> A TPM with an attestation key that is known to the previous owner (eg manufacturer or distributor) allows the previous owner (and everyone who trusts them) to

> A TPM with an attestation key that is known to the previous owner (eg manufacturer or distributor) allows the previous owner (and everyone who trusts them) to compel the current owner to verify what software they are running on their own machine. The user can change the seeds and this stops being the case. Also, this feature is very useful in enterprise settings. Useful here, harmful there -- that's what makes the technology neutral. Even if TPMs didn't have endorsement key certificates, the platform vendor could add its own -- TPMs would be pretty useless without being able to derive keys from seeds or wrap keys, but having that feature is enough to make possible what you dislike. > Saying "buy this corporate phone and then run this procedure to change the TPM key [destroying your ability to use corporate-based attestation]" isn't a compelling story [...] You wouldn't say that. You'd say "buy this [device] and install [certain OS] on it". Why would vendors pre-ship the thing that they don't want? The user has to do something, but it can be made easy.