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I note that this requires DNSSEC, which isn't very popular here on HN.
by pabs3 4y ago
I note that this requires DNSSEC, which isn't very popular here on HN.
- ilyt 4y agoI still don't understand how industry got conned into thinking sending all your DNS requests to essentially one actor (DoH) is a good idea
- mjevans 4y agoToo many ISPs hijacking requests to user configured DNS servers and too many ISPs providing default servers that 'helpfully' redirect to a placeholder domain with ads rather than just an NX record.
- dinosaurdynasty 4y agohttps://dnscrypt.info/public-servers https://dnscrypt.info/public-servers Lots of servers out there support DoH
- pabs3 4y agoI got the impression that DoH/DoT are mainly for request privacy rather than security.
- DistractionRect 4y agoIt's about security. It keeps intermediate hops from hijacking your query and providing their own response. Unfortunately, it offers no privacy. DNS is usually the precursor to a tls connection, and the domain name is sent in cleartext during the tls handshake. So the same people who would hijack your DNS queries are still privy to them if you use DoH (routers, ISPs, governments, etc).
- pabs3 4y agoDoT/DoH only stops one hop of the DNS resolution process from hijacking requests, so it isn't as good as DNSSEC for security. There is encrypted TLS handshaking for hiding the TLS domain name indicator. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/
- duskwuff 4y ago> ... so it isn't as good as DNSSEC for security. And DNSSEC doesn't provide any privacy to the end user. Both mechanisms provide something of value, and ideally they'd both be used together.
- josephcsible 4y agoThere's a lot of different DoH providers. And don't most people who aren't using DoH send all of their DNS requests to the same actor (usually their ISP) anyway?
- mindslight 4y agoCentralized servers run by trusted [0] third parties is the foundation that most of the industry is built on. Surveillance dollars flow in, and mindshare follows. DNS seems eminently easy to secure against eavesdropping, given it is just distributed database, and a slowly consistent one at that. Someone just needs to step up to the plate and make a p2p resolver that communicates with a secure protocol, rather than the naive one spelled out in rfc1035. And with DNSSEC you wouldn't even have to worry about trusting/verifying other peers. [0] The formal definition of someone who can break you, not the common usage that implies "trustworthy".
- pabs3 4y agoI like the GNU Name System for replacing DNS: https://www.gnunet.org/gns https://www.gnunet.org/gns
- duskwuff 4y agoEvery time people bring this project up, I have to say this again, so here goes: The purpose of a naming system is to give users a common way to consistently reference specific things. Anyone should be able to mention a name for a thing, and know that any other user will be able to look up that name and resolve it to the same thing. GNS missed this lesson. Under GNS, every user has their own, slightly different view of naming; a name which one user is able to resolve may not be resolvable for another user, or (even worse) other users might see it resolve to something completely different. There are many ways of defining how a "decentralized" naming system should work. This is one of them, and I'm sure it sounds cool, but it is not a good idea. Try again.
- dimensi0nal 4y agoDNSSEC is not the same thing as DoH or DoT or DNSCrypt
- dogecoinbase 4y agoIt's to prevent DNS-based ad blocking (e.g. Pi-hole).
- josephcsible 4y agoThis isn't true. There are DoH servers that do ad blocking.
- candiddevmike 4y agoParent means from the IoT device side. DoH lets devices (say your TV) bypass a pi-hole and still reach ad servers. That's why I blackhole DoH on my network. Don't connect to my wireless if you want DoH privacy.
- SAI_Peregrinus 4y agoBypassing your network's DNS doesn't require DoH, it just requires the IoT device to use its own DNS servers.
- candiddevmike 4y agoI redirect all outbound TCP/UDP 53 traffic to my DNS servers. I can't do that with DoH, so into the blackhole it goes
- josephcsible 4y agoRemember, if you can censor traffic at the network level, so can Comcast and China. Hopefully, there will eventually be a day when Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and CloudFlare all serve DoH from the same IPs they serve the rest of the websites they host from, so that it won't be feasible to block them anymore.
- SAI_Peregrinus 4y agoBut they can run DoH on any server, they don't have to use CloudFlare or Google or whatever. So any port 80 connection is suspect. Same for any port 443 connection with DoT. Or any port whatsoever if they run their DNS (on any transport) on a "non-standard" port, which is not unheard of for such devices. DNS works on port 5353 just as well as it does on port 53. Redirecting outbound port 53 to your own servers has never been an effective way to stop devices from using their own DNS. DoH and DoT do make it harder to block (since they're authenticated), but even classic DNS can evade simple port-based redirection.
- akerl_ 4y agoIt doesn't seem to actually require DNSSEC. Let's Encrypt will happily use these new fields to restrict issuance, the same way they were checking CAA records previously, for domains with and without DNSSEC.
- dinosaurdynasty 4y agoIt requires DNSSEC to prevent MITM between the CA and the domain's nameservers.
- regecks 4y agoIn this context, I think "requires DNSSEC" is an opinion at best. "Requires" is probably the wrong word. You are welcome to use CAA accounturi without DNSSEC and it will be effective. Your zone may be vulnerable to an active man-in-the-middle DNS attack (which is hard to pull off), but it will still be protected against somebody figuring out how to upload an /.well-known/acme-challenge/ file on your domain and issue an unauthorized certificate from a foreign ACME account. This attack is much easier - I did it against a popular mail provider a few years ago.
- zinekeller 4y ago> This attack is much easier - I did it against a popular mail provider a few years ago. I guess this is Fastmail :)
- holigot 4y agoCan't even understand, why they do not give us some features like IPv6, DANE, DNSSEC and so on... https://fastmail.blog/historical/fastmail-dns-hosting/ https://fastmail.blog/historical/fastmail-dns-hosting/ In 2014 Rob Mueller wrote: "Our future DNS plans include DNSSEC support (which then means we can also do DANE properly, which allows server-to-server email sending to be more secure), DMARC record support, and ideally one day Anycast support to make DNS lookups faster."
- 4y ago
- teddyh 4y agoI only ever see one person argue persistently against DNSSEC here on HN.
- fomine3 4y agoI saw some criticism https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29378633 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29378633
- teddyh 4y ago…by that person.
- akvadrako 4y agoWhy should anybody? DNSSEC is almost irrelevant for the majority of domains. I've worked at a place that was pioneering it and found it over complicated and fragile, so haven't touched it since. If you implement it correctly you are slightly more secure but there are better ways to spend your time.
- josephg 4y agoThis is a big problem. I feel like the security world is trusting DNSSEC to close the unencrypted / unsigned DNS record shaped security hole. If its not something people actually want to implement because its a mess, what do we do? Do we need something better than DNSSEC? Is DoH good enough?
- teddyh 4y agoI’ll just say that the same thing could be said (and was said, frequently and loudly) about HTTPS.
- tptacek 4y agoNo, it wasn't. I've been working in security since 1995. People have at times said that HTTPS was unnecessary for things like static content sites and blogs, sure. There has been pushback against the idea of doing HTTPS everywhere. But no serious person has ever pushed back against the need for HTTPS in some places. HTTPS and DNSSEC are not comparable. We've spent 25 years trying to have DNSSEC and not having it, and for a lot of us, the verdict is in: DNSSEC isn't necessary for a secure Internet.