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https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18376885 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18376885 There were rumored to be "explosive bolts" on the ARPA/MILNET gatew

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18376885 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18376885 There were rumored to be "explosive bolts" on the ARPA/MILNET gateways (whether they were metaphorical or not, I don't know). Here's something interesting that Milo Medin wrote about dual homed sites like NSA and NASA, that were on both the ARPANET and MILNET: To: fair@ucbarpa.berkeley.edu (Erik E. Fair) Cc: Hackers_Guild@ucbvax.berkeley.edu, ucdavis!ccohesh@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Subject: Re: a question of definition Date: Thu, 29 Jan 87 15:33:35 PST From: Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC Code ED) <medin@orion.arpa> Right, the core has many gateways on it now, maybe 20-30. All the LSI's will be stubbed off the core however, and only buttergates will be left after the mailbridges and EGP peers are all converted. Actually, I think DARPA is paying for it all... Ames is *not* getting a mailbridge. You are right of course, that we could use 2 gateways, not just 1 (actually, there will be a prime and backup anyways), and then push routing info appropriately. But that's anything but simple. Firstly, the hosts have to know which gateway to send a packet to a given network, and thus have to pick between the 2. That's a bad idea. It also means that I have to pass all EGP learned info around on the local cable, and if I do that, then I can't have routing info from the local cable pass out via EGP. At least not without violating the current EGP spec. Think about it. It'd be really simple to create a loop that way. Thus, in order to maximize the use of both PSN's, you really need one gateway wired to both PSN's, and just have it advertise a default route inside. Or use a reasonble IGP, of which RIP (aka /etc/routed stuff) is not. I'm hoping to get an RFC out of BBN at this IETF meeting which may go a long way in reducing the use of RIP as an IGP. BTW, NSA is an example of a site on both MILNET and ARPANET but without a mailbridge... There is no restriction that a network can only be on ARPANET or MILNET. That goes against the Internet model of doing things. Our local NASA gatewayed nets will be advertised on both sides. The restriction on BARRNet is that the constituent elements of BARRNet do not all have access to MILNET. NSF has an understanding with DARPA and DCA that NSFnet'd sites can use ARPANET. That does not extend to the MILNET. Thus, Davis can use UCB's or Stanford's, our even NASA's ARPANET gateways, with the approval of the site of course, but not MILNET, even though NASA has MILNET coverage. Thus we are required to restrict BARRNet routing through our MILNET PSN. If we were willing to sponsor UCB's MILNET access, for some requirement which NASA had to implement, then we would turn that on. But BARRNet itself will but cutoff to MILNET (and probably ARPANET too) at Ames, but not cut off to other NASA centers or sites that NASA connects. There is no technical reason that prevents this, in fact, we have to take special measures to prevent it. But those are the rules. Anyways, mailbridge performance should improve after the conversion, so UCB should be in better shape. And you'll certainly be able to talk to us via BARRNnet... I have noticed recently that MILNET<-> ARPANET performance has been particularly poor... Sigh. The DCA folks feel that in case of an emergency they may be forced to use an unsecure network to pass certain info around. The DDN brochure mentions SIOP related data for example. Who knows, if the balloon goes up, the launch order might pass through Evans Hall on its way out to SAC... :-) Milo

DonHopkins 4y ago
Here's another funny story from my email archives of around the same time, about how Jordan Hubbard's infamous rwall almost got UC Berkeley cut off from the internet, with some more interesting details from other old net boys like Milo Medin, Marc Crispin, and Dennis G. Perry: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31822138 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31822138 Speaking of YP (which I always thought sounded like a brand of moist baby poop towelettes), BSD, wildcard groups, SunRPC, and Sun's ingenuous networking and security and remote procedure call infrastructure, who remembers Jordan Hubbard's infamous rwall incident on March 31, 1987? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25156006 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25156006 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan_Hubbard#rwall_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan_Hubbard#rwall_incident >rwall incident >On March 31, 1987 Hubbard executed an rwall command expecting it to send a message to every machine on the network at University of California, Berkeley, where he headed the Distributed Unix Group. The command instead began broadcasting Hubbard's message to every machine on the internet and was stopped after Hubbard realised the message was being broadcast remotely after he received complaints from people at Purdue University and University of Texas. Even though the command was terminated, it resulted in Hubbard receiving 743 messages and complaints, including one from the Inspector General of ARPAnet. I was logged in on my Sun workstation "tumtum" when it happened, so I received his rwall too, and immediately sent him a humorous email with the subject of "flame flame flame" which I've lost in the intervening 35 years, but I still have a copy of his quick reply: From: Jordan K. Hubbard <jkh%violet.Berkeley.EDU@berkeley.edu> Date: Tue, Mar 31, 1987, 11:02 PM To: Don Hopkins <don@tumtum.cs.umd.edu> Subject: re: flame flame flame Thanks, you were nicer than most.. Here's the stock letter I've been sending back to people: Thank you, thank you.. Now if I can only figure out why a lowly machine in a basement somewhere can send broadcast messages to the entire world. Doesn't seem *right* somehow. Yours for an annoying network. Jordan P.S. I was actually experimenting to see exactly now bad a crock RPC was. I'm beginning to get an idea. I look forward to your flame. Jordan Here's the explanation he sent to hackers_guild, and some replies from old net boys like Milo Medin (who said the program manager of the Arpanet in the Information Science and Technology Office of DARPA Dennis G. Perry said they would kick UCB off the Arpanet if it ever happened again), Mark Crispin (who presciently proposed cash rewards for discovering and disclosing security bugs), and Dennis G. Perry himself: From: Jordan K. Hubbard <jkh%violet.Berkeley.EDU@berkeley.edu> Date: April 2, 1987 Subject: My Broadcast By now, many of you have heard of (or seen) the broadcast message I sent to the net two days ago. I have since received 743 messages and have replied to every one (either with a form letter, or more personally when questions were asked). The intention behind this effort was to show that I wasn't interested in doing what I did maliciously or in hiding out afterwards and avoiding the repercussions. One of the people who received my message was Dennis Perry, the Inspector General of the ARPAnet (in the Pentagon), and he wasn't exactly pleased. (I hear his Interleaf windows got scribbled on) So now everyone is asking: "Who is this Jordan Hubbard, and why is he on my screen??" I will attempt to explain. I head a small group here at Berkeley called the "Distributed Unix Group". What that essentially means is that I come up with Unix distribution software for workstations on campus. Part of this job entails seeing where some of the novice administrators we're creating will hang themselves, and hopefully prevent them from doing so. Yesterday, I finally got around to looking at the "broadcast" group in /etc/netgroup which was set to "(,,)". It was obvious that this was set up for rwall to use, so I read the documentation on "netgroup" and "rwall". A section of the netgroup man page said: ... Any of three fields can be empty, in which case it signifies a wild card. Thus universal (,,) defines a group to which everyone belongs. Field names that ... ... Now "everyone" here is pretty ambiguous. Reading a bit further down, one sees discussion on yellow-pages domains and might be led to believe that "everyone" was everyone in your domain. I know that rwall uses point-to-point RPC connections, so I didn't feel that this was what they meant, just that it seemed to be the implication. Reading the rwall man page turned up nothing about "broadcasts". It doesn't even specify the communications method used. One might infer that rwall did indeed use actual broadcast packets. Failing to find anything that might suggest that rwall would do anything nasty beyond the bounds of the current domain (or at least up to the IMP), I tried it. I knew that rwall takes awhile to do its stuff, so I left it running and went back to my office. I assumed that anyone who got my message would let me know.. Boy, was I right about that! After the first few mail messages arrived from Purdue and Utexas, I begin to understand what was really going on and killed the rwall. I mean, how often do you expect to run something on your machine and have people from Wisconsin start getting the results of it on their screens? All of this has raised some interesting points and problems. 1. Rwall will walk through your entire hosts file and blare at anyone and everyone if you use the (,,) wildcard group. Whether this is a bug or a feature, I don't know. 2. Since rwall is an RPC service, and RPC doesn't seem to give a damn who you are as long as you're root (which is trivial to be, on a work- station), I have to wonder what other RPC services are open holes. We've managed to do some interesting, unauthorized, things with the YP service here at Berkeley, I wonder what the implications of this are. 3. Having a group called "broadcast" in your netgroup file (which is how it comes from sun) is just begging for some novice admin (or operator with root) to use it in the mistaken belief that he/she is getting to all the users. I am really surprised (as are many others) that this has taken this long to happen. 4. Killing rwall is not going to solve the problem. Any fool can write rwall, and just about any fool can get root priviledge on a Sun workstation. It seems that the place to fix the problem is on the receiving ends. The only other alternative would be to tighten up all the IMP gateways to forward packets only from "trusted" hosts. I don't like that at all, from a standpoint of reduced convenience and productivity. Also, since many places are adding hosts at a phenominal rate (ourselves especially), it would be hard to keep such a database up to date. Many perfectly well- behaved people would suffer for the potential sins of a few. I certainly don't intend to do this again, but I'm very curious as to what will happen as a result. A lot of people got wall'd, and I would think that they would be annoyed that their machine would let someone from the opposite side of the continent do such a thing! Jordan Hubbard jkh@violet.berkeley.edu (ucbvax!jkh) Computer Facilities & Communications. U.C. Berkeley From: Milo S. Medin <medin@orion.arpa> Date: Apr 6, 1987, 5:06 AM Actually, Dennis Perry is the head of DARPA/IPTO, not a pencil pusher in the IG's office. IPTO is the part of DARPA that deals with all CS issues (including funding for ARPANET, BSD, MACH, SDINET, etc...). Calling him part of the IG's office on the TCP/IP list probably didn't win you any favors. Coincidentally I was at a meeting at the Pentagon last Thursday that Dennis was at, along with Mike Corrigan (the man at DoD/OSD responsible for all of DDN), and a couple other such types discussing Internet management issues, when your little incident came up. Dennis was absolutely livid, and I recall him saying something about shutting off UCB's PSN ports if this happened again. There were also reports about the DCA management types really putting on the heat about turning on Mailbridge filtering now and not after the buttergates are deployed. I don't know if Mike St. Johns and company can hold them off much longer. Sigh... Mike Corrigan mentioned that this was the sort of thing that gets networks shut off. You really pissed off the wrong people with this move! Dennis also called up some VP at SUN and demanded this hole be patched in the next release. People generally pay attention to such people. Milo From: Mark Crispin <MRC%PANDA@sumex-aim.stanford.edu> Date: Mon, Apr 6, 1987, 10:15 AM Dan - I'm afraid you (and I, and any of the other old-timers who care about security) are banging your head against a brick wall. The philsophy behind Unix largely seems quite reminiscent of the old ITS philsophy of "security through obscurity;" we must entrust our systems and data to a open-ended set of youthful hackers (the current term is "gurus") who have mastered the arcane knowledge. The problem is further exacerbated by the multitude of slimy vendors who sell Unix boxes without sources and without an efficient means of dealing with security problems as they develop. I don't see any relief, however. There are a lot of politics involved here. Some individuals would rather muzzle knowledge of Unix security problems and their fixes than see them fixed. I feel it is *criminal* to have this attitude on the DDN, since our national security in wartime might ultimately depend upon it. If there is such a breach, those individuals will be better off if the Russians win the war, because if not there will be a Court of Inquiry to answer... It may be necessary to take matters into our own hands, as you did once before. I am seriously considering offering a cash reward for the first discoverer of a Unix security bug, provided that the bug is thoroughly documented (with both cause and fix). There would be a sliding cash scale based on how devastating the bug is and how many vendors' systems it affects. My intention would be to propagate the knowledge as widely as possible with the express intension of getting these bugs FIXED everywhere. Knowledge is power, and it properly belongs in the hands of system administrators and system programmers. It should NOT be the exclusive province of "gurus" who have a vested interest in keeping such details secret. -- Mark -- PS: Crispin's definition of a "somewhat secure operating system": A "somewhat secure operating system" is one that, given an intelligent system management that does not commit a blunder that compromises security, would withstand an attack by one of its architects for at least an hour. Crispin's definition of a "moderately secure operating system": a "moderately secure operating system" is one that would withstand an attack by one of its architects for at least an hour even if the management of the system are total idiots who make every mistake in the book. ------- From: Dennis G. Perry <PERRY@vax.darpa.mil> Date: Apr 6, 1987, 3:19 PM Jordan, you are right in your assumptions that people will get annoyed that what happened was allowed to happen. By the way, I am the program manager of the Arpanet in the Information Science and Technology Office of DARPA, located in Roslin (Arlington), not the Pentagon. I would like suggestions as to what you, or anyone else, think should be done to prevent such occurances in the furture. There are many drastic choices one could make. Is there a reasonable one? Perhaps some one from Sun could volunteer what there action will be in light of this revelation. I certainly hope that the community can come up with a good solution, because I know that when the problem gets solved from the top the solutions will reflect their concerns. Think about this situation and I think you will all agree that this is a serious problem that could cripple the Arpanet and anyother net that lets things like this happen without control. dennis ------- Also: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/4.73.html#subj10.1 http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/4.73.html#subj10.1 https://everything2.com/title/Jordan+K.+Hubbard https://everything2.com/title/Jordan+K.+Hubbard

DonHopkins 4y ago

Here's another funny story from my email archives of around the same time, about how Jordan Hubbard's infamous rwall almost got UC Berkeley cut off from the internet, with some more interesting details from other old net boys like Milo Medin, Marc Crispin, and Dennis G. Perry: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31822138 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31822138 Speaking of YP (which I always thought sounded like a brand of moist baby poop towelettes), BSD, wildcard groups, SunRPC, and Sun's ingenuous networking and security and remote procedure call infrastructure, who remembers Jordan Hubbard's infamous rwall incident on March 31, 1987? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25156006 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25156006 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan_Hubbard#rwall_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan_Hubbard#rwall_incident >rwall incident >On March 31, 1987 Hubbard executed an rwall command expecting it to send a message to every machine on the network at University of California, Berkeley, where he headed the Distributed Unix Group. The command instead began broadcasting Hubbard's message to every machine on the internet and was stopped after Hubbard realised the message was being broadcast remotely after he received complaints from people at Purdue University and University of Texas. Even though the command was terminated, it resulted in Hubbard receiving 743 messages and complaints, including one from the Inspector General of ARPAnet. I was logged in on my Sun workstation "tumtum" when it happened, so I received his rwall too, and immediately sent him a humorous email with the subject of "flame flame flame" which I've lost in the intervening 35 years, but I still have a copy of his quick reply: From: Jordan K. Hubbard <jkh%violet.Berkeley.EDU@berkeley.edu> Date: Tue, Mar 31, 1987, 11:02 PM To: Don Hopkins <don@tumtum.cs.umd.edu> Subject: re: flame flame flame Thanks, you were nicer than most.. Here's the stock letter I've been sending back to people: Thank you, thank you.. Now if I can only figure out why a lowly machine in a basement somewhere can send broadcast messages to the entire world. Doesn't seem *right* somehow. Yours for an annoying network. Jordan P.S. I was actually experimenting to see exactly now bad a crock RPC was. I'm beginning to get an idea. I look forward to your flame. Jordan Here's the explanation he sent to hackers_guild, and some replies from old net boys like Milo Medin (who said the program manager of the Arpanet in the Information Science and Technology Office of DARPA Dennis G. Perry said they would kick UCB off the Arpanet if it ever happened again), Mark Crispin (who presciently proposed cash rewards for discovering and disclosing security bugs), and Dennis G. Perry himself: From: Jordan K. Hubbard <jkh%violet.Berkeley.EDU@berkeley.edu> Date: April 2, 1987 Subject: My Broadcast By now, many of you have heard of (or seen) the broadcast message I sent to the net two days ago. I have since received 743 messages and have replied to every one (either with a form letter, or more personally when questions were asked). The intention behind this effort was to show that I wasn't interested in doing what I did maliciously or in hiding out afterwards and avoiding the repercussions. One of the people who received my message was Dennis Perry, the Inspector General of the ARPAnet (in the Pentagon), and he wasn't exactly pleased. (I hear his Interleaf windows got scribbled on) So now everyone is asking: "Who is this Jordan Hubbard, and why is he on my screen??" I will attempt to explain. I head a small group here at Berkeley called the "Distributed Unix Group". What that essentially means is that I come up with Unix distribution software for workstations on campus. Part of this job entails seeing where some of the novice administrators we're creating will hang themselves, and hopefully prevent them from doing so. Yesterday, I finally got around to looking at the "broadcast" group in /etc/netgroup which was set to "(,,)". It was obvious that this was set up for rwall to use, so I read the documentation on "netgroup" and "rwall". A section of the netgroup man page said: ... Any of three fields can be empty, in which case it signifies a wild card. Thus universal (,,) defines a group to which everyone belongs. Field names that ... ... Now "everyone" here is pretty ambiguous. Reading a bit further down, one sees discussion on yellow-pages domains and might be led to believe that "everyone" was everyone in your domain. I know that rwall uses point-to-point RPC connections, so I didn't feel that this was what they meant, just that it seemed to be the implication. Reading the rwall man page turned up nothing about "broadcasts". It doesn't even specify the communications method used. One might infer that rwall did indeed use actual broadcast packets. Failing to find anything that might suggest that rwall would do anything nasty beyond the bounds of the current domain (or at least up to the IMP), I tried it. I knew that rwall takes awhile to do its stuff, so I left it running and went back to my office. I assumed that anyone who got my message would let me know.. Boy, was I right about that! After the first few mail messages arrived from Purdue and Utexas, I begin to understand what was really going on and killed the rwall. I mean, how often do you expect to run something on your machine and have people from Wisconsin start getting the results of it on their screens? All of this has raised some interesting points and problems. 1. Rwall will walk through your entire hosts file and blare at anyone and everyone if you use the (,,) wildcard group. Whether this is a bug or a feature, I don't know. 2. Since rwall is an RPC service, and RPC doesn't seem to give a damn who you are as long as you're root (which is trivial to be, on a work- station), I have to wonder what other RPC services are open holes. We've managed to do some interesting, unauthorized, things with the YP service here at Berkeley, I wonder what the implications of this are. 3. Having a group called "broadcast" in your netgroup file (which is how it comes from sun) is just begging for some novice admin (or operator with root) to use it in the mistaken belief that he/she is getting to all the users. I am really surprised (as are many others) that this has taken this long to happen. 4. Killing rwall is not going to solve the problem. Any fool can write rwall, and just about any fool can get root priviledge on a Sun workstation. It seems that the place to fix the problem is on the receiving ends. The only other alternative would be to tighten up all the IMP gateways to forward packets only from "trusted" hosts. I don't like that at all, from a standpoint of reduced convenience and productivity. Also, since many places are adding hosts at a phenominal rate (ourselves especially), it would be hard to keep such a database up to date. Many perfectly well- behaved people would suffer for the potential sins of a few. I certainly don't intend to do this again, but I'm very curious as to what will happen as a result. A lot of people got wall'd, and I would think that they would be annoyed that their machine would let someone from the opposite side of the continent do such a thing! Jordan Hubbard jkh@violet.berkeley.edu (ucbvax!jkh) Computer Facilities & Communications. U.C. Berkeley From: Milo S. Medin <medin@orion.arpa> Date: Apr 6, 1987, 5:06 AM Actually, Dennis Perry is the head of DARPA/IPTO, not a pencil pusher in the IG's office. IPTO is the part of DARPA that deals with all CS issues (including funding for ARPANET, BSD, MACH, SDINET, etc...). Calling him part of the IG's office on the TCP/IP list probably didn't win you any favors. Coincidentally I was at a meeting at the Pentagon last Thursday that Dennis was at, along with Mike Corrigan (the man at DoD/OSD responsible for all of DDN), and a couple other such types discussing Internet management issues, when your little incident came up. Dennis was absolutely livid, and I recall him saying something about shutting off UCB's PSN ports if this happened again. There were also reports about the DCA management types really putting on the heat about turning on Mailbridge filtering now and not after the buttergates are deployed. I don't know if Mike St. Johns and company can hold them off much longer. Sigh... Mike Corrigan mentioned that this was the sort of thing that gets networks shut off. You really pissed off the wrong people with this move! Dennis also called up some VP at SUN and demanded this hole be patched in the next release. People generally pay attention to such people. Milo From: Mark Crispin <MRC%PANDA@sumex-aim.stanford.edu> Date: Mon, Apr 6, 1987, 10:15 AM Dan - I'm afraid you (and I, and any of the other old-timers who care about security) are banging your head against a brick wall. The philsophy behind Unix largely seems quite reminiscent of the old ITS philsophy of "security through obscurity;" we must entrust our systems and data to a open-ended set of youthful hackers (the current term is "gurus") who have mastered the arcane knowledge. The problem is further exacerbated by the multitude of slimy vendors who sell Unix boxes without sources and without an efficient means of dealing with security problems as they develop. I don't see any relief, however. There are a lot of politics involved here. Some individuals would rather muzzle knowledge of Unix security problems and their fixes than see them fixed. I feel it is *criminal* to have this attitude on the DDN, since our national security in wartime might ultimately depend upon it. If there is such a breach, those individuals will be better off if the Russians win the war, because if not there will be a Court of Inquiry to answer... It may be necessary to take matters into our own hands, as you did once before. I am seriously considering offering a cash reward for the first discoverer of a Unix security bug, provided that the bug is thoroughly documented (with both cause and fix). There would be a sliding cash scale based on how devastating the bug is and how many vendors' systems it affects. My intention would be to propagate the knowledge as widely as possible with the express intension of getting these bugs FIXED everywhere. Knowledge is power, and it properly belongs in the hands of system administrators and system programmers. It should NOT be the exclusive province of "gurus" who have a vested interest in keeping such details secret. -- Mark -- PS: Crispin's definition of a "somewhat secure operating system": A "somewhat secure operating system" is one that, given an intelligent system management that does not commit a blunder that compromises security, would withstand an attack by one of its architects for at least an hour. Crispin's definition of a "moderately secure operating system": a "moderately secure operating system" is one that would withstand an attack by one of its architects for at least an hour even if the management of the system are total idiots who make every mistake in the book. ------- From: Dennis G. Perry <PERRY@vax.darpa.mil> Date: Apr 6, 1987, 3:19 PM Jordan, you are right in your assumptions that people will get annoyed that what happened was allowed to happen. By the way, I am the program manager of the Arpanet in the Information Science and Technology Office of DARPA, located in Roslin (Arlington), not the Pentagon. I would like suggestions as to what you, or anyone else, think should be done to prevent such occurances in the furture. There are many drastic choices one could make. Is there a reasonable one? Perhaps some one from Sun could volunteer what there action will be in light of this revelation. I certainly hope that the community can come up with a good solution, because I know that when the problem gets solved from the top the solutions will reflect their concerns. Think about this situation and I think you will all agree that this is a serious problem that could cripple the Arpanet and anyother net that lets things like this happen without control. dennis ------- Also: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/4.73.html#subj10.1 http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/4.73.html#subj10.1 https://everything2.com/title/Jordan+K.+Hubbard https://everything2.com/title/Jordan+K.+Hubbard