiments have been done) you
by godelski 4y ago
If you're actually concerned about this (as far as I'm aware there's been no evidence that the voting you suggest is common when experiments have been done) you can normalize the individual ballots (e.g. softmax). But I truly believe that the added complexity to this would unnecessarily complicate an effect we do not observe. (Consider that we also have an edge case of A:10 B:10 C:10 as well. Though this ballot is easy to handle in other ways: toss it) Most voters will use a scaled sincerity voting strategy and thus you'd have A:6 B:8 C:10 and our bullet voter will no longer have an advantage. It pays to be sincere.
Continuing down this, you're essentially discussing bullet voting. I should EXPLICITLY state that this is a well known case and has been extensively studied[0][1]. I appreciate that you have concern with the system and I implore you to continue to search for flaws, but also to look for information discussing these ideas. The reason the bullet voting was likely so low in this study is that most voters are rational and understand that they are giving up significant leverage when bullet voting (note that the case is even worse in approval!). We often think our neighbors are far less rational than they actually are and we shouldn't make this mistake.
We should probably also discuss Monotonicity[2], but maybe in a follow-up conversation.
[0] https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo
[1] https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat3.html (called Plurality here, strategy B)
[2] https://electionscience.org/library/monotonicity/ https://electionscience.org/library/monotonicity/
- ad404b8a372f2b9 4y agoI don't understand how normalizing the individual ballots would change anything in the example he has given?
- godelski 4y agoSo a standard normalization (divide by max value) wouldn't solve much but why I specifically mentioned a softmax is because you then rescale all voting preferences to have the same power. I don't think it is a good idea btw, other than the added complexity. But it does change the above example. The problem with the example was that the first voter gave no strong preferences and thus the second voter had more power. The solution is to rescale these, which is why I said that voters tend to do this automatically (give their preferred candidate on the ballot the stop score and rate all others in proportionate to them).
- idrios 4y agoI'm loving learning about these different voting methods. I do still stand by my point though. You're right, I was arguing that voters degenerate into bullet voting over time 100% for the candidate they liked, 0% for the ones they don't. Your article [0] contends that it's not a good strategy to vote like this if you're trying to be strategic, because if candidates are A=974, B=974, F=231 and you liked F, you'd be foolish to vote 100% F, as if you like B better than A you should vote some for B. This looks too much like the current system we have, where people don't vote for the person they like best, they cast all their votes for the person they hate the least who could beat the person they hate the most. Basically: if you normalize votes, people are going to vote 100% for the lesser of 2 evils and we're back to square 1. If you don't normalize votes, you'll get one of the other voting strategies you've already linked to in your [1]. I expect it would essentially devolve into approval voting, as it's still voting for the lesser of 2 evils of the strongest candidates, then casting additional votes for anyone who seems viable. Perhaps it finds some other equilibrium. Either way, I think it takes too much strategy and voter headspace compared to ranked voting, where you can just vote for the candidates you want, in the order you want, and you didn't waste a vote if your top candidate loses because your #2 vote didn't lose any weight.
- godelski 4y agoI think you're trying too hard to look for errors in a system that isn't your preference and not looking hard enough at errors for the system that is your preference. All voting systems have errors and we must be clear about this. But this strategy and consequence exists in ordinal systems just as much as cardinal systems. There is nothing stopping a voter from bullet voting on a ranked ballot. They just rank one person and no one else. The consequences are quite similar actually but might be more obvious that you're throwing away your ballot in this case. But I assure you, you're effectively throwing away your ballot in the cardinal case too. I'm also not sure what is wrong with approval. Approval is awesome. I am also not sure why you keep using the phrase "lesser of 2 evils". If we have a 2 candidate election then there's no point in using any of these voting systems because plurality is a strictly better system (in a 2 candidate election). In fact, it is preferential that a multi-candidate system degenerates into a plurality system when there are only two candidates! The phrase "lesser of n equals" is not really about a voting system so much as it is related to another saying: "those that seek power do not deserve it" (or Plato's alternative: "Only those who do not seek power are qualified to hold it"). This has nothing to do with a voting system but has everything to do with a candidate selection process. There's an ethical conundrum though because you need strong authoritarian power to force thrust (the potential for) power upon people. But we're digressing, just like the normalization discussion is digressing (it was intended to introduce the concept of scaled sincerity, which we see people use in practice).