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I find your first point to be similar (almost the opposite?) of Descartes' Ontological argument [0]. > 1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be cont

I find your first point to be similar (almost the opposite?) of Descartes' Ontological argument [0]. > 1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. Our (in)ability to imagine or reason about something does not make it (un)real or (un)true. Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Further... You already know that something exists, but that's a pretty unbelievable fact if you stop to think about it. You probably wouldn't believe it if it weren't so obvious. Why? Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. 0. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/

skissane 4y ago
> Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Note I explicitly said "if that impossibility is... not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation". Understanding mathematics to be a science (albeit a formal science rather than a natural one), a dolphin's inability to understand algebra is an example of "scientific or technological limitation"; therefore, my principle does not apply to that case, and your counterexample cannot be an argument against the principle when the principle as worded already excludes it. > Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. There are more than just two possibilities here. When you say "things always having existed", that can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways – an infinite past, or circular time (as in Nietzsche's eternal recurrence). Or, another possibility would be that the universe originated in the Hartle–Hawking state, meaning that as we approach the beginning of the universe, time becomes progressively more space-like, and hence there could be no unique "first moment" of time – in the beginning, there was no time, only space, and then (part of) space gradually becomes time, but in a continuous process in which there is no clear cut-off point between time's existence and non-existence. Can I comprehend these possibilities? I feel like I can, for some of them–maybe some of them are more comprehensible to me than to you. But, those which I cannot comprehend, is that because the theory itself is inherently incomprehensible, or is that "in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation"? I can't say for sure it isn't the later. For example, I find it really hard to comprehend the Hartle-Hawking proposal, but I don't have a good understanding of the maths and physics behind it, so it seems entirely possible that my difficulties in comprehending it are due to my lack of ability in maths and physics, rather than the very nature of the idea itself. Similarly, my intuition is repelled by the notion of an infinite past, but is it possible I'd view the matter differently if I had a better understanding of the mathematics of infinity? I can't completely rule that out. By contrast, I have no reason to think that my inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" is due to any limitation of my understanding of mathematics and physics. What mathematics or physics could possibly be relevant to it? There isn't any, and there is no reason to think there ever could be any. So, I say my principle clearly applies here, but not in the "how did things begin to exist" case which you raise.
- DangitBobby 4y ago
  It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true?
  - skissane 4y ago
    > It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. By the terms of the principle I proposed, it does matter. Now, maybe you are arguing my proposed principle is wrong in saying that matters – but, I don't know if considering a dolphin really helps get us anywhere in that argument: dolphins are – as far as we know – incapable of the kind of abstract conceptual thought necessary to even consider the question "is it possible that nothing could have existed at all", so why would what they can or can't imagine be relevant to that question? > What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? Essentially what I am arguing, is that it is inherent to the very idea of existence that at least something exists. The idea of some particular thing not existing is coherent, but the idea of nothing existing at all isn't. > And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true? Consider a statement like "the square is both entirely black and entirely white", or "1 + 1 = 3". For such statements, it is both true that (a) it is impossible that they are true, and (b) it is impossible for us to imagine what it would be like for them to be true. Now the question is, is it merely coincidentally true that both (a) and (b), or are they both true because their truth is related in some way? To me, the later seems far more plausible than the former. In which case, if we know (b) is true of a statement, that gives us at least some reason to think that (a) might be true of it as well. Of course, we are aware of specific cases in which (b) is true without (a) being true – but, all such known cases involve limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology. Is it possible for (b) to be true, yet (a) being false, for a reason unrelated to limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology? Nobody has proposed any such plausible reason, so I think it is reasonable to conclude that there probably isn't one. Hence, if (b) is true of a proposition, and we have no good reason to suppose our inability to imagine is due to limitations of our scientific/mathematical knowledge or technology, then that's a good reason to believe that (a) is at least probably true with respect to that proposition.

skissane 4y ago

> Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Note I explicitly said "if that impossibility is... not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation". Understanding mathematics to be a science (albeit a formal science rather than a natural one), a dolphin's inability to understand algebra is an example of "scientific or technological limitation"; therefore, my principle does not apply to that case, and your counterexample cannot be an argument against the principle when the principle as worded already excludes it. > Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. There are more than just two possibilities here. When you say "things always having existed", that can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways – an infinite past, or circular time (as in Nietzsche's eternal recurrence). Or, another possibility would be that the universe originated in the Hartle–Hawking state, meaning that as we approach the beginning of the universe, time becomes progressively more space-like, and hence there could be no unique "first moment" of time – in the beginning, there was no time, only space, and then (part of) space gradually becomes time, but in a continuous process in which there is no clear cut-off point between time's existence and non-existence. Can I comprehend these possibilities? I feel like I can, for some of them–maybe some of them are more comprehensible to me than to you. But, those which I cannot comprehend, is that because the theory itself is inherently incomprehensible, or is that "in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation"? I can't say for sure it isn't the later. For example, I find it really hard to comprehend the Hartle-Hawking proposal, but I don't have a good understanding of the maths and physics behind it, so it seems entirely possible that my difficulties in comprehending it are due to my lack of ability in maths and physics, rather than the very nature of the idea itself. Similarly, my intuition is repelled by the notion of an infinite past, but is it possible I'd view the matter differently if I had a better understanding of the mathematics of infinity? I can't completely rule that out. By contrast, I have no reason to think that my inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" is due to any limitation of my understanding of mathematics and physics. What mathematics or physics could possibly be relevant to it? There isn't any, and there is no reason to think there ever could be any. So, I say my principle clearly applies here, but not in the "how did things begin to exist" case which you raise.

DangitBobby 4y ago
It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true?
- skissane 4y ago
  > It doesn't really matter _why_ the dolphin doesn't believe algebra is possible, their subjective experience of being unable to imagine something is all it takes. The dolphin doesn't think it's a scientific or technological limitation, they just don't think it's possible. By the terms of the principle I proposed, it does matter. Now, maybe you are arguing my proposed principle is wrong in saying that matters – but, I don't know if considering a dolphin really helps get us anywhere in that argument: dolphins are – as far as we know – incapable of the kind of abstract conceptual thought necessary to even consider the question "is it possible that nothing could have existed at all", so why would what they can or can't imagine be relevant to that question? > What about "not existing" is impossible as an inherent property of nothingness? Essentially what I am arguing, is that it is inherent to the very idea of existence that at least something exists. The idea of some particular thing not existing is coherent, but the idea of nothing existing at all isn't. > And why do you think your ability to believe or picture something has any impact on whether it's real or true? Consider a statement like "the square is both entirely black and entirely white", or "1 + 1 = 3". For such statements, it is both true that (a) it is impossible that they are true, and (b) it is impossible for us to imagine what it would be like for them to be true. Now the question is, is it merely coincidentally true that both (a) and (b), or are they both true because their truth is related in some way? To me, the later seems far more plausible than the former. In which case, if we know (b) is true of a statement, that gives us at least some reason to think that (a) might be true of it as well. Of course, we are aware of specific cases in which (b) is true without (a) being true – but, all such known cases involve limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology. Is it possible for (b) to be true, yet (a) being false, for a reason unrelated to limitations of mathematical/scientific knowledge or technology? Nobody has proposed any such plausible reason, so I think it is reasonable to conclude that there probably isn't one. Hence, if (b) is true of a proposition, and we have no good reason to suppose our inability to imagine is due to limitations of our scientific/mathematical knowledge or technology, then that's a good reason to believe that (a) is at least probably true with respect to that proposition.