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The assumption of a trusted setup phase makes zkSNARKs somewhat obscure to use. Definitely, it does not fit for making evidence for voting where an adversary co
by JanisErdmanis 4y ago
The assumption of a trusted setup phase makes zkSNARKs somewhat obscure to use. Definitely, it does not fit for making evidence for voting where an adversary could have rigged a setup phase allowing to issue votes as sees fit.
- PretzelPirate 4y agoYou can include a very large set of people in the trusted setup, and if even one of them destroys their key the system is safe. So far, there have been ceremonies which invite anyone to join who wants to, and anyone who participated and destroyed their own key knows that the trusted setup isn't compromised. An entire community could participate for their local votes and they could each destroy their own key in order to have confidence in the result.
- JanisErdmanis 4y agoInteresting. I am concerned, however, that those ceremonies would not be protected against sabotage. For instance, if a few participants decide not to follow the protocol, the ceremony would need to be restarted. A question then, would the dishonest parties could be identified? That can be used as a reason in the face of security to limit who could join and in that way, sabotage the ceremony. > An entire community could participate for their local votes and they could each destroy their own key in order to have confidence in the result. Two problems. Dishonest voters spoil the process. Synchronically running multiparty ceremony between all participants at the same time (what if the voter could not make it, what if the server gets a DDOS attack in the process).