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What I don't see touched on in this post is the high-level trust model. What generally makes trusted computing a non-starter for libre software is that it conta
by mindslight 4y ago
What I don't see touched on in this post is the high-level trust model. What generally makes trusted computing a non-starter for libre software is that it contains privileged keys baked in by the manufacturer.
A secure element chip does not need a completely libre/open design to support software freedom, but it does need to allow end-owners to run whatever software they would like - not subject to a third party's approval. To that end:
1. The chip needs to be able to be completely erased, having all keys zeroed out, at which time new keys can be loaded and/or internally generated. Signature verification keys are zeroed out to establish a new root of trust, and program/memory keys are zeroed out to maintain the security of information previously entrusted to the chip.
2. Resetting the chip should take a configurable amount of time (days to a month), either based on internally counting the clock or external proof of work, to protect against evil maid attacks by those with temporary possession of the hardware.
3. If there is any remote attestation functionality, then the reset procedure must output the attestation signing keys, including the private parts. This way the manufacturer (or any downstream integrators) cannot record the public identity of the shipped attestation keys to create a trust relationship that would prevent the ultimate owner from running software of their choosing.
For software freedom, these aspects are much more important than the design and licensing of the computation core(s). Let them ship ARM. Let them ship only ARM. Let them ship a proprietary ISA that needs to be painstakingly reverse engineered over a decade. Spend your social capital making sure the ultimate end-owners of the chip remain in control of their own devices! This is what is critical for open source.
- josephcsible 4y agoExactly. In particular, see the "Powerful, Reliable Software Can Be Bad" section of <https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point....>. It'll take careful engineering to keep this from being useful for DRM, which I'm worried won't get done.
- mindslight 4y agoActually even with the requirements I laid out, DRM would still work. A manufacturer could ship a device with decryption keys for DRM content. If the end-owner decided to liberate their device, then the decryption keys would be erased and DRM content could no longer be played. The owner would be left with a blank device ready to accept new software, likely open source, and the device wouldn't be relegated to becoming e-waste.
- p_l 4y agoThat's how it works with some of the hw backed DRM schemes that for example try to use remote Attestation with TPM, or secure media pathways on intel me or AMD PSP. The DRM software simply stops working, while you get to run everything you build yourself still.
- cryptonector 4y agoThere's no stopping walled gardens -- not with technology as the vendors would choose not to use such technology. The most choice users will ever get to make (per-device) is whether to be locked-into or locked-out-of the walled gardens.
- josephcsible 4y agoHuh, good point. I wonder how that would be fixable too.
- mindslight 4y agoDoes it need to be? I'm a staunch supporter of libre software, but I don't see the harm.
- mschuster91 4y ago> I'm a staunch supporter of libre software, but I don't see the harm. The harm is we're still perpetuating DRM crap. The music industry has accepted that Spotify's DRM can be trivially broken and completely given up trying to police BitTorrent... it's time for the movie industry to realize the same. Sadly, Netflix failed to get enough dominance to bend over and cane the movie industry into submission, and regulatory agencies worldwide just accepted happily that movie studios went all-in on vertical integration again.
- cryptonector 4y agoThe TCG got this right in that TPMs do not force you into a DRM world, but they certainly enable it. I say that's right because any TPM-like technology that could let you secure boot could also let the platform vendor lock you into a DRM world -or lock you out of the walled garden if you opt out- but the TCG took a neutral approach that lets the user opt out.
- p_l 4y agoBy making it only possible to verify that you run on certain stack (which enforces your DRM) they made a very simple but powerful scheme that doesn't in fact infringe on users rights (No matter what FSF's FUD campaign said)
- cryptonector 4y agoThere's more to it. A TPM comes with an endorsement key certificate, and the platform to which the TPM is attached can come with platform certificates, and the OS can require those to exist and be valid and that the TPM still have the corresponding private keys. An OS can use those keys and certificates to implement a garden walled by secured boot + attestation. The user gets to change the relevant key hierarchy seeds, thus causing those private keys to no longer be available, and those certificates to be useless, and the OS to no longer be able to do attestation using those keys and certificates -- but then the OS vendor gets to lock that device out of the walled garden.
- mindslight 4y ago> they made a very simple but powerful scheme that doesn't in fact infringe on users rights This is straight up false in the standard model where protocols are what mediates between otherwise-independent parties. If a remote party can verify the software I am running on my machine against my wishes, that creates a security vulnerability that prevents me from running software of my choice.
- cryptonector 4y ago> > they [the TCG] made a very simple but powerful scheme that doesn't in fact infringe on users rights > This is straight up false in the standard model where protocols are what mediates between otherwise-independent parties. I've answered this elsewhere. TPMs are neutral technology enabling technology that you might approve of and technology you might disapprove of. > If a remote party can verify the software I am running on my machine against my wishes, that creates a security vulnerability that prevents me from running software of my choice. TPMs do not prevent you from having opt-out. The matter of whether someone can give you only a binary choice of opting into or out of walled gardens is a market/political problem. I don't see how to prevent walled gardens using technology, especially when walled gardens vendors can make it so you can only access the walled gardens on devices that they manufacture (or bless) -- it's their tech, so what can you do to make it not possible for them to implement lock-in? It's just not possible.
- cryptonector 4y ago> What I don't see touched on in this post is the high-level trust model. What generally makes trusted computing a non-starter for libre software is that it contains privileged keys baked in by the manufacturer. Keys don't have to be open source. Re (2), the way you defeat evil maid attacks on boot or wake is by using a TPM and measuring every bit of firmware and software loaded (to some point) so that local storage decryption is not possible unless you're running golden code. The hard part is stopping evil maid attacks on running systems. Re (3), for open systems you really need any remote attestation to be at the option of the end user or the operating system that they choose to run (but the end user must have the option to run an operating system of their choice, which then might not implement remote attestation). TPMs got these things right, but they're not SEs. TPMs could be SEs, but they're missing necessary functionality. I'm imagining a BPF-style system where you'd get to send bytecode to be interpreted with access to various loaded key objects (handles), and which would be able to execute TPM commands (subject to policy) and use their outputs without exposing them to the user, with the program's execution and availability of its final outputs being conditional on satisfying some relevant policy. Because so many systems have a TPM, a TCG TPM standard update that allows for a very limited and TPM-centric SE to be implemented with a TPM firmware update would be very interesting. > For software freedom, these aspects are much more important than the design and licensing of the computation core(s). Let them ship ARM. Let them ship only ARM. Let them ship a proprietary ISA that needs to be painstakingly reverse engineered over a decade. Spend your social capital making sure the ultimate end-owners of the chip remain in control of their devices! This is what is critical for open source. Yes, the amount of software built to run in SEs is minute, therefore it's not that big a deal to expect vendors to recompile that software if a new version of the SE were to use a different ISA. I'm a bit surprised at the focus on RISC-V, but I'm not annoyed by it -- if it really costs them little, then I don't see the problem, and having the option is certainly interesting.
- ignaloidas 4y agoI think the focus on RISC-V is in large part because of the focus of RTL-level verification. You can't release ARM core's RTL, and some may fear that backdoors might be hidden there. But you can easily release RISC-V core's RTL, and let people verify that there is no backdoors in there.
- JoachimS 4y agoThe Tillitis TKey may provide a solution to this. You can (will be very soon) able to buy TKey devices that are not provisioned by Tillitis. Using the TKey programmer you can build your own FPGA bitstream (using the open toolchain). And then, using the provisioning tool or manually generate and insert your own Unique Device Secret (UDS). This also means that you can get two (or more) blank TKey devices and provision them with the same UDS, creating a backup key that you can put in a safe place. I'd recommend to at least have different Unique Device Identities, to allow you to see which of the devices you use when connecting it to the host. The bitstream, with the UDS is stored and locked in the FPGA non volatile configuration memory. It will not protect against a prepared evil maid-attack that gives the attacker enough time to dismantle the casing and perform a warm-boot attack. We are working on ways to make that attack harder, less feasible.