3 ms·
The axe to grind here is that whatever the author mentions is, ipso facto, a flaw. I've highlighted an example where the author presents as unreasonable a choic
by thaumasiotes 4y ago
The axe to grind here is that whatever the author mentions is, ipso facto, a flaw. I've highlighted an example where the author presents as unreasonable a choice to go with greater security over lesser security, and labels that choice a security issue. This is not a reasoned or reasonable decision on the part of the author. I'm going to generalize the quality of argument here, which is terrible, to whatever else the author says.
Want to make the argument that libsignal can be misused? First, go through all of your examples and make sure they actually show misuse.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 4y agoAll of these examples show flaws in applications that libsignal didn't intrinsically mitigate. I think your response here is knee-jerk and superficial.
- thaumasiotes 4y agoBy a generous standard in which "they are more secure than I claim they should be" is considered a security issue, all of these examples show flaws. I don't find that convincing, no. > I think your response here is knee-jerk and superficial. You're not exactly in a position to criticize that. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33918022 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33918022
- mjg59 4y agoFirst, it's not clear that the failure to fall back to losing forward security in the event of one-time prekey exhaustion is a decision - if you simply error in your client code when you try to get a prekey and there aren't any, that could also be because you didn't understand that libsignal will perform that fallback. But the more important point is that the spec is explicit about the importance of trying to prevent exhaustion of one-time prekeys, and their failure to do that is absolutely an issue. I was trying to talk about the consequences of that issue, rather than saying that the decision not to fallback is inherently itself a security concern.