8 ms·

Good to see this. Apple's WWDC video on Passkeys [1] has a good explanation of how passkeys work, including the nifty feature where you can use your phone to lo

by tedd4u 4y ago

Good to see this. Apple's WWDC video on Passkeys [1] has a good explanation of how passkeys work, including the nifty feature where you can use your phone to log in on a laptop without the laptop getting your credentials. [1] https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2022/10092/ https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2022/10092/

kccqzy 4y ago
And what's more nifty is that the phone can be Android or iOS, the laptop can be Windows or macOS and it will all work.
- knaik94 4y ago
  How is that different from password+2 factor? Logging-in is already platform independent.
  - yencabulator 4y ago
    Webauthn is immune to phishing. The message sent to the server cryptographically depends on the target domain. With Webauthn, you can't be fooled into typing your password+2factor into gmai1.com.
  - stetrain 4y ago
    Password+2 factor sends your password across the wire to the website, and trusts that website and the path between to handle it securely and not store or log it anywhere. Passkey never sends your private key to the website you are signing in to.
    - knaik94 4y ago
      That's the purpose of the 2 factor. The "private key" used to generate the 5/6 digit pin stays on my device and isn't transmitted.
      - stetrain 4y ago
        Well what if we got rid of the password and just used the private key part?
        knaik94 4y ago
        That's how SSH commits work on github. It's an option, but for complete multi-factor security passwords take care of the "something you know" factor. The factors "something you know" like a password, "something you are" like biometrics, along with "something you have" like a hardware authenticator that implements TOTP/HOTP.
        stetrain 4y ago
        But modern password best practices require long, unique passwords for each website. Most users either don’t follow this, or use a password manager. If you use a password manager, the “something you know” has become just another “something you have” like an SSH or 2 factor key. Basically for good security practices, passwords are converging on becoming SSH keys except less secure since you trust the website (or any device that isn’t yours that you type them into) to not leak them. At that point, what value is the password providing when you are always pairing it with an actual private key challenge?
        knaik94 4y ago
        The best practices about the length and uniqueness of passwords was based on the assumption that leaked passwords and rainbow tables could be used to compromise multiple accounts from a single compromise. The current standard of storing salted passwords makes the uniqueness requirement of passwords meaningless. If companies don't properly salt passwords, then uniqueness and length became an issue again. Salted passwords are effectively the same as appending an SSH key to a chosen password and letting websites manage them. With properly salted passwords, even if everyone chose the exact same password, a compromised password database would be meaningless. This is the reason why NIST changed its guidelines about how often a password should be reset. It also changed the guidelines for complexity rules of passwords. "Q-B05: Is password expiration no longer recommended? A-B05: SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 states: “Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.” Users tend to choose weaker memorized secrets when they know that they will have to change them in the near future. When those changes do occur, they often select a secret that is similar to their old memorized secret by applying a set of common transformations such as increasing a number in the password. This practice provides a false sense of security if any of the previous secrets has been compromised since attackers can apply these same common transformations. But if there is evidence that the memorized secret has been compromised, such as by a breach of the verifier’s hashed password database or observed fraudulent activity, subscribers should be required to change their memorized secrets. However, this event-based change should occur rarely, so that they are less motivated to choose a weak secret with the knowledge that it will only be used for a limited period of time. Q-B06: Are password composition rules no longer recommended? A-B06: SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 recommends against the use of composition rules (e.g., requiring lower-case, upper-case, digits, and/or special characters) for memorized secrets. These rules provide less benefit than might be expected because users tend to use predictable methods for satisfying these requirements when imposed (e.g., appending a ! to a memorized secret when required to use a special character). The frustration they often face may also cause them to focus on minimally satisfying the requirements rather than devising a memorable but complex secret. Instead, a blacklist of common passwords prevents subscribers from choosing very common values that would be particularly vulnerable, especially to an online attack. Composition rules also inadvertently encourage people to use the same password across multiple systems since they often result in passwords that are difficult for people to memorize." https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/#q-b05 https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/#q-b05
knaik94 4y ago
I don't see why I should be worried about storing and using credentials on my own devices. What would be the point, what threat does it protect against, and in what way is it more useful than using OAuth 2.0 "sign in with" feature?
- taftster 4y ago
  Logging into devices you don't own, for example.
  - knaik94 4y ago
    I log in to devices I don't own using a password+2factor. I have a long but memorable password that I just type in. I don't have some obtuse password where I require a password manager to log-in, I refuse to use the suggested password that chrome generates. What is the point of a password I don't remember? I am going to link this helpful xkcd comic https://xkcd.com/936/ https://xkcd.com/936/ that was published August 10, 2011 that is still relevant.
    - stetrain 4y ago
      If you type your password into a device you don’t own, what value is left in the password? Shouldn’t you basically consider it compromised at that point? If you rely on remembering your passwords, do you also keep them unique for every website?
      - brookst 4y ago
        It’s easy to have memorable and unique passwords for every website. You just create a personal hash algorithm to derive a password from the site name. For instance: number of letters in site name + second letter of site name in caps + last letter of site name + number of repeat letters in site name + (! if even number of letters, * if odd) + capitalized first letter google.com = 6Oe1!G bestbuy.com = 7Ey0*B Longer rules than that, but once you remember than you can derive the password for any site. If an adversary gets a few of your passwords and the sites they’re for, it would be easy to crack the rules. But that’s not an attack vector that typical hackers are exploring.
FeistySkink 4y ago
What's wrong with any of the existing methods of logging into my laptop?
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]

by tedd4u 4y ago

kccqzy 4y ago

And what's more nifty is that the phone can be Android or iOS, the laptop can be Windows or macOS and it will all work.

knaik94 4y ago
How is that different from password+2 factor? Logging-in is already platform independent.
- yencabulator 4y ago
  Webauthn is immune to phishing. The message sent to the server cryptographically depends on the target domain. With Webauthn, you can't be fooled into typing your password+2factor into gmai1.com.
- stetrain 4y ago
  Password+2 factor sends your password across the wire to the website, and trusts that website and the path between to handle it securely and not store or log it anywhere. Passkey never sends your private key to the website you are signing in to.
  - knaik94 4y ago
    That's the purpose of the 2 factor. The "private key" used to generate the 5/6 digit pin stays on my device and isn't transmitted.
    - stetrain 4y ago
      Well what if we got rid of the password and just used the private key part?
      - knaik94 4y ago
        That's how SSH commits work on github. It's an option, but for complete multi-factor security passwords take care of the "something you know" factor. The factors "something you know" like a password, "something you are" like biometrics, along with "something you have" like a hardware authenticator that implements TOTP/HOTP.
        stetrain 4y ago
        But modern password best practices require long, unique passwords for each website. Most users either don’t follow this, or use a password manager. If you use a password manager, the “something you know” has become just another “something you have” like an SSH or 2 factor key. Basically for good security practices, passwords are converging on becoming SSH keys except less secure since you trust the website (or any device that isn’t yours that you type them into) to not leak them. At that point, what value is the password providing when you are always pairing it with an actual private key challenge?
        knaik94 4y ago
        The best practices about the length and uniqueness of passwords was based on the assumption that leaked passwords and rainbow tables could be used to compromise multiple accounts from a single compromise. The current standard of storing salted passwords makes the uniqueness requirement of passwords meaningless. If companies don't properly salt passwords, then uniqueness and length became an issue again. Salted passwords are effectively the same as appending an SSH key to a chosen password and letting websites manage them. With properly salted passwords, even if everyone chose the exact same password, a compromised password database would be meaningless. This is the reason why NIST changed its guidelines about how often a password should be reset. It also changed the guidelines for complexity rules of passwords. "Q-B05: Is password expiration no longer recommended? A-B05: SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 states: “Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.” Users tend to choose weaker memorized secrets when they know that they will have to change them in the near future. When those changes do occur, they often select a secret that is similar to their old memorized secret by applying a set of common transformations such as increasing a number in the password. This practice provides a false sense of security if any of the previous secrets has been compromised since attackers can apply these same common transformations. But if there is evidence that the memorized secret has been compromised, such as by a breach of the verifier’s hashed password database or observed fraudulent activity, subscribers should be required to change their memorized secrets. However, this event-based change should occur rarely, so that they are less motivated to choose a weak secret with the knowledge that it will only be used for a limited period of time. Q-B06: Are password composition rules no longer recommended? A-B06: SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 recommends against the use of composition rules (e.g., requiring lower-case, upper-case, digits, and/or special characters) for memorized secrets. These rules provide less benefit than might be expected because users tend to use predictable methods for satisfying these requirements when imposed (e.g., appending a ! to a memorized secret when required to use a special character). The frustration they often face may also cause them to focus on minimally satisfying the requirements rather than devising a memorable but complex secret. Instead, a blacklist of common passwords prevents subscribers from choosing very common values that would be particularly vulnerable, especially to an online attack. Composition rules also inadvertently encourage people to use the same password across multiple systems since they often result in passwords that are difficult for people to memorize." https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/#q-b05 https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/#q-b05

knaik94 4y ago

I don't see why I should be worried about storing and using credentials on my own devices. What would be the point, what threat does it protect against, and in what way is it more useful than using OAuth 2.0 "sign in with" feature?

taftster 4y ago
Logging into devices you don't own, for example.
- knaik94 4y ago
  I log in to devices I don't own using a password+2factor. I have a long but memorable password that I just type in. I don't have some obtuse password where I require a password manager to log-in, I refuse to use the suggested password that chrome generates. What is the point of a password I don't remember? I am going to link this helpful xkcd comic https://xkcd.com/936/ https://xkcd.com/936/ that was published August 10, 2011 that is still relevant.
  - stetrain 4y ago
    If you type your password into a device you don’t own, what value is left in the password? Shouldn’t you basically consider it compromised at that point? If you rely on remembering your passwords, do you also keep them unique for every website?
    - brookst 4y ago
      It’s easy to have memorable and unique passwords for every website. You just create a personal hash algorithm to derive a password from the site name. For instance: number of letters in site name + second letter of site name in caps + last letter of site name + number of repeat letters in site name + (! if even number of letters, * if odd) + capitalized first letter google.com = 6Oe1!G bestbuy.com = 7Ey0*B Longer rules than that, but once you remember than you can derive the password for any site. If an adversary gets a few of your passwords and the sites they’re for, it would be easy to crack the rules. But that’s not an attack vector that typical hackers are exploring.

FeistySkink 4y ago

What's wrong with any of the existing methods of logging into my laptop?

deleted 4y ago
[deleted]