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> Once the feature exists your local data might become accessible to a government warrant, which would make the iPhone the opposite of a privacy oriented device
by brookst 4y ago
> Once the feature exists your local data might become accessible to a government warrant, which would make the iPhone the opposite of a privacy oriented device
Why does that dystopia require on device scanning? Why couldn't they just do it with an OS update today? It's not a reasonably slippery slope, given the actual mechanics of how the CSAM system was designed (perceptual image hashes, not access to arbitrary files)
> There's no reason to use customer's CPU/battery against them.
That's the better argument, but still not super strong. On-device scanning means you know and can verify what hashes are being scanned for, who is providing them, and when they change. Cloud scanning is a complete black box. None of us would know if Google was doing ad-hoc scans of particular users' photos at the behest of random LEOs.
- unityByFreedom 4y ago> Why couldn't they just do it with an OS update today? See my comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33903825 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33903825 > None of us would know if Google was doing ad-hoc scans of particular users' photos at the behest of random LEOs. Not your device, not your software. You should assume anything you upload unencrypted is scanned. This distinction was clearly voiced by the majority during the debacle of Apple's on-device scanning proposal. They basically said, "Scanning in the cloud is [choose one: fine, skeezy], but we draw the line at doing on-device scans. I don't want that software on my device."