3 ms·

It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it take

It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true?

skissane 4y ago
> It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. By the terms of the principle I proposed, it does matter. Now, maybe you are arguing my proposed principle is wrong in saying that matters – but, I don't know if considering a dolphin really helps get us anywhere in that argument: dolphins are – as far as we know – incapable of the kind of abstract conceptual thought necessary to even consider the question "is it possible that nothing could have existed at all", so why would what they can or can't imagine be relevant to that question? > What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? Essentially what I am arguing, is that it is inherent to the very idea of existence that at least something exists. The idea of some particular thing not existing is coherent, but the idea of nothing existing at all isn't. > And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true? Consider a statement like "the square is both entirely black and entirely white", or "1 + 1 = 3". For such statements, it is both true that (a) it is impossible that they are true, and (b) it is impossible for us to imagine what it would be like for them to be true. Now the question is, is it merely coincidentally true that both (a) and (b), or are they both true because their truth is related in some way? To me, the later seems far more plausible than the former. In which case, if we know (b) is true of a statement, that gives us at least some reason to think that (a) might be true of it as well. Of course, we are aware of specific cases in which (b) is true without (a) being true – but, all such known cases involve limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology. Is it possible for (b) to be true, yet (a) being false, for a reason unrelated to limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology? Nobody has proposed any such plausible reason, so I think it is reasonable to conclude that there probably isn't one. Hence, if (b) is true of a proposition, and we have no good reason to suppose our inability to imagine is due to limitations of our scientific/mathematical knowledge or technology, then that's a good reason to believe that (a) is at least probably true with respect to that proposition.

skissane 4y ago

> It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. By the terms of the principle I proposed, it does matter. Now, maybe you are arguing my proposed principle is wrong in saying that matters – but, I don't know if considering a dolphin really helps get us anywhere in that argument: dolphins are – as far as we know – incapable of the kind of abstract conceptual thought necessary to even consider the question "is it possible that nothing could have existed at all", so why would what they can or can't imagine be relevant to that question? > What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? Essentially what I am arguing, is that it is inherent to the very idea of existence that at least something exists. The idea of some particular thing not existing is coherent, but the idea of nothing existing at all isn't. > And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true? Consider a statement like "the square is both entirely black and entirely white", or "1 + 1 = 3". For such statements, it is both true that (a) it is impossible that they are true, and (b) it is impossible for us to imagine what it would be like for them to be true. Now the question is, is it merely coincidentally true that both (a) and (b), or are they both true because their truth is related in some way? To me, the later seems far more plausible than the former. In which case, if we know (b) is true of a statement, that gives us at least some reason to think that (a) might be true of it as well. Of course, we are aware of specific cases in which (b) is true without (a) being true – but, all such known cases involve limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology. Is it possible for (b) to be true, yet (a) being false, for a reason unrelated to limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology? Nobody has proposed any such plausible reason, so I think it is reasonable to conclude that there probably isn't one. Hence, if (b) is true of a proposition, and we have no good reason to suppose our inability to imagine is due to limitations of our scientific/mathematical knowledge or technology, then that's a good reason to believe that (a) is at least probably true with respect to that proposition.