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> Ethics too is rooted in emotion. Says who? Can you prove it? This is a pretty big claim to make

marginalia_nu 4y ago
One can construct an argument based on the is-ought problem. As a brief recap: Statements about how things ought to be can not be derived solely from statements about how things are. For example, from "my house is on fire" (what is) alone does logically not follow "I should try to extinguish the fire" (what should be), without a quiet assumption something like "my home and belongings should not go up in flames" (what should be). Ethics are obviously within the category of how things should to be, and thus it cannot be derived in its entirety from the state of the world as it is. Thus ethics must be derived from some other notion about how the world should be. If you take account of the sources of our fundamental notions about how the world should be, you'll find they're all some variant of emotions, or possibly something like aesthetics, which unfortunately again cooks down a desire for that which is pleasant to the mind and senses. All other notions about how the world should be are so-that something else, which if you keep following the reasons so-that, all land in emotions. For example, the reason why we seek things like truth and justice is because we like how they feel, we feel content, as though things are the way we think they should be. We dislike lies and injustice because they make us angry when it happens to others, sad or indignant when they happen to us. If we did not feel this way, surely we would have no reason to prefer justice to injustice, or truth to lies. It would by definition be all the same to us. Alternatively, one may argue that God has decided how things should be. But that is just replacing human emotion with the moods of God. God may get angry if you marry your daughter and ransack the temple and will be happy if you offer libations. An ethics based on piety is a system of ethics based on whatever makes God happy.
- deleted 4y ago
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- spritefs 4y ago
  > Thus ethics must be derived from some other notion about how the world should be. Yes, but bringing in is-ought only tells us that the ethical realm is self contained. It doesn't tell us that the ethical realm is reducible to emotions > All other notions about how the world should be are so-that something else, which if you keep following the reasons so-that, all land in emotions. You're just repeating the same claim that I questioned earlier > For example, the reason why we seek things like truth and justice is because we like how they feel, we feel content, as though things are the way we think they should be Can you prove this? Why this specific explanation and not some random other one like "because God wills it"? It's unclear to me why this explanation is any more convincing
  - marginalia_nu 4y ago
    > Can you prove this? Arguments can be constructed for or against such things, they cannot ever be proven. Very few things can be conclusively proven about the world. We could after all be just be brains in vats being fed a simulated reality and we'd never prove the fact. There is always that doubt. The perhaps most damning argument is to consider a being without desire, fear, content, disgust, anger, and other such things. What would compel this entity to any action? Try to rob them with a gun and they will not fear you. "I'll shoot!", you'll say, and if they react at all, they'll say "ok". Try to bribe them with delicious food, wealth, sex; and you'll get nothing. They do not desire it. Commit an injustice in front of them and they'll likewise not be angered. Stop a crime and they'll find no reason to praise you. Even if we permit them to feel pleasure or pain, which is generous and not necessary for the experiment, they will by our definitions not desire the pleasure and seek it out or fear the pain and try to avoid it. Permit them hunger and let them starve, and they will not desire it to end. This entity has no state of the world that brings them joy since they do not know what it is, and no state of the world that brings them anger or resentment for similar reasons. The pleasure of the beautiful will not be sought out for they have no desire, and the nausea and revulsion of the hideous will not be avoided. As a consequence, the logical and consistent will not be preferred to the illogical and inconsistent. Their ranking in a social structure will not matter to them, since they will not fear becoming an outcast, have no envy of the success of others, and so on. Since that is the case, core to this being is that all states of the world are equal in their eyes. Could this entity using their perfectly intact faculty of reason derive a system of ethics? This seems unlikely, since normative statements do in conflict with this prefer certain states of the world to others.
    - spritefs 4y ago
      > Try to bribe them with delicious food, wealth, sex; and you'll get nothing. They do not desire it. Sounds like an enlightened person to me > Could this entity using their perfectly intact faculty of reason derive a system of ethics? See Kantian ethics

One can construct an argument based on the is-ought problem. As a brief recap: Statements about how things ought to be can not be derived solely from statements about how things are. For example, from "my house is on fire" (what is) alone does logically not follow "I should try to extinguish the fire" (what should be), without a quiet assumption something like "my home and belongings should not go up in flames" (what should be). Ethics are obviously within the category of how things should to be, and thus it cannot be derived in its entirety from the state of the world as it is. Thus ethics must be derived from some other notion about how the world should be. If you take account of the sources of our fundamental notions about how the world should be, you'll find they're all some variant of emotions, or possibly something like aesthetics, which unfortunately again cooks down a desire for that which is pleasant to the mind and senses. All other notions about how the world should be are so-that something else, which if you keep following the reasons so-that, all land in emotions. For example, the reason why we seek things like truth and justice is because we like how they feel, we feel content, as though things are the way we think they should be. We dislike lies and injustice because they make us angry when it happens to others, sad or indignant when they happen to us. If we did not feel this way, surely we would have no reason to prefer justice to injustice, or truth to lies. It would by definition be all the same to us. Alternatively, one may argue that God has decided how things should be. But that is just replacing human emotion with the moods of God. God may get angry if you marry your daughter and ransack the temple and will be happy if you offer libations. An ethics based on piety is a system of ethics based on whatever makes God happy.

deleted 4y ago
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spritefs 4y ago
> Thus ethics must be derived from some other notion about how the world should be. Yes, but bringing in is-ought only tells us that the ethical realm is self contained. It doesn't tell us that the ethical realm is reducible to emotions > All other notions about how the world should be are so-that something else, which if you keep following the reasons so-that, all land in emotions. You're just repeating the same claim that I questioned earlier > For example, the reason why we seek things like truth and justice is because we like how they feel, we feel content, as though things are the way we think they should be Can you prove this? Why this specific explanation and not some random other one like "because God wills it"? It's unclear to me why this explanation is any more convincing
- marginalia_nu 4y ago
  > Can you prove this? Arguments can be constructed for or against such things, they cannot ever be proven. Very few things can be conclusively proven about the world. We could after all be just be brains in vats being fed a simulated reality and we'd never prove the fact. There is always that doubt. The perhaps most damning argument is to consider a being without desire, fear, content, disgust, anger, and other such things. What would compel this entity to any action? Try to rob them with a gun and they will not fear you. "I'll shoot!", you'll say, and if they react at all, they'll say "ok". Try to bribe them with delicious food, wealth, sex; and you'll get nothing. They do not desire it. Commit an injustice in front of them and they'll likewise not be angered. Stop a crime and they'll find no reason to praise you. Even if we permit them to feel pleasure or pain, which is generous and not necessary for the experiment, they will by our definitions not desire the pleasure and seek it out or fear the pain and try to avoid it. Permit them hunger and let them starve, and they will not desire it to end. This entity has no state of the world that brings them joy since they do not know what it is, and no state of the world that brings them anger or resentment for similar reasons. The pleasure of the beautiful will not be sought out for they have no desire, and the nausea and revulsion of the hideous will not be avoided. As a consequence, the logical and consistent will not be preferred to the illogical and inconsistent. Their ranking in a social structure will not matter to them, since they will not fear becoming an outcast, have no envy of the success of others, and so on. Since that is the case, core to this being is that all states of the world are equal in their eyes. Could this entity using their perfectly intact faculty of reason derive a system of ethics? This seems unlikely, since normative statements do in conflict with this prefer certain states of the world to others.
  - spritefs 4y ago
    > Try to bribe them with delicious food, wealth, sex; and you'll get nothing. They do not desire it. Sounds like an enlightened person to me > Could this entity using their perfectly intact faculty of reason derive a system of ethics? See Kantian ethics