You write, in comparing "our" (presumably US) system to the Finns that our system is not only ineffective and inefficient, it is immoral. Are you saying that n

You write, in comparing "our" (presumably US) system to the Finns that our system is not only ineffective and inefficient, it is immoral. Are you saying that non-internationalist socialism is inherently moral while individual property rights and exchange are not? That morally speaking someone's education should not be determined by who their parents are, but should be determined by the nation to which their parents are subject? Would you like to give a hint why? The notion that individual economic rights are void while national economic rights are valid is delicious for people whose most valuable asset is their inherited citizenship or their power in nationalist institutions, so over the last century or so enormous effort has been expended in trying to justify this notion. However, the state of the art in such moral justifications does not impress me. Is there a particular justification that you are not embarrassed to be associated with? The old internationalist socialism was screwed up in various vital ways, but at least I can understand how an idealist could be attracted to it. In this particular policy question, I can see how an idealist would attracted to the idea of opening an educational program to everyone in the world. But you seem to see clear moral superiority in a system which is open only to those who inherited Finnish citizenship. As socialist ideas spread in practical politics, internationalist ideas were almost completely abandoned. (See e.g. how large transfer payments within nations are compared to how large foreign aid is, or how interested people are in Gini coefficients within nations compared to globally.) This doesn't stop modern noninternationalist socialists from regularly appealing to the old internationalist rhetoric for justification, but that's dishonest. (It's also circumstantial evidence for how weak the moral arguments for noninternalist socialism are, or more precisely, how the ones which aren't hopelessly weak tend to be strong enough to "justify" various of the horrors of the twentieth century, or various older nastiness like heriditary aristocracy or slavery. Classical liberalism and universalist socialism differ in whether "positive rights" and equality of outcome are better than ordinary negative rights and equality under the law, but justifications for both tend to appeal to a general idea of equal rights of all humans. To justify noninternationalist socialism of the usual heritable citizenship sort, you have to break that and find a way to justify hereditary privilege.) Note also that essentially all those moral arguments for national economic rights are subject to various classic moral questions against how to get individual economic rights quite right. E.g., it is a classic difficult question how to assign individual property rights initially in a morally satisfying way. This question doesn't get any easier when it comes to assigning property rights to individual noninternalist socialist nations in a morally satisfying way. (And to it is added the new question of how individual people are to be assigned to such nations in a morally satisfying way.) There are defensible practical justifications for the conclusion that individual people shouldn't have individual economic rights but that individual nations should, in particular the observation that strongly collectivist nations punched above their weight in some of the wars of the 20th century. (There are also arguments based on the supposed inefficiency of a free market, but those have fared so poorly in reality that most people no longer advance them, at least without couching them in calculated vagueness or doublespeak.) But you seem to be appealing not to some empirical practical justification, but to some abstract moral justification, and I am unable to guess which you might have in mind.