> If I take a script, modify it and re sign it with a valid key, it will still be signed, just not by the original author, and will run. > Even on windows now,

> If I take a script, modify it and re sign it with a valid key, it will still be signed, just not by the original author, and will run. > Even on windows now, package are often signed by individual developers rather than an entity that you might recognise the name of. This is implies what you, as an attacker: have the access to the Enterprise PKI can issue code signing certificates somehow your certificate drops in the Trusted Publishers[0] on the endpoint ie you have the access or to the GPO/domain controllers (keys to the kingdom) or to the endpoint (making the whole dance with certs moot) > If this is an optional step (which it would have to be) then the easiest thing to do is to remove the signature from the script This would make the script to fail from running in a proper configuration > and modify the instructions on how to run the script. And again this requires the access to the endpoint, which makes your assumptions moot. > If an attacker has compromised the supply chain, unless the original host has done something incredibly dumb, chances are they're quite dedicated and jumping through a handful of extra steps arent going to stop them. Exactly, which is why you don't "signed by individual developers", don't provide the easy way to access the PKI, don't sign the scripts and yet run them with -bypass. Come on, I did deploy PKI and PS Code Signing. [0] https://old.reddit.com/r/PowerShell/comments/kpwi5r/powershell_script_signing_trusted_publisher_prompt/gi4idy1/ https://old.reddit.com/r/PowerShell/comments/kpwi5r/powershe...