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Garbage. The problem is not the transport-layer security. Transport-layer attacks are very difficult to implement. What is risky is what happens when someone
by jrockway 15y ago
Garbage. The problem is not the transport-layer security. Transport-layer attacks are very difficult to implement. What is risky is what happens when someone gets access to the database and does "SELECT * FROM user". This is a very realistic threat, and with properly hashed passwords, gives an attacker no useful information. With plain-text passwords, though, they now have carte blanche to try the credentials at other sites, and steal someone's entire identities.
Yes, it's bad if you use the same password everywhere. Yes, it's bad if someone man-in-the-middles you. Yes, it's bad that arbitrary web users can run arbitrary database queries. But the point of robust engineering is to protect a system from many failures. If your passwords are stored in cleartext, your system is less safe overall than one that stores the passwords hashed. And because it's so easy to hash passwords, and because it's so damaging to your users to leak their password, it's generally considered Pretty Fucking Incompetent to keep passwords around in cleartext.
- dhx 15y agoIf someone can execute a "SELECT * FROM user" query, it's highly likely that they can also intercept login form responses to retrieve plain text passwords.
- jrockway 15y agoNot true in practice. The select statement is often tacked on to some other database query. To intercept login form responses would require the ability to run "real code" rather than just ask the database things. The reality is that most programmers do not call eval("code from the user") but they often call sql_query("code from the user").
- muyuu 15y agoI haven't defended anywhere in my post stored passwords in plain text. Maybe you replied to the wrong post?
- jrockway 15y agoYou mitigated its importance by saying: Unwarranted paranoia... Any time you set a password it travels in plain text (typically - and hopefully - via a secure connection) and it arrives to their server in plain text. This is true, but data in motion is less vulnerable to compromise than data at rest (due to how the Internet works and how web applications are programmed), and so the conclusion "unwarranted paranoia" is wrong. The paranoia is warranted.
- muyuu 15y agoThe main points from my point of view, and the reasons I think this is unwarranted paranoia: - not a critical resource : if your email is compromised, the importance of that makes this insignificant. It's also a local resource, cannot be exploited from afar. - just because they email it to you doesn't mean it's in plain text. It can be symmetrically encrypted, or (not in this case) it can be sent prior to storage. Not all accounts require draconian password policies. In fact, the abuse of these requirements encourage users to make really bad decisions regarding passwords, like reusing them or having them stored in a central repository.