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The older model also didn't incentivize the things needed to support a reusable rocketry program. Companies were encouraged to have bloat and making satellites

The older model also didn't incentivize the things needed to support a reusable rocketry program. Companies were encouraged to have bloat and making satellites was still extremely expensive so there wasn't anywhere near enough demand to justify producing and reusing a handful of boosters. Ariane space was still arguing that reuse wasn't viable for them due to their low flight rate only until a handful of years ago. As far as I'm aware, ULA's CEO still insists that anything more than their proposed engine segment reuse is going to require too high of a flight rate to pay for itself (IIRC he said they'd need 10 flights per booster). This is also part of why SpaceX's model works. Even when disposable F9 is much cheaper than previous rockets in its class.

bumby 4y ago
>The older model also didn't incentivize the things needed to support a reusable rocketry program. I assume you mean the cost-plus contracting model? Or is there a different incentive mechanism you're referring to?
- dotnet00 4y ago
  Cost-plus is part of it, but also just the launch vehicle acquisition process in general. Early on, SpaceX's biggest hurdle was getting payload contracts. IIRC they had to sue the government several times to overturn bad acquisition policies. Government acquisition processes weren't suited to supporting small new entrances into the launch market and there was somewhat of a belief that you weren't a credible launch provider unless you were as large as Boeing or Lockmart. In comparison nowadays it's relatively normal for lower cost programs or ones which can accept some loss to try flying on less proven rockets. New bold approaches to designing, building and flying rockets aren't immediately dismissed as just young naive engineers who haven't had the reality of spaceflight beat into them.
  - bumby 4y ago
    What was determined to be bad acquisition policy? My understanding is that early contracts were awarded to ULA because SpaceX wasn't certified for military payloads. That, combined with your statement, implies the certification process levies bad requirements. Do we know what these bad requirements were?
    - dotnet00 4y ago
      As Musk had pointed out at the time, the requirements were essentially just large amounts of paperwork (since if NASA considers F9 reliable enough for cargo and even crew, it's kind of ridiculous to suggest it can't handle a GPS satellite), such that it was unreasonable for USAF to buy multiple years worth of launches without competitive bidding despite obviously having another option almost through certification. At the time they had made that award, SpaceX was already mostly through the certification paperwork with zero changes needed to the rocket. Besides that, although not a lawsuit, Lori Garver's book "Escaping Gravity" goes into a lot of depth regarding the behind the scenes political struggle regarding commercial cargo and commercial crew and how Congress and some parts of NASA leaned on the idea that they couldn't tolerate any failure as a means of trying to disqualify anyone but ULA,Boeing etc from those programs. I was wrong about them having to sue "several times" though.
      - bumby 4y ago
        A small nit: the DoD and NASA are two different customers who don't have to align on their risk thresholds. Just because NASA is okay with a particular risk, doesn't mean that the DoD should be. What I've seen happen in some cases is one side essentially says "That may be okay for them, but we don't trust their level of oversight and want it done our way." I would push back a bit on the "mostly certified" as being sufficient; you're either certified or you're not. I've seen the paperwork argument cut both ways. It can definitely create a bureaucratic mess. On the other hand, one of the things NASA tries to drive is "risk informed decision making". Part of this process involves writing waivers when a requirement can't/won't be met to document what the new risk is (and they have to document that they find that risk acceptable). A lot of times, this process was dismissed at "just large amounts of paperwork" but in dismissing it, they made it very hard for decision makers to fully understand what the residual risk was. It was interesting to me that paperwork was used as an excuse to not commit to the process, but when it was streamlined, it still wasn't used. To me, that feels more like avoiding accountability than avoiding needless paperwork. This misunderstanding of risk is at the heart of most of NASA's spaceflight mishaps. I wasn't aware of Garver's book, but thanks for bringing it up. Sounds like a good read.

bumby 4y ago

>The older model also didn't incentivize the things needed to support a reusable rocketry program. I assume you mean the cost-plus contracting model? Or is there a different incentive mechanism you're referring to?

dotnet00 4y ago
Cost-plus is part of it, but also just the launch vehicle acquisition process in general. Early on, SpaceX's biggest hurdle was getting payload contracts. IIRC they had to sue the government several times to overturn bad acquisition policies. Government acquisition processes weren't suited to supporting small new entrances into the launch market and there was somewhat of a belief that you weren't a credible launch provider unless you were as large as Boeing or Lockmart. In comparison nowadays it's relatively normal for lower cost programs or ones which can accept some loss to try flying on less proven rockets. New bold approaches to designing, building and flying rockets aren't immediately dismissed as just young naive engineers who haven't had the reality of spaceflight beat into them.
- bumby 4y ago
  What was determined to be bad acquisition policy? My understanding is that early contracts were awarded to ULA because SpaceX wasn't certified for military payloads. That, combined with your statement, implies the certification process levies bad requirements. Do we know what these bad requirements were?
  - dotnet00 4y ago
    As Musk had pointed out at the time, the requirements were essentially just large amounts of paperwork (since if NASA considers F9 reliable enough for cargo and even crew, it's kind of ridiculous to suggest it can't handle a GPS satellite), such that it was unreasonable for USAF to buy multiple years worth of launches without competitive bidding despite obviously having another option almost through certification. At the time they had made that award, SpaceX was already mostly through the certification paperwork with zero changes needed to the rocket. Besides that, although not a lawsuit, Lori Garver's book "Escaping Gravity" goes into a lot of depth regarding the behind the scenes political struggle regarding commercial cargo and commercial crew and how Congress and some parts of NASA leaned on the idea that they couldn't tolerate any failure as a means of trying to disqualify anyone but ULA,Boeing etc from those programs. I was wrong about them having to sue "several times" though.
    - bumby 4y ago
      A small nit: the DoD and NASA are two different customers who don't have to align on their risk thresholds. Just because NASA is okay with a particular risk, doesn't mean that the DoD should be. What I've seen happen in some cases is one side essentially says "That may be okay for them, but we don't trust their level of oversight and want it done our way." I would push back a bit on the "mostly certified" as being sufficient; you're either certified or you're not. I've seen the paperwork argument cut both ways. It can definitely create a bureaucratic mess. On the other hand, one of the things NASA tries to drive is "risk informed decision making". Part of this process involves writing waivers when a requirement can't/won't be met to document what the new risk is (and they have to document that they find that risk acceptable). A lot of times, this process was dismissed at "just large amounts of paperwork" but in dismissing it, they made it very hard for decision makers to fully understand what the residual risk was. It was interesting to me that paperwork was used as an excuse to not commit to the process, but when it was streamlined, it still wasn't used. To me, that feels more like avoiding accountability than avoiding needless paperwork. This misunderstanding of risk is at the heart of most of NASA's spaceflight mishaps. I wasn't aware of Garver's book, but thanks for bringing it up. Sounds like a good read.