> ... Padding oracle vulnerabilities, use of ECB mode (leaks information about password length and which passwords in the vault are similar/the same. recently

> ... Padding oracle vulnerabilities, use of ECB mode (leaks information about password length and which passwords in the vault are similar/the same. recently switched to unauthenticated CBC, which isn't much better, plus old entries will still be encrypted with ECB mode), vault key uses AES256 but key is derived from only 128 bits of entropy, encryption key leaked through webui, silent KDF downgrade, KDF hash leaked in log files, they even roll their own version of AES - they essentially commit every "crypto 101" sin. All of these are trivial to identify (and fix!) by anyone with even basic familiarity with cryptography, and it's frankly appalling that an alleged security company whose product hinges on cryptography would have such glaring errors. ... Seems bad. I took the author's advice and did the google search "jeremi gosney" + "lastpass". This 2015 article turned up: > A longtime LastPass user himself, Gosney says he doesn’t plan to change a thing following the breach – not even his master password. “I am confident in the strength of my master password. As a password cracker, I know it’s impossible to crack,” he says. https://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/consultant-dont-sweat-the-lastpass-breach/ https://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/consultant-dont-sweat... When the same author now recommends Bitwardenen and 1Password, it's hard to view it as anything other than more of the same. The author might want to tone down the unqualified language around computer security to avoid history repeating itself.