4 ms·
I reject the second clause, in accepting the first clause. There is no sanity clause. "no first use" here is HIGHLY qualified: it's not "only use nuclear as re
by ggm 4y ago
I reject the second clause, in accepting the first clause. There is no sanity clause.
"no first use" here is HIGHLY qualified: it's not "only use nuclear as retaliation for nuclear attack" it's "only use nuclear as retaliation for an attack on Russia" and in some readings of Putin's intent, the claimed territories ARE russia, so he has a trigger any time he wants to use it, in his own twisted logic.
The history of who claimed or disclaimed first-use since 1945 is itself fascinating. MAD at times depended on force posture being.. ambiguous.
The Ukrainian attacks on long range bomber infrastructure partially impacts Russian ability to launch airborne nuclear weapons. These are more tactical than strategic, but are precisely the expected first use in some scenarios (I believe EMP take-out of communications was usually held up as the "real" first use)
The closer an attack on infrastructure comes to Moscow or St Petersburg, or to industrial/electrical infrastructure, the more likely it is Putin will claim a NATO backed attack on Russia: precisely the situation his "no first use except" clause is aimed at.
This is not to seek to undermine what the Ukrainians are doing: If you want to fight an asymmetric war with highly motivated people and attack their deep production and generation facilities (which is what Putin's forces are doing) and lay waste to people's housing (likewise) coming in to winter, you should expect something to happen inside your own mother-russia territory.