7 ms·
> If you had a legacy 5000 rounds or 10000 rounds, the # of rounds can't just be increased server side. Changing that would mean a new key is derived. So older
by bawolff 4y ago
> If you had a legacy 5000 rounds or 10000 rounds, the # of rounds can't just be increased server side. Changing that would mean a new key is derived. So older users likely still have a pretty low number of pbkdf2 rounds which makes them more vulnerable to brute forcing
Kind of unclear but i think this implies that lastpass doesn't do some and reencrypt on login. Are they saying its just people who havent unlocked there vault in a decade, or are they saying all old users have this? If the latter this is really poor design.
> Lots of vault entries may be encrypted with ECB mode AES-256.
Wtf wtf wtf. This would be considered wildly insecure even by the standards of the 80s
- SyzygistSix 4y agoOld(er) users. This is the kick in the ass I needed to switch to something else.
- Philip-J-Fry 4y agoI just checked my old account and it was configured to be 5000. I changed it and re-encrypts the data and uploads it, and then forces you to login again, presumably to do server side part. Seems weird that they would have the number of rounds fixed from the time of account creation though. Surely it would be possible to increase the number of rounds over time. Edit: I should add that I have logged into this account within the past year or two. So if they're supposed to increase over time, it ain't worked.
- bawolff 4y agoIt's also not really an obscure issue. For example, the owasp password cheatsheet talks about the need to increase the work factor over time - https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Stor... . I would hope that password manager software would at least know the things that end up on "cheatsheets"
- IgorPartola 4y agoWhy is this even a setting exposed to users? Shouldn’t this be entirely up to them to manage the correct work factor?
- crazygringo 4y ago100% agreed. Paying for a major brand password manager, you should assume that you are paying for them to always keep the security totally up-to-date with best practices. The idea that you are somehow responsible for finding an obscure setting not just in "Account settings" but in a separate "Advanced settings" that defaults to hidden, and knowing the appropriate number to set it to, boggles the mind.
- SyzygistSix 4y ago[flagged]
- brookst 4y ago“But look, you found the notice, didn’t you?” “Yes,” said Arthur, “yes I did. It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard.’”
- thechao 4y agoThere’s an entire novella of Arthur just finding this notice, right? It could be serialized into three one hour episodes of Dent, queuing & requeuing and just talking to others inqueue.
- roflyear 4y agoBc product people are hilarious!
- Someone1234 4y agoWhy not both? Keep in mind that this is a trade-off, it requires more computational power AND battery, so giving users access to the leavers makes sense (e.g. power users with nice equipment can pump up the number). That being said I do agree that it is up to the vendor to set AND enforce a new higher minimum. If someone logs in with 5K rounds, it should be changed to the new default (100k). On a related note Bitwarden also allows users to configure this. I recently increased mine to 150K rounds.
- cshimmin 4y agoYeah I was a daily user until about a month or two ago. Didn't even know about this setting, and I still haven't figured out how to change it in the mobile app. But mine is definitely set to 5k. Still in the process of changing all my passwords...
- brianshaler 4y agoThis is pretty wild. When you rotate your master password and it re-encrypts everything, that's a perfect opportunity to use a new iteration count. If they didn't want change the value for user's who were at an old default value, they at least could have nagged "your account is using an old/low value for an encryption setting, click here to use the latest recommended default" Of course, changing it now won't do any good with regard to previous leaks.
- insanitybit 4y agoThey could have changed the setting any time the user logged in. I pointed out that they used too few rounds over a decade ago, I believe. To their credit, they increased the limit to 256K in response (it was much lower before).
- crazygringo 4y agoYup mine was 5000 too. I'm baffled as to why they don't force an upgrade on everyone the next time they log in. Old accounts that haven't been touched in years, sure. But active accounts being used daily? This is really unfathomable.
- arka2147483647 4y ago> Seems weird that they would have the number of rounds fixed from the time of account creation though. Surely it would be possible to increase the number of rounds over time. Well, No. In metacode, pbkdf2 works something like: derived_password = pbkdf2(real_password, salt, 5000, ...); Encrypt(vault, derived_password); (See Wikipedia for more details https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2) Point being, you can only change the number of rounds if you re-encrypt the vault, and you can only do that, if the users participates by giving their password to first un-encrypt it during that process. So it cannot be done silently in the background.
- mvonballmo 4y agoAgreed, it requires user-participation. However, LastPass could be proactive about this, perhaps including the number of rounds in its security check. It could tell you that your legacy account should be updated and guide you through it. That would be helpful. I have the standard 100,100 iterations, but had no idea that this was a feature I had to keep track of.
- gregmac 4y agoIt's possible to silently do this as part of logging in. I've done this with normal login for several (legacy) systems I've worked on, migrating users from md5 or sha1 to better algorithms.
- d1str0 4y agoTheres a big difference. If you’re hashing a password for storage you end up getting the password first. LastPass NEVER gets your master key server side. All encryption is done locally. Also, hashing a password is extremely quick. To unencrypt the full vault and re-encrypt it does take an amount of focused time. Might not be able to be done “silently” in the background, but obviously LP should have been forcing an upgrade on login.
- coder543 4y ago> To unencrypt the full vault and re-encrypt it does take an amount of focused time. The entire vault should not be encrypted directly with the user's password. That would go against standard best practices. See this comment written hours before yours, right under the comment you replied to: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34127993 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34127993 There is no "big difference" here, and it could be done trivially during login. The fact that it would be done client side instead of server side is a very minor implementation detail.
- vegardlarsen 4y agoMine seem to be set to 1 iteration, screenshot here: https://snabelen.no/@vegardlarsen/109575002998425618 https://snabelen.no/@vegardlarsen/109575002998425618 My account is very old, but this was hidden behind advanced settings. And I have used this account daily since I created it. Not having this increase from their end seems very unprofessional.
- mattm 4y agoMine was also set to 5000
- fluidcruft 4y agoI have a really old account (pretty sure I started using it ~2010) and I use lastpass essentially daily. I've never looked at that setting and I see that mine is set to 100,100. So it's migrated sometime. But I do also have some vague memory of a lastpass incident years ago where there was a prompt that they wanted to re-encrypt everything preemptively.
- FreakLegion 4y ago> Wtf wtf wtf. This would be considered wildly insecure even by the standards of the 80s You aren't wrong, if true that's certainly a mistake on their part. Practically speaking though as long as the passwords are randomly generated it probably doesn't matter, i.e. if you think about what the IV and chaining are doing in CBC. ECB is just as good for encrypting a random stream of bits; CBC just makes sure the bits are random before passing them into the cipher. Of course the optics are still terrible.
- cmeacham98 4y agoWhile you're correct: 1. In real life, passwords aren't random. Password manager users are probably less likely than average to make this blunder, but I'd still be willing to bet _the majority_ of lastpass's customers do. 2. Even if you personally have all random passwords, would you really want to use a product made by people who made this level of a noob mistake? I used to pay for LastPass premium, now my account is deleted, my passwords are changed, and my money goes to Bitwarden instead - and every time I hear about Lastpass I don't regret this decision.
- FreakLegion 4y agoI suspect that even non-random passwords here are fine, again practically speaking (edit: and given certain assumptions, to be clear, like no reuse), but haven't sat down and proved it. Obviously this isn't an endorsement of LastPass. Everything about their protocols is disappointing. Even if the encryption issues turn out to be of the well-that-was-a-dumb-choice-but-you-don't-need-to-panic variety, it's because they got lucky, not because they were good.
- cmeacham98 4y ago> and given certain assumptions, to be clear, like no reuse Maybe I wasn't obvious enough, but this is the problematic assumption. When I say "non-random password", that's what I mean: a reused password. Almost everyone I know reuses passwords (sometimes with a slight variation, but 90% of the password the same), and my day job is a software engineer. I'd be willing to be at least half of Lastpass's users have at least 1 reused password.
- Leo_Verto 4y agoTo add onto this, the reason ECB mode is so horribly bad, is that it produces the same cyphertext for blocks with the same plaintext. This allows an attacker to detect repeating plain text segments, e.g. reused passwords. The Wikipedia article on block cypher modes illustrates this problem rather well [1]. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation#Electronic_codebook_(ECB) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation...
- zinekeller 4y agoECB Penguin! (https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/ https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/) Also, I've just learned that the quintessential file has been recently replaced. I understand the need for a higher resolution file, but I'm still a bit sad.
- evandale 4y agoHah, that first tweet is classic https://xkcd.com/1053/ https://xkcd.com/1053/ and I'm one of the 10000 today :) Today is the first time I've seen the penguin!
- bbbbb5 4y ago>This allows an attacker to detect repeating plain text segments, e.g. reused passwords. This is hardly a problem, any login form will also allow an attacker to do this.
- ilyt 4y ago... actually that might be a "feature" for them, they do have duplicate password report, I had assumed that's just based off decrypted ones on client side but they might be just using ECB for that
- insanitybit 4y agoThat report requires you enter your master password, so I doubt it.
- t0mas88 4y agoECB mode somehow still gets used, Zoom also did it. I think this is a result of many developers not knowing much about encryption and then selecting the simplest option from their language's standard library.
- owenmarshall 4y agoBecause I always want to identify the solution when we point to the problem: https://doc.libsodium.org/ https://doc.libsodium.org/ http://noiseprotocol.org/ http://noiseprotocol.org/
- eternityforest 4y agoAlso TLS and SSH for data in transport.
- bawolff 4y agoZoom at least has the excuse that its more convinent if you are possibly dropping frames and need random access decryption (still really not acceptable). LastPass does not even have that.
- robryk 4y agoCTR with no authentication is strictly better than EBC with no authentication in that case. Similarly, CTR-then-MAC (with MACs being e.g. per packet) is strictly better than EBC-then-MAC.
- upofadown 4y agoMissing (or duplicating) a block in the CTR (counter) block cipher mode messes up the alignment of the count. Then everything after that comes out as random garbage. CTR is not a very robust block cipher mode...
- tptacek 4y agoMissing or duplicating a block anywhere in a ciphertext should completely prevent decryption; that's how authenticated encryption works. The idea that some cipher modes are more or less resilient to corruption is, for the most part, a discredited 1990s idea.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- eternityforest 4y agoHow is AES ECB even possible? You would have to actively choose to do that. It's more effort than something like libsodium. Have they not heard of the first rule of crypto being "You probably aren't qualified to do it, use libsodium or TLS or SSH" yet? Why are they messing with cipher modes themselves?
- tptacek 4y agoTheir encryption code predates libsodium, and ECB was (on many platforms still is) the default mode --- also, the only mode that doesn't require confusing extra parameters.
- eternityforest 4y agoIt's an utterly useless mode though unless you add your own confusing extra stuff. It was probably a bad plan to make that the default.
- insanitybit 4y agoPeople forget that: a) LastPass is extremely old b) Browser extensions used to be completely different. You needed to call out to native code to do tons of stuff because the JS apis were extremely limited and slow. So it was either "roll crypto in JS" or "make users install a binary", the latter stopped being possible over something like a decade ago.
- aaron695 4y ago[dead]
- kodah 4y agoThat's correct. That means they didn't have a workflow for batch reencryption on login, must less a workflow for annually increasing rounds.
- bbbbb5 4y ago>Wtf wtf wtf. This would be considered wildly insecure even by the standards of the 80s For this particular use-case? Hardly. Since an attacker can easily use any login form of their choice as an oracle for password reuse, ECB mode can't really introduce significant issues here.
- nequo 4y agoWhat do you mean by “use any login form?” I don’t understand this phrase. If the attacker has an encrypted vault, what is the login form there for them to use and detect password reuse?
- bbbbb5 4y agoThese vaults conveniently come with unencrypted URLs of the login forms associated with each password. An attacker who discovers the plaintext of one password can trivially attempt to reuse that against all of the forms. Incorrect password attempts are essentially free, so ECB revealing reuse does not meaningfully help the attacker.
- nequo 4y agoOh I see. That makes sense. But for the attacker to try one of my passwords in a login form, they do need to have that password cracked already, which means that they already have my master password. But if they have that, they can decrypt all of my passwords, and the login forms are of no use. Am I misunderstanding something here?
- bbbbb5 4y ago>Am I misunderstanding something here? No, not at all. The point is that while ECB is a silly choice, it does not make it easier for the attacker to crack your vault. It does allow the attacker to see if you're reusing passwords, but does not reveal to the attacker what those passwords are. On the other hand, If the attacker were to discover one of your passwords from another source, they'd be able to confirm reuse anyway by simply attempting to use that password on other websites.
- ilyt 4y agoYeah it also struck me as bizzare. When client-side app has master key entered it it could just opportunistically upgrade that
- wernerb 4y agoThis is such a non-issue. You build in flags in the clients that are server activated "needs-reencrypt". After login (local client) flag is read from server and logic begins. You notify the user their vault needs stronger encryption. They can choose to continue and enter password, skip for now or ignore for 1 month (or something more reasonable). The point is you explain why you do this. Start the message with "We care about your encryption" and go from there to explain that they need you to upgrade because the don't know your master key, they need your help to do it. Adding this kind of behavior should be their core business. Apparently it's not.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- batter 4y agoYou can, I was working on solution to have hashing 2 times - new, and later old algo. Salt can be either reused or you'll have to use 2 salts for each algo.