4 ms·

>The abandoned plan was perceptual hashing, which should return the same hash for very similar photos . . . Is there any proof they actually abandoned this? Ne

by drbawb 4y ago

>The abandoned plan was perceptual hashing, which should return the same hash for very similar photos . . . Is there any proof they actually abandoned this? NeuralHash seems alive and well in iOS 16[1]. Supposedly the rest of the machinery around comparing these hashes to a blind database, encrypting those matches, and sending them to Apple et al. to be reviewed has all been axed. However that's not exactly trivial to verify since Photos is closed source. [1]: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/find-and-delete-duplicate-photos-and-videos-iph1978d9c23/ios https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/find-and-delete-dupli...

TimTheTinker 4y ago
Anything over a network can be decrypted and inspected with a MITM proxy (manually adding its root certificate to the trust store), as long as only TLS (no application-level encryption) is being used.
- lxgr 4y ago
  As far as I remember, iOS native apps and services now either consistently use CA pinning or largely don't respect user-added CAs.
  - azinman2 4y ago
    There are a multitude of ways to inspect the decrypted traffic of your own device, whether it's a jailbroken iPhone provided by Apple to the security community or a non-kosher jailbroken device. People inspect this traffic all the time.
  - manmal 4y ago
    No. Install Charles Proxy (iOS app) and see what you can get of the MITM proxy it ships with. Many apps don’t ship with pinning.
    - soziawa 4y ago
      But most importantly the whole OS and all of the integrated apps do use pinning.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- drbawb 4y ago
  > . . . as long as only TLS (no application-level encryption) is being used. Therein lies the rub: the payload itself is protected by an encryption scheme where the keys are intentionally being withheld by either party. In the case of Apple's proposed CSAM detection Apple would be withholding the secret in the form of the unblinded database's derivation key. In the case of Advanced Data Protection the user's key lives in the SEP, unknown to Apple. By design the interior of the "safety vouchers" cannot be inspected, supposedly not even by Apple, unless you are in possession of (a) dozens of matching vouchers and (b) the unblinded database. So on the wire you're just going to see opaque encrypted containers representing a photo destined for iCloud.
miohtama 4y ago
Apple does not need scan your photos on a server, because they now can do it on a device.

by drbawb 4y ago

TimTheTinker 4y ago

Anything over a network can be decrypted and inspected with a MITM proxy (manually adding its root certificate to the trust store), as long as only TLS (no application-level encryption) is being used.

lxgr 4y ago
As far as I remember, iOS native apps and services now either consistently use CA pinning or largely don't respect user-added CAs.
- azinman2 4y ago
  There are a multitude of ways to inspect the decrypted traffic of your own device, whether it's a jailbroken iPhone provided by Apple to the security community or a non-kosher jailbroken device. People inspect this traffic all the time.
- manmal 4y ago
  No. Install Charles Proxy (iOS app) and see what you can get of the MITM proxy it ships with. Many apps don’t ship with pinning.
  - soziawa 4y ago
    But most importantly the whole OS and all of the integrated apps do use pinning.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
drbawb 4y ago
> . . . as long as only TLS (no application-level encryption) is being used. Therein lies the rub: the payload itself is protected by an encryption scheme where the keys are intentionally being withheld by either party. In the case of Apple's proposed CSAM detection Apple would be withholding the secret in the form of the unblinded database's derivation key. In the case of Advanced Data Protection the user's key lives in the SEP, unknown to Apple. By design the interior of the "safety vouchers" cannot be inspected, supposedly not even by Apple, unless you are in possession of (a) dozens of matching vouchers and (b) the unblinded database. So on the wire you're just going to see opaque encrypted containers representing a photo destined for iCloud.

miohtama 4y ago

Apple does not need scan your photos on a server, because they now can do it on a device.