3 ms·
Nah, let's say there are 3 candidates: A, B and C. A wins a plurality of first preference votes. Otherwise, voters are split between B and C. We assume that if
by scaredginger 4y ago
Nah, let's say there are 3 candidates: A, B and C.
A wins a plurality of first preference votes. Otherwise, voters are split between B and C. We assume that if a candidate places C as their first preference, they will place B as their second preference, and vice-versa.
In this scenario, whoever gets more first preference votes out of B and C will win the election since the other will place third and get knocked out of the race, so anybody who placed A as their first preference didn't get to express whether they'd prefer B or C.
If it wasn't obvious,
A: LNP
B/C: Labor/Greens
https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2022/guide/bris https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/federal/2022/guide/bri...
- lotsofpulp 4y agoIs it known that B/C voters strategically voted to knock out A?
- scaredginger 4y agoB and C voters aren't strategic here. If they wish to knock out A, then placing A at the bottom would not be strategic voting. The point is that A voters arguably should have voted such that they could influence which of the two other candidates (B and C) won. This would require 'lying' about which candidate is their favourite; i.e. strategic voting