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>It’s fine to store your passwords online for convenience, but as a user, it’s important to accept that it’s no longer your private password and will, at some p
by smegger001 4y ago
>It’s fine to store your passwords online for convenience, but as a user, it’s important to accept that it’s no longer your private password and will, at some point, leak.
ehh. I store my passwords online but its on a file I encrypted offline with strong password (over 20+ characters) and key. I use keepass which is a locally encrypted and stored password manger, and I store the DB on Dropbox and download it to any of my computers/devices were it is decrypted locally when needed. I don't trust password wallet services ass they all seem to want to do the enryption server side with a reset-able password which really means they have the master password not you, but my set up seems secure enough to me.
- 12907835202 4y agoHow does this work with mobile chrome/Firefox etc. Does it sync?
- smegger001 4y agothere is a keepass compatable app on fdroid i use, and it can sync just by syncing the db over dropbox
- xnickb 4y agoI have a similar setup, except I use Syncthing. Works fine with Keepass2Android/KeepassXC on both Windows and Linux machines. Occasionally I might need to do some manual steps (a week ago windows stopped running Syncthing and that caused some conflicts down the road), but most of the time it just works. If you have specific questions, feel free to ask.
- konha 4y ago> I don't trust password wallet services ass they all seem to want to do the enryption server side with a reset-able password which really means they have the master password not you None of the popular password managers work this way.
- milkshakes 4y ago1password for teams works exactly this way so does the family pack
- konha 4y agoSo you’re saying 1Password for families / teams differs significantly from their zero knowledge architecture? Have a look at [0] - recovery works without 1Password having the master password. [0] https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf#page48 https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-p...
- milkshakes 4y agoIf you read page 49 of the document you link: > Recovery Groups One of the most powerful capabilities that a team administrator has is the power to assign members to the team’s Recovery Group. In most configurations the assignment is automatic and Owners, Organizers, and Administrators will automatically be made members of the Recovery Group. In 1Password Families there is no ability to separate the roles of Owner, Administrator, and Recovery Group member; they are all wrapped up as “Organizer.” With 1Password Teams Administrators are given more control, but not all of the underlying flexibility may be exposed to the user.17 17We discovered during our beta testing that it was difficult to make the distinction between Owners, Administrators, vault Managers, and Recovery Group members clear enough for those distinctions to be sufficiently useful. This document describes recovery in terms of the Recovery Group even when the group is not exposed to the Team administrator in those terms. > Implicit sharing When a vault is created, a copy of the vault key is encrypted with the public key of the Recovery Group. The members of the Recovery Group are able to decrypt the private key of the Recovery Group. Thus from an exclusively cryptographic point of view the members of the Recovery Group have access to all of the vaults. Recovery Group members never have the ability to learn anyone’s account password, Secret Key, Account Unlock Key (AUK), or SRP-𝑥. Recovery is recovery of the vault keys; it is not recovery of account passwords nor Secret Keys.
- 4y ago