I appreciate your reasoned reply in the face of my (sometimes) animated post! (I hope you could tell, even through the flattened nuance of a forum post, that I

I appreciate your reasoned reply in the face of my (sometimes) animated post! (I hope you could tell, even through the flattened nuance of a forum post, that I was having a little fun and not being a jerk.) However, I think that we really are in disagreement. There was some government policy that was bad for the market (easy money leading to bad lending) but the creation of credit default swaps certainly has to fall under "the (real) market." This is my point about the No True Scotsman fallacy. Buying a credit default swap certainly had to be a bad idea from the very beginning. You're insuring an asset that you don't (necessarily have to) own. This falls right under the classical definition of a "Moral Hazard." However, they were bought by the very agents (or at least agents indistinguishable by market theory from the actual agents) that compose the market that is now correcting itself. The agents were incapable of seeing the disaster ahead. This either means that they weren't rational (in which case we don't have a 'market') or that they were rational (in which case free markets really did get us into this mess). I don't know which is more frightening. The analogy is often made that free markets allow a kind of evolution to occur. The fitness function is profitability/solvency, and the organisms are investors, organizations, consumers, et al. I think this is a great analogy, but it does have some interesting implications. Fraud happens in nature (caterpillars that mimic ant pheromones to invade ant nests). Boom/bust cycles happen in nature (algal blooms, even in the absence of agricultural runoff). Parasitism happens in nature. All of these things have market analogues. Indeed, all of those analogues figure highly in the current debacle. While "[h]eavily socialist systems can shield people from the truth of a problem," they can also shield people from the worst of market excesses. There doesn't seem, to me at least, to be any kind of fundamental reason why regulation and government action, socialist or otherwise, either has to shield people from truth or is incapable of shielding people from what could turn out to be very dire consequences. Free markets won't [languish indefinitely] The Krugman article I mentioned (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/mushy.html http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/mushy.html) actually talks about a case in which a free market will languish indefinitely, namely, if nobody knows to expect any better than they're currently getting. This is just one of the many consequences of the fact that the agents that compose real markets differ significantly from the rational agents of classical economics. I mean, presumably, people who advocate for free markets aren't heartless and bloodthirsty. They advocate, fundamentally, because they want what's best for everybody. I think it's important for them, in light of their desire to do good, to take an honest look at the limitations of the theory and ask, "Are we going to get what's best for everybody by blindly implementing classical economic theory with disregard for the differences between the model and reality? Or are we going to do better by implementing it only so far as it goes and then putting other systems in place to ameliorate the worst of its excesses in the fairest manner we can find?" This is fundamentally a philosophical question, not an economic one.