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An interesting thing is that it should be the other way around. Repository packages usually are signed with GPG. You can even use HTTP - it does not matter. An
by vbezhenar 4y ago
An interesting thing is that it should be the other way around.
Repository packages usually are signed with GPG. You can even use HTTP - it does not matter. And GPG could be used to sign packages on another machine, may be even on offline machine with HSM.
Things like pip or curl rely only on HTTPS. There are many agents between developer who built a deliverable artifact and your machine. There's WWW-server. There's some CDN with HTTPS termination. There's NSA which can issue fake certificate and MITM attack you (mostly imaginably threat for sure, but still).
And hacked WWW servers already happened. Transmission website was hacked and their binary was infected.
Now I don't claim it to be a big issue. Malevolent developer is much more dangerous and much more likely to happen. But if we want to compare those two methods - I think that repositories with proper signatures are safer.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- KyeRussell 4y agoAt the risk of pointing out what I see as the obvious, but you’re focusing on different attacks. It’s a lot more nuance than “it should be the other way around”. A very valid argument can be made that it’s more likely that you’re installing a dodgy package rather than being subject to some sort of MITM attack.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- gorgoiler 4y agoAn apt repository has to be trusted forever: every apt upgrade brings a risk that something new and nefarious will slip in. With curl|bash it’s a one time risk.