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Vaults stored in Dropbox could be brute forced if an attacker ever gains access to the ciphertext. The 1P service mitigates this by adding a random key as salt
by manmal 4y ago
Vaults stored in Dropbox could be brute forced if an attacker ever gains access to the ciphertext. The 1P service mitigates this by adding a random key as salt that’s stored locally (iOS keychain/browser storage). That key never leaves your device (authentication is done via zero knowledge proof), so the master password is virtually impossible to brute force right now, even with a very weak master password.
I can highly recommend reading the white paper, it’s very well written and kinda like a comprehensive guide to E2EE which every SWE should be familiar with anyway.
And what do you mean by Apple being lethargic? They added a secure enclave to all their devices that is probably the most secure storage and crypto processor you can hope to get for that kind of money. They also added the option of completely end to end encrypted backups. Because of the secure enclave, that’s actually a really safe option.
- 0cf8612b2e1e 4y ago> Vaults stored in Dropbox could be brute forced if an attacker ever gains access to the ciphertext. I’m sorry, but could you expand on this? If I leave my encrypted password vault on Dropbox’s servers, then of course they could attempt to brute force it. I thought the entire point of the encrypted vaults is that brute forcing is computationally infeasible, but technically possible.