4 ms·

It’s a technical philosophical term for sensations like color and smell, which denotes they are subjective experiences of sensory information, as opposed to obj

It’s a technical philosophical term for sensations like color and smell, which denotes they are subjective experiences of sensory information, as opposed to objective properties out there in the world.

dragonwriter 4y ago
Technically, its the technical philosophical term for subjective experiences generally. Any discussion about it, however, is fairly deep navel-gazing, because it excludes and cannot be distinguished by any objective, testable, material effect.
- skissane 4y ago
  > because it excludes and cannot be distinguished by any objective, testable So, if you give people the “Mary the colour scientist” thought experiment, the vast majority of people give the answer consistent with the existence of qualia. That is something “objectively measurable”. Furthermore, I think it is important when someone asks the kind of question you are asking, to inspect what “objective” and “measurable” actually mean. Ultimately, something is “measurable” if some human has the subjective experience of performing that measurement (whether directly or indirectly). Similarly, something is “objective” if some human has the subjective experience of communicating with other humans and confirming they make the same measurement/observation/etc. To object to subjective experiences (qualia) on the ground that they are not “objective” or “measurable” is self-defeating, because “objective” and “measurable” presume the very thing being objected to.
  - jameshart 4y ago
    > something is “objective” if some human has the subjective experience of communicating with other humans and confirming they make the same measurement/observation/etc. Me and a dog both agree that steak tastes great. Me and a plant both agree that there's warmth and light that comes from the sun Me and the ocean both agree that the moon is out in the sky and goes round in a circle So... the ocean has subjective qualia relating to the moon's gravitational pull?
    - Winsaucerer 4y ago
      In what way do you and plants and you and the ocean 'agree'? I'm not sure how to make sense of these claims. I'm not even sure that you and the dog agree on this matter, but I can make more sense of that.
      - jameshart 4y ago
        Just poking at the 'human' part of the definition. Because if we want to ever be able to answer a question like 'does this AI system experience qualia', we need a definition that doesn't rely on 'well, qualia are a thing humans have, so... no'
        skissane 4y ago
        When I have a social-emotional interaction with another human being, of a certain quality, that interaction produces in me the conviction that they must be really conscious, as opposed to a psychological zombie. Of course, I only personally have that kind of interaction with a tiny subset of all humans, but I generalise that conviction from those humans which provide its immediate justification, to all humanity Which means, if there was an AI with which I could have that kind of interaction, I would likely soon develop the conviction that it was also really conscious, as opposed to a psychological zombie. Existing systems (for example, ChatGPT) don't offer me the quality of social-emotional interaction necessary to develop that conviction, but maybe some future AI will. And, if an AI did create that conviction in me, I likely would generalise it – not to every AI, but certainly to any other AI which I believed was capable of interacting in the same way
        andreareina 4y ago
        The whole idea of p zombies is that they can't be distinguished from conscious entities. Same inputs as a conscious mind, same outputs as a conscious mind, same behavior etc yet not conscious.
        4y ago
  - dragonwriter 4y ago
    > So, if you give people the “Mary the colour scientist” thought experiment, the vast majority of people give the answer consistent with the existence of qualia. The existence of qualia, and a change in it, is an assumption within the premise of the question, there is no answer to it that is not consistent with the existence of qualia: both “Mary does not gain new knowledge by direct experience of color” and “Mary does gain new knowledge by the direct experience of color” are consistent with, and depend on, qualia, to with, the direct experience of color. It is not an unknown effect (nor one that tells anything about the existence of qualia) that framing a qestions with a concept in the premise is a good way to get people to accept the premise and focus on answering the question within it. In fact, a very important propaganda technique involves leveraging this by working to get a question incorporating a proposition you wish to get accepted as part of its premise into public debate so that, whatever position people take on the questions, your interests are advanced because merely getting the question into the debate leads people to accept its premises.
    - skissane 4y ago
      Ask people: "is there a subjective experience of seeing a reddish patch, which is distinct from whatever physical processes might be going on in the eye and brain when one sees that reddish patch?" I think most people would say "yes". I don't think that's a "leading question". And, the "Mary the color scientist" thought experiment is just adding a bit more color (excuse the pun) to the question. > In fact, a very important propaganda technique involves leveraging this by working to get a question incorporating a proposition you wish to get accepted as part of its premise into public debate so that, whatever position people take on the questions, your interests are advanced because merely getting the question into the debate leads people to accept its premises. If there is "pro-qualia" propaganda in the public debate, I think there is at least as much "pro-materialism" propaganda as well.

dragonwriter 4y ago

Technically, its the technical philosophical term for subjective experiences generally. Any discussion about it, however, is fairly deep navel-gazing, because it excludes and cannot be distinguished by any objective, testable, material effect.

skissane 4y ago
> because it excludes and cannot be distinguished by any objective, testable So, if you give people the “Mary the colour scientist” thought experiment, the vast majority of people give the answer consistent with the existence of qualia. That is something “objectively measurable”. Furthermore, I think it is important when someone asks the kind of question you are asking, to inspect what “objective” and “measurable” actually mean. Ultimately, something is “measurable” if some human has the subjective experience of performing that measurement (whether directly or indirectly). Similarly, something is “objective” if some human has the subjective experience of communicating with other humans and confirming they make the same measurement/observation/etc. To object to subjective experiences (qualia) on the ground that they are not “objective” or “measurable” is self-defeating, because “objective” and “measurable” presume the very thing being objected to.
- jameshart 4y ago
  > something is “objective” if some human has the subjective experience of communicating with other humans and confirming they make the same measurement/observation/etc. Me and a dog both agree that steak tastes great. Me and a plant both agree that there's warmth and light that comes from the sun Me and the ocean both agree that the moon is out in the sky and goes round in a circle So... the ocean has subjective qualia relating to the moon's gravitational pull?
  - Winsaucerer 4y ago
    In what way do you and plants and you and the ocean 'agree'? I'm not sure how to make sense of these claims. I'm not even sure that you and the dog agree on this matter, but I can make more sense of that.
    - jameshart 4y ago
      Just poking at the 'human' part of the definition. Because if we want to ever be able to answer a question like 'does this AI system experience qualia', we need a definition that doesn't rely on 'well, qualia are a thing humans have, so... no'
      - skissane 4y ago
        When I have a social-emotional interaction with another human being, of a certain quality, that interaction produces in me the conviction that they must be really conscious, as opposed to a psychological zombie. Of course, I only personally have that kind of interaction with a tiny subset of all humans, but I generalise that conviction from those humans which provide its immediate justification, to all humanity Which means, if there was an AI with which I could have that kind of interaction, I would likely soon develop the conviction that it was also really conscious, as opposed to a psychological zombie. Existing systems (for example, ChatGPT) don't offer me the quality of social-emotional interaction necessary to develop that conviction, but maybe some future AI will. And, if an AI did create that conviction in me, I likely would generalise it – not to every AI, but certainly to any other AI which I believed was capable of interacting in the same way
        andreareina 4y ago
        The whole idea of p zombies is that they can't be distinguished from conscious entities. Same inputs as a conscious mind, same outputs as a conscious mind, same behavior etc yet not conscious.
        4y ago
- dragonwriter 4y ago
  > So, if you give people the “Mary the colour scientist” thought experiment, the vast majority of people give the answer consistent with the existence of qualia. The existence of qualia, and a change in it, is an assumption within the premise of the question, there is no answer to it that is not consistent with the existence of qualia: both “Mary does not gain new knowledge by direct experience of color” and “Mary does gain new knowledge by the direct experience of color” are consistent with, and depend on, qualia, to with, the direct experience of color. It is not an unknown effect (nor one that tells anything about the existence of qualia) that framing a qestions with a concept in the premise is a good way to get people to accept the premise and focus on answering the question within it. In fact, a very important propaganda technique involves leveraging this by working to get a question incorporating a proposition you wish to get accepted as part of its premise into public debate so that, whatever position people take on the questions, your interests are advanced because merely getting the question into the debate leads people to accept its premises.
  - skissane 4y ago
    Ask people: "is there a subjective experience of seeing a reddish patch, which is distinct from whatever physical processes might be going on in the eye and brain when one sees that reddish patch?" I think most people would say "yes". I don't think that's a "leading question". And, the "Mary the color scientist" thought experiment is just adding a bit more color (excuse the pun) to the question. > In fact, a very important propaganda technique involves leveraging this by working to get a question incorporating a proposition you wish to get accepted as part of its premise into public debate so that, whatever position people take on the questions, your interests are advanced because merely getting the question into the debate leads people to accept its premises. If there is "pro-qualia" propaganda in the public debate, I think there is at least as much "pro-materialism" propaganda as well.