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Trust Windfalls sound like a terrible idea. If you allow someone to give out cash and select the next person to give out cash, the money will concentrate within

Trust Windfalls sound like a terrible idea. If you allow someone to give out cash and select the next person to give out cash, the money will concentrate within a friend group. At the very least, funding will disburse over much narrower set of research topics (I am most familiar with the work/people who research topics similar to my own). > Trust Windfalls are a Rorschach test for whether you trust people or not. I’m a guy on the internet going “hey give me a bunch of money and I’ll give it to my friends and it’ll be great!”... If you don’t know me and you’re a bit of a misanthrope, this sounds like the worst idea ever. Indeed, it does sound like the worst idea ever because I don't know you. That means there is zero chance of me getting the funding. And when you give the money to a friend, it's likely your friend will return the favor and give it back to you. Why nominate a person you know will not return the favor? And when they do, who is your next pick? Well, their wife needs funding, and so does your wife. So you go another round. Then who? Your cousin need funding, and so does your college roommate. You know who doesn't get funding - that person with a rival theory, and that person attempting to replicate your work. And if the money does happen to migrate to me, nothing against you, its just that if the money migrates out of my 'trusted network' it will likely not return for a long time. And my lab won't survive several years waiting for the funding to return.

notafraudster 4y ago
I'm not the author. I think you've hit on the main limitations, but I don't think it's fatal. If the lay of the land in a given field is such that there are well defined camps, then you allocate the money to each camp[0] and allow the camps to allocate the money internally. If the lay of the land is that it's diffuse and has very shifting structure, then you can't follow this strategy, but also it's maybe worth raising the possibility that it's not yet time to allocate money and the first thing the field should do is try to develop some structure. [0] Obviously the problem of what %age to give to each camp is an important second-order problem, but if you imagine a scenario like a university, I find it more likely the Provost's office can figure out how much to give to which Dean than they to be able to figure out how much to give to which lab. (I also think you're right to observe that even within a particular camp of a particular field there will be relationship-driven gladhanding that helps determine the flow of money, and that's a real concern, but it's just a more localized concern than I think you give it credit for. I'm also not entirely sold on it.)
- subroutine 4y ago
  > if you imagine a scenario like a university I find it more likely the Provost's office can figure out how much to give to which Dean than they to be able to figure out how much to give to which lab. If left to the provost or dean, the money will inevitably be distributed equally between all faculty. Once the money enters the university, there is no longer a separation between funding agency and recipients. And since 'equally' is the least complex/controversial way to distribute the funds, that's where it will eventually settle. (Hm, perhaps I am a misanthrope).

notafraudster 4y ago

I'm not the author. I think you've hit on the main limitations, but I don't think it's fatal. If the lay of the land in a given field is such that there are well defined camps, then you allocate the money to each camp[0] and allow the camps to allocate the money internally. If the lay of the land is that it's diffuse and has very shifting structure, then you can't follow this strategy, but also it's maybe worth raising the possibility that it's not yet time to allocate money and the first thing the field should do is try to develop some structure. [0] Obviously the problem of what %age to give to each camp is an important second-order problem, but if you imagine a scenario like a university, I find it more likely the Provost's office can figure out how much to give to which Dean than they to be able to figure out how much to give to which lab. (I also think you're right to observe that even within a particular camp of a particular field there will be relationship-driven gladhanding that helps determine the flow of money, and that's a real concern, but it's just a more localized concern than I think you give it credit for. I'm also not entirely sold on it.)

subroutine 4y ago
> if you imagine a scenario like a university I find it more likely the Provost's office can figure out how much to give to which Dean than they to be able to figure out how much to give to which lab. If left to the provost or dean, the money will inevitably be distributed equally between all faculty. Once the money enters the university, there is no longer a separation between funding agency and recipients. And since 'equally' is the least complex/controversial way to distribute the funds, that's where it will eventually settle. (Hm, perhaps I am a misanthrope).