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Adding to the point on flexibility, not that anyone would do this, but SAN certs technically have no restrictions on sub-domain wildcard names but public CA's w
by LinuxBender 4y ago
Adding to the point on flexibility, not that anyone would do this, but SAN certs technically have no restrictions on sub-domain wildcard names but public CA's will not allow more than 1 sub-domain wildcard because they would lose money doing that.
In a private CA one could not that one would add as many wildcard sub-domain names as they wish.
e.g.
*.some-name.private-tld
*.*.some-name.private-tld
*.*.*.some-name.private-tld
and so on. Again, not that anyone would do this, but CA's will not permit it for financial reasons not technical reasons. They would instead have one buy a restricted signing cert bound to an apex domain+tld and I only know of a couple of CA's that even have that option and it is not an official offering. One has to be a partner of that CA. More common is to have customers buy one wildcard sub-domain cert per sub-domain level.
Another reason one might use an internal CA is to remove all public CA trusts on hardened systems and document this in SOC1/SOC2 controls as one of many mitigating controls for data leakage. Intra-datacenter communication can be forced through a MitM proxy in addition to VPN's and deny anything that is not specifically signed with the internal CA. This is not a common setup and only a handful of orgs would need such a control, but they do exist.
- tashian 4y agoFull disclosure: I work for Smallstep. I love your point about being able to limit trust on hardened systems to your own CA. For servers, in many cases you don't need any CAs in the trust store, because a lot of services will only trust the roots you've explicitly configured (if you're using client authentication). I've also noticed that Linux container distros generally ship with empty trust stores. So, a container distro can be a nice starting point for this.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]