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You don’t experience inner dialog or visualizations? Some people don’t, but I assume you recall dreaming. Opponents of qualia like Dennett argue against the mov

You don’t experience inner dialog or visualizations? Some people don’t, but I assume you recall dreaming. Opponents of qualia like Dennett argue against the movie in the head, but dreams sure aren’t coming from the external environment.

Garlef 4y ago
I think qualia is a good term in the following sense: An analogue question would be "why do things exist?". There can be no answer to this question. We can of course come up with theories that explain why certain things exist. But never why something even exists at all. Whatever reason we propose, reason, it again might needs to exist in order to be an acceptable answer. Qualia seems to be similar: They name precisely what is subjective about experience and therefore cannot be fully turned objective. We can of course develop theories of how certain experiences arise but never break down this barrier. So I find it a bit short sighted to simply say "there is no such thing as qualia". My preferred view is to think of both "qualia" and "existence" as a koan: They are very nonsensical terms but lead to interesting questions.
- skissane 4y ago
  > An analogue question would be "why do things exist?". There can be no answer to this question. We can of course come up with theories that explain why certain things exist. But never why something even exists at all. Here's an argument for the conclusion "it is necessary that at least one thing exists": 1) For some proposition P, if it is impossible for us to concieve of P being true, and if that impossiblity is inherent in the very nature of P, and not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation, then P is necessarily false 2) It is impossible for us to conceive of the proposition "nothing exists at all" being true 3) Our inability to concieve of "nothing exists at all" is inherent in the very nature of "nothing exists at all", as opposed to being somehow a product of our scientific or technological limitations. We have no good reason to believe that any future advances in science or technology will make any difference to our inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" being true 4) Hence, it is necessarily false that "nothing exists at all" 5) Hence, necessarily, at least one thing exists. Now, others may disagree with this argument, but I personally believe it to be sound. And, if we have a sound argument that "necessarily at least one thing exists", then that proposition, and the argument used to prove it, constitute a good answer to the question "why do things exist?"
  - riwsky 4y ago
    ahhh, but you forgot the axiom of choice! now something exists, but we have no idea what it is!
  - DangitBobby 4y ago
    I find your first point to be similar (almost the opposite?) of Descartes' Ontological argument [0]. > 1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. Our (in)ability to imagine or reason about something does not make it (un)real or (un)true. Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Further... You already know that something exists, but that's a pretty unbelievable fact if you stop to think about it. You probably wouldn't believe it if it weren't so obvious. Why? Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. 0. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/
    - skissane 4y ago
      > Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Note I explicitly said "if that impossibility is... not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation". Understanding mathematics to be a science (albeit a formal science rather than a natural one), a dolphin's inability to understand algebra is an example of "scientific or technological limitation"; therefore, my principle does not apply to that case, and your counterexample cannot be an argument against the principle when the principle as worded already excludes it. > Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. There are more than just two possibilities here. When you say "things always having existed", that can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways – an infinite past, or circular time (as in Nietzsche's eternal recurrence). Or, another possibility would be that the universe originated in the Hartle–Hawking state, meaning that as we approach the beginning of the universe, time becomes progressively more space-like, and hence there could be no unique "first moment" of time – in the beginning, there was no time, only space, and then (part of) space gradually becomes time, but in a continuous process in which there is no clear cut-off point between time's existence and non-existence. Can I comprehend these possibilities? I feel like I can, for some of them–maybe some of them are more comprehensible to me than to you. But, those which I cannot comprehend, is that because the theory itself is inherently incomprehensible, or is that "in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation"? I can't say for sure it isn't the later. For example, I find it really hard to comprehend the Hartle-Hawking proposal, but I don't have a good understanding of the maths and physics behind it, so it seems entirely possible that my difficulties in comprehending it are due to my lack of ability in maths and physics, rather than the very nature of the idea itself. Similarly, my intuition is repelled by the notion of an infinite past, but is it possible I'd view the matter differently if I had a better understanding of the mathematics of infinity? I can't completely rule that out. By contrast, I have no reason to think that my inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" is due to any limitation of my understanding of mathematics and physics. What mathematics or physics could possibly be relevant to it? There isn't any, and there is no reason to think there ever could be any. So, I say my principle clearly applies here, but not in the "how did things begin to exist" case which you raise.
dragonwriter 4y ago
> dreams sure aren’t coming from the external environment. They are, to the extent not random, coming from the material universe, whether from the part arbitrarily deemed “internal” to the “observer” or not.
- skissane 4y ago
  > They are, to the extent not random, coming from the material universe, whether from the part arbitrarily deemed “internal” to the “observer” or not. What is this "material universe" of which you speak? As an idealist, I'm inclined to say that the "universe" is a set of minds whose qualia cohere with each other (not perfectly, but substantially). “Physical” objects, events, laws, processes, etc, are patterns which exist in those qualia.
  - dragonwriter 4y ago
    > What is this “material universe” of which you speak? The part of my qualia which can be reduced consistent, predictive patterns (and, for convenience, a set of concepts which represent patterns, an explanatory models for patterns, within that.) The idea that there is anything that meaningfully exists outside of my qualia, is the lowest-level of those models, and that that includes other entities which have qualia of their own, is a high-level model (or maybe, more accurately, a conjecture) built on top of those models which might have consequences for, say, my preferences for how I would like the universe to develop, but interesting lacks predictive consequences – its a dead-end within the composite model. On a fundamental level, outside of any beliefs about the “reality” of the patterns or explanatory models of the “material universe”, objective questions are ones which have consequences on the expectations within that set of patterns, whereas subjective ones are those which do not.
    - skissane 4y ago
      > The idea that there is anything that meaningfully exists outside of my qualia, is the lowest-level of those models, and that that includes other entities which have qualia of their own, is a high-level model (or maybe, more accurately, a conjecture) built on top of those models which might have consequences for, say, my preferences for how I would like the universe to develop, but interesting lacks predictive consequences – its a dead-end within the composite model. Are you arguing that idealism is a predictive dead-end? I don't think it is any more of a predictive dead-end than materialism is. Scientific theories are conceptual frameworks which can be used to predict future observations. As such, they make no claims about the ultimate ontological status of their theoretical constructs. Materialists propose that those theoretical constructs (or at least some subset of them) are ontologically fundamental, and minds/qualia/etc must be ontologically derivative. Idealists propose that minds/qualia are ontologically fundamental, and those theoretical constructs are ontologically derivative. Neither is science, although both are philosophical interpretations of science – I see no reason why science (correctly interpreted) should be taken as preferring one to the other.

Garlef 4y ago

I think qualia is a good term in the following sense: An analogue question would be "why do things exist?". There can be no answer to this question. We can of course come up with theories that explain why certain things exist. But never why something even exists at all. Whatever reason we propose, reason, it again might needs to exist in order to be an acceptable answer. Qualia seems to be similar: They name precisely what is subjective about experience and therefore cannot be fully turned objective. We can of course develop theories of how certain experiences arise but never break down this barrier. So I find it a bit short sighted to simply say "there is no such thing as qualia". My preferred view is to think of both "qualia" and "existence" as a koan: They are very nonsensical terms but lead to interesting questions.

skissane 4y ago
> An analogue question would be "why do things exist?". There can be no answer to this question. We can of course come up with theories that explain why certain things exist. But never why something even exists at all. Here's an argument for the conclusion "it is necessary that at least one thing exists": 1) For some proposition P, if it is impossible for us to concieve of P being true, and if that impossiblity is inherent in the very nature of P, and not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation, then P is necessarily false 2) It is impossible for us to conceive of the proposition "nothing exists at all" being true 3) Our inability to concieve of "nothing exists at all" is inherent in the very nature of "nothing exists at all", as opposed to being somehow a product of our scientific or technological limitations. We have no good reason to believe that any future advances in science or technology will make any difference to our inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" being true 4) Hence, it is necessarily false that "nothing exists at all" 5) Hence, necessarily, at least one thing exists. Now, others may disagree with this argument, but I personally believe it to be sound. And, if we have a sound argument that "necessarily at least one thing exists", then that proposition, and the argument used to prove it, constitute a good answer to the question "why do things exist?"
- riwsky 4y ago
  ahhh, but you forgot the axiom of choice! now something exists, but we have no idea what it is!
- DangitBobby 4y ago
  I find your first point to be similar (almost the opposite?) of Descartes' Ontological argument [0]. > 1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. Our (in)ability to imagine or reason about something does not make it (un)real or (un)true. Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Further... You already know that something exists, but that's a pretty unbelievable fact if you stop to think about it. You probably wouldn't believe it if it weren't so obvious. Why? Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. 0. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/
  - skissane 4y ago
    > Your version would be like a dolphin claiming algebra can't be real because they can't imagine a system of equations, let alone solving one. Note I explicitly said "if that impossibility is... not in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation". Understanding mathematics to be a science (albeit a formal science rather than a natural one), a dolphin's inability to understand algebra is an example of "scientific or technological limitation"; therefore, my principle does not apply to that case, and your counterexample cannot be an argument against the principle when the principle as worded already excludes it. > Well, can you imagine how things (or the very first thing) came to exist? Or can you imagine the concept of things always having existed? What does that even mean? They are both beyond comprehension, and yet one of them is true. There are more than just two possibilities here. When you say "things always having existed", that can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways – an infinite past, or circular time (as in Nietzsche's eternal recurrence). Or, another possibility would be that the universe originated in the Hartle–Hawking state, meaning that as we approach the beginning of the universe, time becomes progressively more space-like, and hence there could be no unique "first moment" of time – in the beginning, there was no time, only space, and then (part of) space gradually becomes time, but in a continuous process in which there is no clear cut-off point between time's existence and non-existence. Can I comprehend these possibilities? I feel like I can, for some of them–maybe some of them are more comprehensible to me than to you. But, those which I cannot comprehend, is that because the theory itself is inherently incomprehensible, or is that "in any way a product of any scientific or technological limitation"? I can't say for sure it isn't the later. For example, I find it really hard to comprehend the Hartle-Hawking proposal, but I don't have a good understanding of the maths and physics behind it, so it seems entirely possible that my difficulties in comprehending it are due to my lack of ability in maths and physics, rather than the very nature of the idea itself. Similarly, my intuition is repelled by the notion of an infinite past, but is it possible I'd view the matter differently if I had a better understanding of the mathematics of infinity? I can't completely rule that out. By contrast, I have no reason to think that my inability to conceive of "nothing exists at all" is due to any limitation of my understanding of mathematics and physics. What mathematics or physics could possibly be relevant to it? There isn't any, and there is no reason to think there ever could be any. So, I say my principle clearly applies here, but not in the "how did things begin to exist" case which you raise.

dragonwriter 4y ago

> dreams sure aren’t coming from the external environment. They are, to the extent not random, coming from the material universe, whether from the part arbitrarily deemed “internal” to the “observer” or not.

skissane 4y ago
> They are, to the extent not random, coming from the material universe, whether from the part arbitrarily deemed “internal” to the “observer” or not. What is this "material universe" of which you speak? As an idealist, I'm inclined to say that the "universe" is a set of minds whose qualia cohere with each other (not perfectly, but substantially). “Physical” objects, events, laws, processes, etc, are patterns which exist in those qualia.
- dragonwriter 4y ago
  > What is this “material universe” of which you speak? The part of my qualia which can be reduced consistent, predictive patterns (and, for convenience, a set of concepts which represent patterns, an explanatory models for patterns, within that.) The idea that there is anything that meaningfully exists outside of my qualia, is the lowest-level of those models, and that that includes other entities which have qualia of their own, is a high-level model (or maybe, more accurately, a conjecture) built on top of those models which might have consequences for, say, my preferences for how I would like the universe to develop, but interesting lacks predictive consequences – its a dead-end within the composite model. On a fundamental level, outside of any beliefs about the “reality” of the patterns or explanatory models of the “material universe”, objective questions are ones which have consequences on the expectations within that set of patterns, whereas subjective ones are those which do not.
  - skissane 4y ago
    > The idea that there is anything that meaningfully exists outside of my qualia, is the lowest-level of those models, and that that includes other entities which have qualia of their own, is a high-level model (or maybe, more accurately, a conjecture) built on top of those models which might have consequences for, say, my preferences for how I would like the universe to develop, but interesting lacks predictive consequences – its a dead-end within the composite model. Are you arguing that idealism is a predictive dead-end? I don't think it is any more of a predictive dead-end than materialism is. Scientific theories are conceptual frameworks which can be used to predict future observations. As such, they make no claims about the ultimate ontological status of their theoretical constructs. Materialists propose that those theoretical constructs (or at least some subset of them) are ontologically fundamental, and minds/qualia/etc must be ontologically derivative. Idealists propose that minds/qualia are ontologically fundamental, and those theoretical constructs are ontologically derivative. Neither is science, although both are philosophical interpretations of science – I see no reason why science (correctly interpreted) should be taken as preferring one to the other.