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Seems like the author has an axe to grind. > When you want to send a message to someone, you ask the server for one of their one-time prekeys and use that. Dec
by thaumasiotes 4y ago
Seems like the author has an axe to grind.
> When you want to send a message to someone, you ask the server for one of their one-time prekeys and use that. Decrypting this message requires using the private half of the one-time prekey, and the recipient deletes it afterwards. This means that an attacker who intercepts a bunch of encrypted messages over the network and then later somehow obtains the long-term keys still won't be able to decrypt the messages, since they depended on keys that no longer exist.
> Since these one-time prekeys are only supposed to be used once (it's in the name!) there's a risk that they can all be consumed before they're replenished. The spec regarding pre-keys says that servers should consider rate-limiting this, but the protocol also supports falling back to just not using one-time prekeys if they're exhausted (you lose the forward secrecy benefits, but it's still end-to-end encrypted).
> This implementation not only implemented no rate-limiting, making it easy to exhaust the one-time prekeys, it then also failed to fall back to running without them. Another easy way to force DoS.
You just described a security/convenience tradeoff in the use of prekeys. OK. Then, the app's choice to go with security over convenience is a security problem, because you're not allowed to send messages without forward secrecy. For greater security, the app should have allowed messages at a lower level of security.
If you want to make the case that someone did the wrong thing, do it in a way where they wouldn't also have been wrong if they did the opposite of what you're complaining about.
- klooney 4y agoAlso, Twitter is a great big centralized system- it seems like it ought to make public key distribution very easy and straightforward.
- djbusby 4y agoWasn't that what KeyBase was supposed to do?
- ttyprintk 4y agoAnd GitHub is beating Keybase at
- brigandish 4y agoCare to expand on that?
- ttyprintk 4y agoAs we see signing support for ssh keys, the automatic hosting of keys from https://GitHub.com/your-name-here.keys https://GitHub.com/your-name-here.keys and the corresponding gpg.
- djbusby 4y agoWhy did I learn this from you and not some docs? Maybe cause I'm here more often than GH.
- ttyprintk 4y agoIt’s possible GitHub doesn’t want to publicize it widely. Using those keys, it’s possible for a server to identify you from a connection attempt: https://words.filippo.io/ssh-whoami-filippo-io/ https://words.filippo.io/ssh-whoami-filippo-io/
- brigandish 4y agoThanks, and interesting info linked below (with explanation linked to here[1]) that made OpenSSH clients versions 5.4 to 7.1 vulnerable: > Although roaming is not supported by the OpenSSH server, it is enabled by default in the OpenSSH client, and contains two vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a malicious SSH server (or a trusted but compromised server): an information leak (memory disclosure), and a buffer overflow (heap-based). [1] https://www.qualys.com/2016/01/14/cve-2016-0777-cve-2016-0778/openssh-cve-2016-0777-cve-2016-0778.txt https://www.qualys.com/2016/01/14/cve-2016-0777-cve-2016-077...
- tptacek 4y agoThis is a blog post relating flaws the author found in systems that naively used libsignal. The "axe" to grind here is that libsignal can be misused.
- thaumasiotes 4y agoThe axe to grind here is that whatever the author mentions is, ipso facto, a flaw. I've highlighted an example where the author presents as unreasonable a choice to go with greater security over lesser security, and labels that choice a security issue. This is not a reasoned or reasonable decision on the part of the author. I'm going to generalize the quality of argument here, which is terrible, to whatever else the author says. Want to make the argument that libsignal can be misused? First, go through all of your examples and make sure they actually show misuse.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 4y agoAll of these examples show flaws in applications that libsignal didn't intrinsically mitigate. I think your response here is knee-jerk and superficial.
- thaumasiotes 4y agoBy a generous standard in which "they are more secure than I claim they should be" is considered a security issue, all of these examples show flaws. I don't find that convincing, no. > I think your response here is knee-jerk and superficial. You're not exactly in a position to criticize that. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33918022 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33918022
- mjg59 4y agoFirst, it's not clear that the failure to fall back to losing forward security in the event of one-time prekey exhaustion is a decision - if you simply error in your client code when you try to get a prekey and there aren't any, that could also be because you didn't understand that libsignal will perform that fallback. But the more important point is that the spec is explicit about the importance of trying to prevent exhaustion of one-time prekeys, and their failure to do that is absolutely an issue. I was trying to talk about the consequences of that issue, rather than saying that the decision not to fallback is inherently itself a security concern.