11 ms·

They also appear to have killed the crazy part of scanning on device. That’s the crazy part, not scanning in iCloud.

billyhoffman 4y ago
They were wanting to implement end-to-end encryption for Photos and iCloud backups (both announced today). Scanning uploaded data in the cloud for CSAM wouldn’t work then. Hence on device scanning
- unityByFreedom 4y ago
  But they backtracked on on-device scanning. So that's not happening unless I missed something. There was a huge outcry when they proposed that.
  - Gigachad 4y ago
    That was just for scanning photos in general. Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different.
    - unityByFreedom 4y ago
      > That was just for scanning photos in general. Are you trolling? What Federighi proposed before was scanning "for CSAM" on device [1]. Same angle. > Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different. Please elaborate. How is it better to force users to run software they don't want than to let them decide whether or not to have their photos scanned when they choose to upload them to the cloud? Anyway it's a false dichotomy. Apple isn't doing on-device scanning, and now they've announced they won't do it in the cloud either. [1] https://youtu.be/OQUO1DSwYN0?t=426 https://youtu.be/OQUO1DSwYN0?t=426
      - Gigachad 4y ago
        iOS is closed source. Literally every part is unverifiable and "forced". I have no way of proving that my iphone isn't and hasn't always been scanning my photos. But I don't have the time or energy to care about that, I've decided that using an Apple product is safer than an Android I didn't audit (which is essentially impossible). By scanning on device it enables the possibility of end to end encryption which reduces the risk of a hack or bug exposing my photos.
        webmobdev 4y ago
        Yes, this whole thing is just another public relation exercise of "Apple cares about your privacy" bullshit when they are actually saying that they still plan to scan your device for CSAM. "End to end" encryption of backup on iCloud is also a joke when they are going to store the encryption keys on the iDevices on which you can run no other system software apart from the closed source ones provide by Apple.
        Sporktacular 4y ago
        Nope. This is a step forward for privacy.
        mildmotive 4y ago
        How is having a hash-based scanner a step forward for privacy compared to not having one?
        Sporktacular 4y ago
        Meant end-to-end encryption, as mentioned by poster, is a step forward. Even if the devices aren't running OSS.
        mildmotive 4y ago
        Ah sorry, yes I agree.
    - naasking 4y ago
      > Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different. I own my device, I don't own their cloud. That's a big difference. Don't co-opt my property to do work you want done. Data stored on your servers is your business, so doing the checking there is fine, as long using them isn't mandatory.
      - Gigachad 4y ago
        They can't do the check there because clearly they had already been working on encrypting the data end to end making that impossible. So the middle ground was end to end encryption with on device scanning which is a step up from no encryption. Somehow we ended up with the best option of no scanning at all which is nice.
        beeboop 4y ago
        He knows they can't do it server-side with E2E. That's his point. Apple can scan my encrypted files all they want.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
infotogivenm 4y ago
My understanding was: it was only ever scanning things on the client that were uploaded to iCloud Photos, in the same exact way they are scanned server-side today but arguably a step more “transparently” for the user (at least if the user is a reverse engineer, heh). What was crazy about this? The media outrage around the PR was incoherent to me at the time, and it seemed no one took any time to understand the present realities or details.
- mindslight 4y ago
  The crazy part is forcing a user to run software that undermines their own interests, on a device they purportedly own that is likely a huge part of their life. Software running on a computer should represent that computer owner's interest, period. Apple can run software that represents Apple's interests on their own servers.
  - brookst 4y ago
    Meh. Running it on device means that it is narrowly scoped and transparent. There is no way to secretly add a new hash or to vary what you're searching for depending on a user's location or identity. Running it on their servers means nobody knows how expansive the scans are, and there is nothing preventing ad-hoc scans for arbitrary content for individual users.
  - sitzkrieg 4y ago
    users havent owned devices in quite a while in this space
  - ec109685 4y ago
    The software uploaded an encrypted fingerprint as metadata as part of every photo. The actual scanning and apple self-interest all happened server side.
    - mindslight 4y ago
      Truthfully generating that fingerprint is not in the user's interest. User representing software would skip doing that. If the storage service required it, it would generate plausible dummy values.
RC_ITR 4y ago
What’s always so interesting about this then is what’s the point? Apple catches the least sophisticated of criminals who don’t know how to turn off iCloud (likely the least harmful nodes in this network of horror)? And to accomplish that all we have to put up with is a huge lack of privacy and tons of false positives?
- unityByFreedom 4y ago
  The point of encryption is obviously privacy.
  - RC_ITR 4y ago
    The question was obviously “What’s the point of only scanning the cloud?”
    - unityByFreedom 4y ago
      I don't understand your question. Are you arguing in favor of on-device scanning? Or arguing against all scanning? Perhaps easier, what do you think they should be doing?
      - RC_ITR 4y ago
        Yea? Either commit and say “scanning for CSAM is the top priority” and scan on device or say “privacy is the top priority” and don’t scan at all. I’m literally saying this halfway path is the worst of both worlds, since people still lose privacy, but very little meaningful progress against csam will be made.
- theshrike79 4y ago
  The point was to encrypt all iCloud data so that Apple could not give access to it to authorities. Now the authorities can go "there might be CP in there, think of the children!" and a judge will give them the warrant. On-device check agains KNOWN CP checksums + E2EE encrypted iCloud -> authorities need to get the actual phone, they can't just go looking around on people's iCloud accounts to see if they might find something.
nojito 4y ago
Scanning on iCloud is infinitely worse.
- unityByFreedom 4y ago
  On what basis? I'd really like to hear your justification. Please include as many details as possible.
  - fiddlerwoaroof 4y ago
    Scanning on iCloud means that Apple can see the content of all your scannable data in iCloud. Scanning on-device is compatible with Apple never having access to your data in an unencrypted format. If Apple has a legal obligation to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM/etc. then either you have to scan on device before upload _or_ you have to store iCloud data without E2E encryption. From a privacy perspective, on-device scanning before upload is obviously better.
    - magicjosh 4y ago
      " If Apple has a legal obligation to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM/etc" My understanding is in the USA companies like Apple cannot be legally obligated to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM. Something about the US Constitution, but I can't remember what. Apple is legally obligated to report CSAM if they come across it themselves though. This appears to be the case in Europe as well. But may not always be that way. The EU appears to be working on legislation that can compel cloud providers to scan for CSAM: https://9to5mac.com/2022/05/11/apples-csam-troubles-may-be-back-as-eu-plans-a-law-requiring-detection/ https://9to5mac.com/2022/05/11/apples-csam-troubles-may-be-b... Welcome sources on this from others. Last time I dug into this was a year ago.
      - unityByFreedom 4y ago
        > Something about the US Constitution, but I can't remember what. The first amendment comes into play. The government cannot compel Apple to write software in a certain way, such as "write your encryption so you have keys that access all of users' data". That would be "compelled speech". So if the government provides Apple with a warrant, Apple can only provide encrypted or whatever meta information they have, not decrypted content.
miohtama 4y ago
> Additionally, the core of the protection is Communication Safety for Messages, which caregivers can set up to provide a warning and resources to children if they receive or attempt to send photos that contain nudity. No, it’s definitely still there.
- unityByFreedom 4y ago
  Messages sent through Apple's systems are not "on-device" scanning. Different topic.
- pavon 4y ago
  That was announced at the same time, but is different from what the parent is talking about. One program scans photos that were about to be messaged and if they look like nudity asks "are you sure you want to do that" (and also optionally notified the parents, although it looks like they aren't going through with that part). The scanning happens on device, and the results of the scanning are never sent to Apple or any other third party. The other program scanned all images that were being uploaded to iCloud and if it found any that matched a government maintained image fingerprint database would notify Apple who would forward that information to the government. Big difference in scope and impact.
lathiat 4y ago
EDIT: Whether or not Apple should be scanning for CSAM in some way is an entirely separate argument to whether it should be "on device" or "in cloud". That's not obvious, so my explanation below explains why that is the case. I disagree. On-device scanning is desirable here and scanning it in iCloud though the industry-norm, is not desirable. Apple specifically stated they would only scan the photos being uploaded to iCloud [1] and not local photos which were not being uploaded. Most cloud storage providers are scanning in the cloud, this necessitates a workflow where both the photos and decryption keys are accessible by the same server and that there is a security workflow to request the users decryption keys without the user involved (by way of their account password, or other enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure only the real user can access such keys, Apple has previously detailed Hardware HSM enforced details of that for iCloud in their Apple Platform Security guide [2]). By extension that opens up the potential for a malicious employee or third-party to either intercept those photos while being scanned or otherwise allows a workflow that could be exploited to request the keys and photos. This is a major loss of security and privacy which Apple is specifically and intentionally designing to avoid. Until now iCloud Backups were a major weakness in that story however they also today announced they are fixing that [3]. Hence: the on-device scanning was just an entirely technical solution to scanning "only photos uploaded to icloud" (like everyone else) while also "ensuring some server in icloud can't decrypt your photos". You could of course argue that it makes a later change of policy to scan local-only photos easier. While this is true, Apple could decide to add code to iOS to do anything they want at any time, so they could just decide to do that anyway, even if they were scanning iCloud photos in the cloud. At the same time, by not scanning them in the cloud, they have a technical solution to ensure it's much harder for a malicious actor to get unauthorised access to iCloud user photos. Because there is no place/server that is "supposed" to be able to access both the photos and the keys. [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_... [2] https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-sec... [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33897793 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33897793 "Apple introduces end-to-end encryption for backups"
- formerly_proven 4y ago
GeekyBear 4y ago
Scanning in the cloud can be just as problematic. Google is not just scanning for known examples of kiddie porn, they are scanning for images of naked children, and reporting parents to the police. for instance, they tried to get a parent arrested for using their Android phone to get medical assistance for their child during lockdown. >With help from the photos, the doctor diagnosed the issue and prescribed antibiotics, which quickly cleared it up. But the episode left Mark with a much larger problem, one that would cost him more than a decade of contacts, emails and photos, and make him the target of a police investigation. “I knew that these companies were watching and that privacy is not what we would hope it to be,” Mark said. “But I haven’t done anything wrong.” The police agreed. Google did not. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveillance-toddler-photo.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveil...
- autoexec 4y ago
  I wouldn't be surprised if Microsoft wasn't doing the same thing with photos viewed in their default Photo app (The names of the images viewed in that app are sent as telemetry already along with the times they were viewed and how long each image was left open). Windows defender may even be checking the files it scans for whatever content MS considers objectionable. We likely wouldn't won't know unless it becomes a news story or a whistleblower tells us.
  - GeekyBear 4y ago
    > I wouldn't be surprised if Microsoft wasn't doing the same thing with photos viewed in their default Photo app Google has apparently shared their algorithm with others, but only Facebook was mentioned by name. >in 2018, Google developed an artificially intelligent tool that could recognize never-before-seen exploitative images of children. That meant finding not just known images of abused children but images of unknown victims who could potentially be rescued by the authorities. Google made its technology available to other companies, including Facebook. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveillance-toddler-photo.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveil...
  - soulofmischief 4y ago
brookst 4y ago
Scanning in cloud is far more problematic. There is not transparency at all about what's being scanned for or when new things are added to the scan.
webmobdev 4y ago
They haven't really - I logged in to specifically post about that. Like you pointed out, the real outrage was never about scanning for CSAM in the "cloud" but on your device. And this clever fluff of public relation exercise by Apple is just to cover up the fact that device scanning for CSAM is still in the picture. Communication Safety for Messages is opt-in and analyzes image attachments users send and receive on their devices to determine whether a photo contains nudity ... The company told WIRED that while it is not ready to announce a specific timeline for expanding its Communication Safety features, the company is working on adding the ability to detect nudity in videos sent through Messages when the protection is enabled. .... “Additionally, because the minor is typically sending newly or recently created images, it is unlikely that such images would be detected by other technology, such as Photo DNA. While the vast majority of online CSAM is created by someone in the victim’s circle of trust, which may not be captured by the type of scanning mentioned, combatting the online sexual abuse and exploitation of children requires technology companies to innovate and create new tools. Scanning for CSAM before the material is sent by a child’s device is one of these such tools and can help limit the scope of the problem.” As for the newly announced "end-to-end encryption" on iCloud, note that the keys will be stored on the iDevices, and as such, available to Apple through its software anytime. This is exactly why the US government and BigTech have been pushing for "passwordless" authentication so strongly. It's no coincidence that Microsoft suddenly started asking for TPM to run Windows. With "passwordless" authentication, we will even lose control over the digital keys that allow us to encrypt and access various services, and BigTech becomes in charge. Yes, I am being very cynical here for 2 major reasons - (1) Governments around the world want control and access to our device, and BigTech can deliver. This is not an Apple or Google problem, this is a social and democratic problem that we need to fight politically with the government by demanding stringent data protection and privacy laws. (2) Apple is a corporate who needs to be profitable. Collecting data and selling it (either to the government through programs like PRISM or to advertisers through a platform is a very lucrative source of revenue. Anybody who things Apple will let go of billions of dollars from that is delusional (and that is exactly why Apple is pivoting to become a service company). Apple's history when it comes to invading its user's privacy is just as bad as Google's or Facebook.

They were wanting to implement end-to-end encryption for Photos and iCloud backups (both announced today). Scanning uploaded data in the cloud for CSAM wouldn’t work then. Hence on device scanning

unityByFreedom 4y ago
But they backtracked on on-device scanning. So that's not happening unless I missed something. There was a huge outcry when they proposed that.
- Gigachad 4y ago
  That was just for scanning photos in general. Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different.
  - unityByFreedom 4y ago
    > That was just for scanning photos in general. Are you trolling? What Federighi proposed before was scanning "for CSAM" on device [1]. Same angle. > Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different. Please elaborate. How is it better to force users to run software they don't want than to let them decide whether or not to have their photos scanned when they choose to upload them to the cloud? Anyway it's a false dichotomy. Apple isn't doing on-device scanning, and now they've announced they won't do it in the cloud either. [1] https://youtu.be/OQUO1DSwYN0?t=426 https://youtu.be/OQUO1DSwYN0?t=426
    - Gigachad 4y ago
      iOS is closed source. Literally every part is unverifiable and "forced". I have no way of proving that my iphone isn't and hasn't always been scanning my photos. But I don't have the time or energy to care about that, I've decided that using an Apple product is safer than an Android I didn't audit (which is essentially impossible). By scanning on device it enables the possibility of end to end encryption which reduces the risk of a hack or bug exposing my photos.
      - webmobdev 4y ago
        Yes, this whole thing is just another public relation exercise of "Apple cares about your privacy" bullshit when they are actually saying that they still plan to scan your device for CSAM. "End to end" encryption of backup on iCloud is also a joke when they are going to store the encryption keys on the iDevices on which you can run no other system software apart from the closed source ones provide by Apple.
        Sporktacular 4y ago
        Nope. This is a step forward for privacy.
        mildmotive 4y ago
        How is having a hash-based scanner a step forward for privacy compared to not having one?
        Sporktacular 4y ago
        Meant end-to-end encryption, as mentioned by poster, is a step forward. Even if the devices aren't running OSS.
        mildmotive 4y ago
        Ah sorry, yes I agree.
  - naasking 4y ago
    > Doing it on device is probably preferable to on cloud and at worst no different. I own my device, I don't own their cloud. That's a big difference. Don't co-opt my property to do work you want done. Data stored on your servers is your business, so doing the checking there is fine, as long using them isn't mandatory.
    - Gigachad 4y ago
      They can't do the check there because clearly they had already been working on encrypting the data end to end making that impossible. So the middle ground was end to end encryption with on device scanning which is a step up from no encryption. Somehow we ended up with the best option of no scanning at all which is nice.
      - beeboop 4y ago
        He knows they can't do it server-side with E2E. That's his point. Apple can scan my encrypted files all they want.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]

infotogivenm 4y ago

My understanding was: it was only ever scanning things on the client that were uploaded to iCloud Photos, in the same exact way they are scanned server-side today but arguably a step more “transparently” for the user (at least if the user is a reverse engineer, heh). What was crazy about this? The media outrage around the PR was incoherent to me at the time, and it seemed no one took any time to understand the present realities or details.

mindslight 4y ago
The crazy part is forcing a user to run software that undermines their own interests, on a device they purportedly own that is likely a huge part of their life. Software running on a computer should represent that computer owner's interest, period. Apple can run software that represents Apple's interests on their own servers.
- brookst 4y ago
  Meh. Running it on device means that it is narrowly scoped and transparent. There is no way to secretly add a new hash or to vary what you're searching for depending on a user's location or identity. Running it on their servers means nobody knows how expansive the scans are, and there is nothing preventing ad-hoc scans for arbitrary content for individual users.
- sitzkrieg 4y ago
  users havent owned devices in quite a while in this space
- ec109685 4y ago
  The software uploaded an encrypted fingerprint as metadata as part of every photo. The actual scanning and apple self-interest all happened server side.
  - mindslight 4y ago
    Truthfully generating that fingerprint is not in the user's interest. User representing software would skip doing that. If the storage service required it, it would generate plausible dummy values.

RC_ITR 4y ago

What’s always so interesting about this then is what’s the point? Apple catches the least sophisticated of criminals who don’t know how to turn off iCloud (likely the least harmful nodes in this network of horror)? And to accomplish that all we have to put up with is a huge lack of privacy and tons of false positives?

unityByFreedom 4y ago
The point of encryption is obviously privacy.
- RC_ITR 4y ago
  The question was obviously “What’s the point of only scanning the cloud?”
  - unityByFreedom 4y ago
    I don't understand your question. Are you arguing in favor of on-device scanning? Or arguing against all scanning? Perhaps easier, what do you think they should be doing?
    - RC_ITR 4y ago
      Yea? Either commit and say “scanning for CSAM is the top priority” and scan on device or say “privacy is the top priority” and don’t scan at all. I’m literally saying this halfway path is the worst of both worlds, since people still lose privacy, but very little meaningful progress against csam will be made.
theshrike79 4y ago
The point was to encrypt all iCloud data so that Apple could not give access to it to authorities. Now the authorities can go "there might be CP in there, think of the children!" and a judge will give them the warrant. On-device check agains KNOWN CP checksums + E2EE encrypted iCloud -> authorities need to get the actual phone, they can't just go looking around on people's iCloud accounts to see if they might find something.

nojito 4y ago

Scanning on iCloud is infinitely worse.

unityByFreedom 4y ago
On what basis? I'd really like to hear your justification. Please include as many details as possible.
- fiddlerwoaroof 4y ago
  Scanning on iCloud means that Apple can see the content of all your scannable data in iCloud. Scanning on-device is compatible with Apple never having access to your data in an unencrypted format. If Apple has a legal obligation to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM/etc. then either you have to scan on device before upload _or_ you have to store iCloud data without E2E encryption. From a privacy perspective, on-device scanning before upload is obviously better.
  - magicjosh 4y ago
    " If Apple has a legal obligation to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM/etc" My understanding is in the USA companies like Apple cannot be legally obligated to ensure that iCloud does not store CSAM. Something about the US Constitution, but I can't remember what. Apple is legally obligated to report CSAM if they come across it themselves though. This appears to be the case in Europe as well. But may not always be that way. The EU appears to be working on legislation that can compel cloud providers to scan for CSAM: https://9to5mac.com/2022/05/11/apples-csam-troubles-may-be-back-as-eu-plans-a-law-requiring-detection/ https://9to5mac.com/2022/05/11/apples-csam-troubles-may-be-b... Welcome sources on this from others. Last time I dug into this was a year ago.
    - unityByFreedom 4y ago
      > Something about the US Constitution, but I can't remember what. The first amendment comes into play. The government cannot compel Apple to write software in a certain way, such as "write your encryption so you have keys that access all of users' data". That would be "compelled speech". So if the government provides Apple with a warrant, Apple can only provide encrypted or whatever meta information they have, not decrypted content.

miohtama 4y ago

> Additionally, the core of the protection is Communication Safety for Messages, which caregivers can set up to provide a warning and resources to children if they receive or attempt to send photos that contain nudity. No, it’s definitely still there.

unityByFreedom 4y ago
Messages sent through Apple's systems are not "on-device" scanning. Different topic.
pavon 4y ago
That was announced at the same time, but is different from what the parent is talking about. One program scans photos that were about to be messaged and if they look like nudity asks "are you sure you want to do that" (and also optionally notified the parents, although it looks like they aren't going through with that part). The scanning happens on device, and the results of the scanning are never sent to Apple or any other third party. The other program scanned all images that were being uploaded to iCloud and if it found any that matched a government maintained image fingerprint database would notify Apple who would forward that information to the government. Big difference in scope and impact.

lathiat 4y ago

EDIT: Whether or not Apple should be scanning for CSAM in some way is an entirely separate argument to whether it should be "on device" or "in cloud". That's not obvious, so my explanation below explains why that is the case. I disagree. On-device scanning is desirable here and scanning it in iCloud though the industry-norm, is not desirable. Apple specifically stated they would only scan the photos being uploaded to iCloud [1] and not local photos which were not being uploaded. Most cloud storage providers are scanning in the cloud, this necessitates a workflow where both the photos and decryption keys are accessible by the same server and that there is a security workflow to request the users decryption keys without the user involved (by way of their account password, or other enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure only the real user can access such keys, Apple has previously detailed Hardware HSM enforced details of that for iCloud in their Apple Platform Security guide [2]). By extension that opens up the potential for a malicious employee or third-party to either intercept those photos while being scanned or otherwise allows a workflow that could be exploited to request the keys and photos. This is a major loss of security and privacy which Apple is specifically and intentionally designing to avoid. Until now iCloud Backups were a major weakness in that story however they also today announced they are fixing that [3]. Hence: the on-device scanning was just an entirely technical solution to scanning "only photos uploaded to icloud" (like everyone else) while also "ensuring some server in icloud can't decrypt your photos". You could of course argue that it makes a later change of policy to scan local-only photos easier. While this is true, Apple could decide to add code to iOS to do anything they want at any time, so they could just decide to do that anyway, even if they were scanning iCloud photos in the cloud. At the same time, by not scanning them in the cloud, they have a technical solution to ensure it's much harder for a malicious actor to get unauthorised access to iCloud user photos. Because there is no place/server that is "supposed" to be able to access both the photos and the keys. [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_... [2] https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-sec... [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33897793 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33897793 "Apple introduces end-to-end encryption for backups"

formerly_proven 4y ago

GeekyBear 4y ago

Scanning in the cloud can be just as problematic. Google is not just scanning for known examples of kiddie porn, they are scanning for images of naked children, and reporting parents to the police. for instance, they tried to get a parent arrested for using their Android phone to get medical assistance for their child during lockdown. >With help from the photos, the doctor diagnosed the issue and prescribed antibiotics, which quickly cleared it up. But the episode left Mark with a much larger problem, one that would cost him more than a decade of contacts, emails and photos, and make him the target of a police investigation. “I knew that these companies were watching and that privacy is not what we would hope it to be,” Mark said. “But I haven’t done anything wrong.” The police agreed. Google did not. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveillance-toddler-photo.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveil...

autoexec 4y ago
I wouldn't be surprised if Microsoft wasn't doing the same thing with photos viewed in their default Photo app (The names of the images viewed in that app are sent as telemetry already along with the times they were viewed and how long each image was left open). Windows defender may even be checking the files it scans for whatever content MS considers objectionable. We likely wouldn't won't know unless it becomes a news story or a whistleblower tells us.
- GeekyBear 4y ago
  > I wouldn't be surprised if Microsoft wasn't doing the same thing with photos viewed in their default Photo app Google has apparently shared their algorithm with others, but only Facebook was mentioned by name. >in 2018, Google developed an artificially intelligent tool that could recognize never-before-seen exploitative images of children. That meant finding not just known images of abused children but images of unknown victims who could potentially be rescued by the authorities. Google made its technology available to other companies, including Facebook. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveillance-toddler-photo.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveil...
- soulofmischief 4y ago

brookst 4y ago

Scanning in cloud is far more problematic. There is not transparency at all about what's being scanned for or when new things are added to the scan.

webmobdev 4y ago

They haven't really - I logged in to specifically post about that. Like you pointed out, the real outrage was never about scanning for CSAM in the "cloud" but on your device. And this clever fluff of public relation exercise by Apple is just to cover up the fact that device scanning for CSAM is still in the picture. Communication Safety for Messages is opt-in and analyzes image attachments users send and receive on their devices to determine whether a photo contains nudity ... The company told WIRED that while it is not ready to announce a specific timeline for expanding its Communication Safety features, the company is working on adding the ability to detect nudity in videos sent through Messages when the protection is enabled. .... “Additionally, because the minor is typically sending newly or recently created images, it is unlikely that such images would be detected by other technology, such as Photo DNA. While the vast majority of online CSAM is created by someone in the victim’s circle of trust, which may not be captured by the type of scanning mentioned, combatting the online sexual abuse and exploitation of children requires technology companies to innovate and create new tools. Scanning for CSAM before the material is sent by a child’s device is one of these such tools and can help limit the scope of the problem.” As for the newly announced "end-to-end encryption" on iCloud, note that the keys will be stored on the iDevices, and as such, available to Apple through its software anytime. This is exactly why the US government and BigTech have been pushing for "passwordless" authentication so strongly. It's no coincidence that Microsoft suddenly started asking for TPM to run Windows. With "passwordless" authentication, we will even lose control over the digital keys that allow us to encrypt and access various services, and BigTech becomes in charge. Yes, I am being very cynical here for 2 major reasons - (1) Governments around the world want control and access to our device, and BigTech can deliver. This is not an Apple or Google problem, this is a social and democratic problem that we need to fight politically with the government by demanding stringent data protection and privacy laws. (2) Apple is a corporate who needs to be profitable. Collecting data and selling it (either to the government through programs like PRISM or to advertisers through a platform is a very lucrative source of revenue. Anybody who things Apple will let go of billions of dollars from that is delusional (and that is exactly why Apple is pivoting to become a service company). Apple's history when it comes to invading its user's privacy is just as bad as Google's or Facebook.